ORIGINAL 11 January 1946.

THE ROLE OF COMPUTEDATION INTELLIGENCE

SUBMARINS WARFARS IN THE PACIFIC

[January, 1943 - Cotober, 1943]

AOLARS AT

The Contributions of Communication Intelligence to the Operations of the Commander of the United States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(July, 1943)

11 January 1948

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER VII (July 1943)

Introduction
(Chart A - graph comparing Jap tonnage
sunk with the number of Jap messages
decrypted from Tune 1942 to end of 1944 v)
(Chart B - analysis of submarine action
resulting from ultra intelligence, de-
rived from decrypted messages, January
through October 1943iz-izal
Analysis and Chart of Results Derived from
Ultra Intelligence for July 1943 I-25
열하는 눈으로 가장 그런 한 사람들은 환경한 그렇게 없었다고 하는 눈이 있다. 경기를 가지 않게 걸린 점점
Chapter VII (July 2-30, 1943) 27-91
Appendir VII 92-361
teriori della comi di colori della dilla dilla di colori di colori di colori di colori di colori di colori dilla
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Home of the Pacific

INTRODUCTION

This volume

is one

of a Series of historical studies which will be devoted to an attempt to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to submarine commanders operating under the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. It is hoped that correlation and interpretation of the source material available in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the United States Naval Communication Intelligence organization will produce valuable lessons for the future.

1943 was selected as a beginning point for this series since it was an outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. Furthermore, since the records for this period are more complete than those of 1941 and 1942, it was felt that a more accurate appraisal of the worth of communication intelligence could be made.

During this period all American submarines operating below the equator and east of longitude 130° were under the command of Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet; all submarine operations above the equator and west of longitude 130° E were the direct responsibility of the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The relationship of communication intelligence to the operations of submarines under the Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet, will be discussed in a different series, when research in the operational files of the command can be effected.

War II which received so little attention as the campaign waged so successfully in the Pacific by the submarines of the United States Mayy. Co-ordinated attacks by American submarines and air fleets from 1941 to 1945 resulted in the destruction of most of the Japanese merchant fleet, the crippling of Japanese industry by cutting off its source of supply, the hampering of Japanese Army and Navy movements, and the isolation of many Japanese garrisons. The destruction of over six million tors of merchant shipping meant that Japan could not


effect its ambition of creating an East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.

As for the part played by American submarines in the elimination of Japan as a military power, statistics indicate that the greater part of Japanese shipping was already destroyed when Allied emphibious forces seized the bases which made possible daily air strikes at Japanese home ports. Although there is no need to enter the current controversy as to whether or not the B-29's won the Japanese war, it suffices to say that the far reaching effects of United States submarine warfare in the Pacific cannot be overlooked by any objective observer. As of Angust 30, 1945, 1255 Japanese ships had been sumk by American submarines.

cuthorities were in constant communication by a direct telephone line with the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization, and the information made available to them was used to such good advantage that many targets, which otherwise might easily have slipped by the submarine patrols, were sent to the bottom of the sea. This

does not mean that American submarines were not able to operate independently and efficiently on their own account. On some occasions, when the Japanese had changed their cipher systems and for a short period of time no information could be derived from their communications, American submarines sank almost as many, if not just as many, Japanese ships as when the Japanese messages were being read. Submarine operational authorities have pointed out, however, that the information made available when the Japanese cipher messages were being read currently was of great value in the carry over period till American naval cryptanalysts solved the new Japanese cipher systems. Analysis of previously deciphered messages supplied valuable data as to the favorite routes and procedures of Japanese merchant ships, and, thus, even when the flow of intelligence decreased temporarily American submarine commanders could be directed to productive areas.

Chart A shows the relationship between the number of Japanese messages translated by American naval cryptanalysts and the tonnage of sunken Japanese shipping.



ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Though United States submerines were not always able to sight targets reported to them by communication intelligence sources, submarine authorities have attributed much of their success to information derived from enemy communications. On April 14, 1945, the Commender, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, informed the Commender-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

...High percentage of submarine sinkings is besed on ULTRA information ... (131237, MCR (1231).

On July 3, 1945, the Commander,
Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet sent the following to
the United States Naval Communication Intelligence
Organization:

"Commander Submarine Force desires to express his admiration and appreciation to the officers of ComintOrg for the splendid support and coverage given by you to the recent submarine operation in the Japan Sea. May the great success of this expedition repay you somewhat for your tireless efforts to strike this blow at the heart of the enemy's empire. It could not have been done without your help."

The use of communication intelligence helped revolutionize submarine strategy in the Pacific,

for operational authorities, because of the continuous flow of communication intelligence which they were receiving, were able to station submarines in certain areas which would not normally be considered productive of targets. Though the routes of Japanese convoys were being constantly shifted to avoid reported American submarines, the messages announcing the change of course were deciphered and made available to American submarine commanders. Thus, many otherwise unavailable targets were provided, torpedces were expended profitably, long patrols in unproductive areas were avoided, and the morale of officers and men was improved.

This volume

cutlines the relationship of Communication Intelligence to American submarines operating in the Pacific during July, 1943. Subsequent volumes will continue the story. Each volume has an appendix which contains the following material source for each case-discussed:

A. Source of Intelligence

Japanese messages deciphered and translated by the United States Haval Communication Intelligence
Organization.

B. Coerational Dispatch

A message containing the information derived from (A), sent by the Commander, Submarine Forse, Pacific Fleet to American submarines.

C. Submarine Action Record

Pertinent data extracted from the action report of the submerine or submerines concerned.

Chart B summerizes the results of action taken by United States Submarines from January through Cotober, 1943, as a result of Communication Intelligence. Another general summary of results will be made in the Volumes dealing with Movember, 1943 to December, 1944.

CHART B

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE
A SECTION OF A SEC
Grand Total - January-October 1943
Total Eumber of Potential Targets*
I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted 445
1. ComSubPac massage not received 4
2. Submarina not in area
3. Submarine pursuing other targets 86
4. Submarine in area-no contact
5. Hechanical difficulties of submarine 5
6. Rough weather-poor visibility
The same of the sa
II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted 354
1. Results of the Contact
A. Targets Sighted and Attacked
(I) Sunk
(2) Damaged56
(3) No perceptible damage 16
(4) Missed
77 Managha di alia 7 % a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked234 (I) Unfavorable position
of submarine
(2) Rough weather-poor
visibility 16
(3) Submarine attacked by
escorta 9
(4) Target showed hospital
ship markings
(5) Engaged with other
targets
(6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure4
2. Quality of the Contact
(secording to charts, Jan-Oct)
A. Positive 112
B. Probable
C. Possible24
III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown
1. 경기 호텔 이번 시간 시간 보다 보고 있는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없다.
The mumber of potential targets in each Case is
And the Court of t

CRIGINAL 15 January 1946

derived from the number in the ComSubPac Ultra dispatch.

If, however, ComSubPac did not state the number but

merely described the target as a convoy, the target is

reckoned as one (an escort is not counted unless specified

as a destroyer or a larger ship). But if the target was

sighted, then the number named in the submarine patrol

report is the number computed in the analysis. If

ComSubPac was indefinite, stating the target to be "seversi"

ships, the target, if not sighted, is counted as two. For

example, in Case 41 of October

ComSubPac described the target as "2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS

SEVERAL DESTROYERS". The target, which was not sighted,

was reckoned as four.

Thus the reckoning is often arbitrary and therefore the figures are only approximate. This applies also to the reasons given for the failure of a submarine to sight, or to attack, an Ultra target assigned to it. If none of the reasons listed in the analysis precisely cover a given case, the case is then reckoned under the most nearly equivalent reason. If two submarines are named as addressees, the reason reckoned in the analysis may be that of the first addressee (e.g., Case 23 of July-Chapter VII) or it may be the reason of the majority if three or more submarines are action addressees (Case 47 of July).

It should be noted that research in this regard was handicapped seriously by the fact that submarine commanders were under orders to omit all references to Communication Intelligence in their reports as will be seen in the following dispatchest

FROM: COMINCH TO:

CTF 17

CTF 71 . CTE 72

COMSCRIGSPAC CINCPAC

PREC: DEFERRED

SUPER SECRET I ULTRA I WAR DIARIES OF SUBMARINES BASING WEST AUSTRALLIA FOR MONTES HOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY CONTAIN NUMEROUS REFERENCES COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE X ALL MENTION THIS SOURCE MUST BE BLIMINATED FROM ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF PAST AND FUTURE DIARIES

FROM: CINCPAC COMPOPAC

18/1836 May

18/1836 Hay

PHEU: ROUTER

PASS COMENCE 181836 TO COMBOPAC FOR ACTION

FROM: CONSUMPAC ALL SUES COPYING NPM FOX 13/0935 July TO:

CINCPAC

PREC: PRICKITY

.... HEITHER ACTUALLY NOR BY IMPLICATION SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO ULTRA MESSAGES SENT BY THIS COMMAND I SAME RULE APPLIES FOR WRITING UP PATROL REPORTS

AMALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

AMALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGE	des.
AN A TO THE SECRET PLANT OF THE SECRET WINDOWS CO.	
July, 1943	
Total Number of Potential Targeta*	131
1. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted	70
The control of the co	1.5
1. ComSubPac message not received 0 2. Submarine not in area	
3. Submarine pursuing other targets 10	-
4. Submarine in area-no contact	
6. Rough seather-poor visibility 4	
II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted	58
l. Results of the Contact	
A. Targets Sighted and Attacked 20	
(2) Damaged	
(4) Missed 4	
B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked 38	
(1) Unfavorable position of submarine	
(2) Rough Weather-poor	
(3) Submarine attacked by	
escorts 7	
(4) Target showed hospital	
(5) Engaged with other targets 9 (6) Target not worth torpedo	
expenditure0	
2. Quality of the Contact	
(according to Chart-July)	
B. Probable	
C. Possible 1	
III. Humber of Potential Targets for which	
the Results are Unknown	_3
considered as but one targets.	
	1

Results of Contact(s) Comsults of Contact(s) The Hallhut sighted two The Hallhut sighted two Thy A at 8-064, 146-13E but was unable to get in position to attack. Comsubra dispatch receive The Pory sighted and attacked the convey at 060 (GCT) July 5 at 7-254, 149 35E and scored one life.	The Jack though in this area, did not aight the
Contacts Made with Paradits Positive Positive	none
45 £ £ £ £ £ 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	Two merchantness to be at the following post-tions at the times and
Submarine (1) Laftfüt Laftfüt Legy	Vacis 8.
Comfubbae Dispational Dispatches (Date-Timg) 1. 02-1149 05-1801 additional information	2. 02-1890

Onicalal. It January 1946 Results of Contact(s)	The Sturgeon was in the are but the report for July 6-1. Is unavailable at this writing.	ComSubPac dispetch recolved The Gurnard at 1.754(GCT) July 10 at 13-104, 131-55E sighted 4 ships and an escort; attacked and sank one The Minro did not assist bu sought mother Ultra target (690 Case 5). Wi 137E and 7-504.	ComSubPac dispatch received The Wings patrolled the are from July 2-10 but sighted nothing.
		F 2	
	1111 Unignous series (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	m 7	type Hone in sitions GCT given: 0300; 1500; 1900.
Type, No. of Ships, Post Claren	One merchantean will pass through 26-32H 134-30E at 0300(GCT) July 6 then through 31-05N, 134-47E to 32-10N, 134-47E to 0300(GCT) on July 7.	Convoy (Convoy O #404) vill pass through the following positions at 0300(GCT) on July 9, 10 and 11 respectively; 16-35W, 132-10E, 13-15W, 132-06E, The convoy will also pas 133-15E and may be a day The convoy should be 7 m and may be escorted.	One merchantman, type Woundmown will be in the following positions on July 9 at the GCE given: 06-15N, 145-20E, 0300; 07-30N, 148-10E, 1900.
Submarine Addressee(9)	U.f. 8. Rturegon	U.S.S. Mingo to assist if able. 7. B-1 [Inforcation]	II FINGO
ComSuppaq Operational Dispatches	7160-70	06-0551 09-1015 8cg Case 10-0840 See Case (Additional	07-0911
	•		3

ORIGINAL II January 1946 Regults of Contact(3)		Comsubbac dispatch received the Pory sighted 3 ships at 1016 (GCr) July 10 at 10-24 150-53E but DD provented attack.	The Hallbut at 1017 (GCT) at 10-374, 150-45E alghtod a carrier and cruiser, made 3 hits in the cruiser.	The Steelhoad at 10-211. 150 49E made 3 hits on the carrier.	Comsubbac dispatch received. The Ethregon at 2103(GCT) July 10 sighted a seaplane tender and DD and at 2205 sighted 2 carriers and 6 cruisors at 27-421, 137-383 but was unable to attack.
Contacts		Post tive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Type, No. of Ships,	odiu	A carrier cruisor and DD s teaving Yokosuka viii pasa through 10-264 150-53E at 0900 (GCt) July 10.			Two carriers, cruisers and DDIs from Inland Bos and a carrier from Yokosuka might rendezvous at 27-20M 137-38E (at 2100(QCT) July 10 according to Japanose dispatch)
Submarine Addressee(s)		To Starton at 10-26N	Harring to the station of the station N.W. DI	Transfer for to take at a transfer of the states S.E. of Pory	Testall Sturkeon
Comfubbac Operational Dispatches		07-0749		S.	
è	•	• 9			4

and the second s

	O Land	Radio reception extremely poor. 6-26 was at Dutch Harbor July 5-13. (8-38 was in the the ure of the Ultra target but the petrol recor prior to July 15 is unavailable at this writing.)	Comsubbac dispatch received the Mings attacked a convoy of A freighters and 2 escor at 0619 (GCT) 12 July in position 1-00%, 142-59E. It probably hit two of the freighters.	Tyed tho not	
9761	The Searnven at 2320 (GCT) all sighted this force at 27-33 137-22E and was also unable to close to attack.	treme Dutch (3-38 (3-38 ultr rol t s una	1 2 60 60 11 2 60 60 11 2 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60	Comsubbac dispatch received The flying Fish was in the area July 12-13 but did not sight the convoy.	(
QUIGINAL 1946 RESULTS Of Confact(3)	The Bearaven at 232 stanted this force 137-22E and was also to ettack	lon os 5-13. of the no pot writh	spatel tacked ors ar 01, 12, 00, 1, two	spatch Lin war. novy.	
	thyen this and o to	Sopt Suly wroa wroa but to Jul	as di figuration of the control of t	Ing I	
811 53	o 508 ghtod 7-22E clos	die r oor- f rbor the rgot dor t	Comgubbac fro Mings of 4 freigh of 6619 (G position 1- probably in freighters	maubres fly	
	全有关交流	Ha Do Thi Thi Thi Do	LEXEGIG	ನಿವ ಕೃತ್ತ	
Contacts Nade with	Posttiva	υαίου	Post tiva	0	
Con	Pos	Unkmow T)	p d	Иоле	
4		o freighter vill pass 2004 167-12E at 0300 ICT) on July 11 and 6 30 167-30E at 0300 (GCT) 119 12	11ng 150,000 14,000 11,	Three merchant ships and three escorts will pass through the following positions on July 12, 13 and 14 at 0300 (GGf);	
July 1943		25 at 0 at 0	un ships, including to Sychological first and love through the sitions on July 11. 22E and 13. 2611, 144-10E.	Three merchant ships and three escorts will pass through the following positions July 12, 13 and 14 a 0300 (GCf);	
		167-1 167-1 7-30F	uv ships, thele sold ships through the ships of the ships	eccha ce es ts th	
700 II		no frei -2004 1 GCT) on 500 1 167 uly 18	Four ships the Evolo llary and llary and llar postions postions 2-500, 138	111 pr 111 pr 111 pr 110 vr 110 (00	
Typ		81673	or Programme		
000	i s			Pfing Fish	
Bubmarine	Noarayan	200	8 8 11100	Tall I	
Tan e					
Comsubbec Operations Dispatches	2	6101-60	0780-01	1725	
Come	(Cont	60	Š	OI	
			œ ·	5	

with the second of the second

Window and white the are

Results of Contact(s) The Searaven patrolled the area July 12-15 but made no contact.	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 2100(GCT) July 14 the Tinosa sighted the force. Fired 4 torpedoes which were eveded. At 0216(GCT) July 15 the Pory sighted the force but was unable to close. At 0251(GCT) July 15 the Steelhead sighted 2 cruisers and bb but was unable to close.	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Searaven patrolled in the area but sighted nothing. The Haddock was waiting off pagen Island for another target; see below in this Case.
Type No. of Ships, Tarkat(a) 27-30N, 141-30E, None 24-20H, 140-30E, None	About 3 cruisors, 2 positive carriers, 1 auxiliary carrier and destroyers on course 130°, speed 24 knots will pass through 10-500 151- Positive 14.	Convoy (same as in Hono case 9) will pass through the following posttions at 0300(GCT) on July 14,15,16 & 17; Hone 21-10N, 145-55E, 18-00N, 141-30E, 14-50N, 142-00E and
E E	U. 8. 8. 92 tation 10-15N, 151- 30E. U. 8. 8. 92 F. to take 3ta- tion 08-40N, 151-30E. New! to take strtion 08-30E	U.S.B.
ComSubPaq Operations Dispatches (Dato-Time	11-0947	11-1037

1,3-15E.

21-10N 118-00N 114-50N

Remilts of Contact(s)	The Rearnson was looking for the provious Ultra target. The Heddock waited off Paga Island about 180, 126E July 14-15 but sighted nothing.	The durnard was leaving the area for Vidosy, having expended all its torpedoes in pended all its torpedoes in an attack on a previous con yoy July 10. (See Case A)	Comsubeac dispatch received The Hallbut patrolled the area but alghted nothing.
Type No. of Ships, Made with Positions fliven	Six merchant ships and None escort will pass through the following bositions at 0300(GCT) None on July 12, 13, 14, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 14, 14, 14, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15	17-348 145-36E and 15-32N 145-36E and Convoy will pass through None 15-45N 131-00E at 0300 (GCT) on July 12 and (GCT) on July 12 thence	Ton Mary (either 072 None or 264 Popcorn) to be at the following 0300 (GCT) positions on
ComSubPac Operational Dispatohos Submarine	(Cont.) U.B.S. Benrayen		Hall But

July 12, 13 and 141
12-10N, 172-10E,
10-30H, 146-15E and
10-10H, 151-21E.
264 Popcorn (p. 264
1n Japanese Merchant
1n Japanese Merchant
to be at the followin
(GCT) positions:

12-0917 Information for Hall but cor-

ORIGINAL Programmery 1946 Rosulta of Contact(s)	Comsublac dispatch received The Plying Fish was not in the area, made no contact in the area, made no contact on July 14-15.	ComSubpac dispatch received The Sturggon sighted nothin possibly because of bad veather and visibility. The Pompano sighted only small boats on these days. The Sawfish was not in the area. The Sighted was in the are July 16 but did not sight the Ultra target.
Thir, 1973 Thir, 1973 Type, No. of Ships, Made with Pagitions Given Tarrent(s) 12-10W, 142-10E, and 10-30W, 146-55E and	08-10W, 151-20E. Goshu Waru and other Wone unidentified merchant as will pass through 28-51W 145-39E at 0300 (GCT) July 12, 25-29W (GCT) July 12, 25-29W (GCT) July 14, and 18-56W 155-14E on July 15.	One carrier, Otale, and None an unidentified ship will leave Gasebo at 0800(I) July 15 and arrive at Shibaura(?) 1200(I) July 17 by way None of 31-13N, 130-10E at 0600(GCT) July 15, 30-10H 136-00E at 03.0(GCT) July 15, 30-00H 136-00E at 03.0(GCT) July 16, and 34-00H 138-38E at 2000 None (GCT) July 16.
Comsubbac Operational Dispatches Submarine No. (Date-Time) Addresses(s)	2, 11-1954 "Laging Fran	13-0739 U.S.B. T.S.S. T.S.S. T.S.S. T.S.S. Bayrigh

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Il January 1946	Results of Contact(s)	Comsubrac dispatch received S-38 patrol report between the hours 1805(GCT) July 14 and 0747(GCT) July 15 is un available at this writing, as 18 also the contact report of S-38 was at the souther approach to Kwajalein at the time and attacked a froight there according to a dispatch sent at 15-1222.	ComsubPac dispatch received The Haddook searched for th convoy but did not sight it	The Sturreon, in bad weather signified nothing.	The Spearfish made no contacts from July 16 to 27. The Secretary patrolled between 151 and 152E, north o	
	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Unknown (but probable	Mome	None	None Rone	· 图 · 图 · 图 · 图 · 图 · 图 · 图 · 图 · 图 · 图
Tuly, 1942	Type, No. of Ships,	one freighter will pass 08-50M 167-26E at 0300(GCT) July 15 cn route to Kwajajein which it will reach July 15.	Convoy wrum 406, will pass through 14-05N 134-30E at 0300(GCT) July 16 and 17-20N 134-30E at the same time on the following day, and	30N, 134E at 0300(GCT) July 21, due at Hayasui Seto at 1200(I) July 22.	Convoy, from Kwajalein to Yokosuka will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 17,18,19 and 20:	部ではなるのではないない。
	Submaring Addressen(B)	0 8 8 ± 8 ± 8 ± 8 ± 8 ± 8 ± 8 ± 8 ± 8 ±	U.S. S. Haddook	U.S. A. Sturggon	U.S.S. Brearfish U.S.A. Hearnyon	
	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	13–1037	16-071			
	ģ		15.		9	

ComBubPac dispatch received The Haddook searched for the convoy but did not sight it	The Sturffeon, in bed weather signified nothing.	The Smearfish made no contacts from July 16 to 27. The Secretaryon patrolled between 151 and 152E, north o
Convoy wrum 406, will Hone pass through 14-05N 134-30E at 0300 (GCT) July 16 and 17-20M, 134-30E at the came time on the following:	30N, 134E at 0300(GCT) None July 21, due at Heyasui Seto at 1230(I)	onvoy, from Kwajalein None o Yokosuka will pass hrough the following 300(GCT) positions on Hone uly 17,18,19 and 20;
m. U.S. S. P. C. P. B. P. C. C. P. P. C. C. P. C.	Sturgeen J	Spearfish Bearnyen

文学经验工遗

ONIGINAL Planuary 1946 Results of Contact(s)	21N, July 18-21, but sighted nothing,	The Hallbut searched the convoy route on July 16 but did not sight the convoy.	The Ekipheck sighted a convoy on July 22 at 34-121. 138-31E, a position two day ahead of the Ultra's schedu from the east, did not sight either the convey on Empire Kwajalein route or the Yoke suka convoy.	See above for the Kingfish, Searaven and Spearifish.
Contacts Hade with		None	None	None
Type No of Ships,	11-051, 160-45E, 14-051, 158-15E, 17-101, 155-50E and 20-05N, 153-10E.	Convoy due at Yoko- suka 0600(I) July 25 will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 16, 17, 18 and 19; 14-451, 145-32E, 17-171, 145-52E, 18-541, 145-40E and 21-101, 140-32E.	Convoy, due at Yoko- suks 0600(I) July 25, will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 20, 21, 22 and 23; 23-45; 136-565, 26-24% 138-565, 29-107, 138-565, 29-107, 138-565,	Convoy, travelling BE, will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 18, 19 and 20;
Submaring Addresses(s)		Wallbut Fallbut	U.S.S. S. U.S. S. S. S. Kingffall	Vanari on
ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	(Cont.)		16-0912 (additional inforation	
ON	15.			10

The Tinosa sighted the tan at 2113(GCr) July 19 at 5-10N, 147-15E on course 90, speed 13. It attacked but

Positive

T-nosa

mtssed.

II Vanuary 1946	Bubmarine Type, No. of Ships, Uade with Results of Contact(s)	Conv Will 18E	Hans convoy (3 mer- Tinosa chantmen, 1 escort) Vill pass through 10- Vill pass to 300(GCT) Vill pass to 300(GCT) Vill pass to 300(GCT) Vill pass to 300(GCT) Vill pass to 300(GCT)	Possible ComBubPac dispatch received. The Porty at 0942(GCT) July 20 sighted 4 freighters and escort at 8-220, 149-44E.	turenan 30-00N, 134-00E at The Shiresan, in a typhoon, 11 0300(GET) July 21,	Convoy of loaded trans- None ComBubbac dispatch received. The Hallbut departed for Mid
	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches Bub	. 17-17.65 HB	(additional The information)	E E	· 图	18-07/2 U.S

Results of Contact(s) ComSubPac dispatch received, The Haddock at 2315 (GCT) July 20 signted 4 troop laden ships on southern course in 16-48N, 134-00E, hit all four, sank one.	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Mingo was in the area attacking another target as it reported to ComSubpac; see 26-1056 below. ComSubpac dispatch received. The Tinosa was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor July 24 comSubpac dispatch received. The Haddock sighted the two tankers at 2-520, 137-40E and damaged one. The Haddock had already made the contact before receiving ComSubpacts.	regard Serial 71 (Case 28) remain within 100 miles of 138E. Wingo:reports 1 tanker, 1 freighter, 1 escort 0200 (GCT) July 26 at 3-40N, 134-28E course 090, speed 13,
Contacts Made with Tarket(s) Positive	None None Posttive	13 28) remais 1 tanker, 13 40N, 13
Tuly 1943 Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given (GCT) July 20 and 15- 5N, 134-00E at 0300 (GCT) July 21.	Two tankers, Misshonand Kenyo Marijs, will pass through the foltowing positions at 150,000 (GCT) on July 25,26,27 and 28;03-00N, 133-50E,03-00N, 143-50E and 04-35N, 148-10E,	Disregard Serial 71 (Ca 3N, 138E, Mingo:report at 0200 (GCT) July 26 s
Bubmarine Addressee(s) U.S. B. Haddock	U.S.B. U.B.B. U.S.S. Haddock	U.B.S. Haddock
ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time) (Cont.)	18-071.4	26-1056
3 6	l s	13

ORIGINAL ORIGINAL Panuary 1946 ComSubbac dispatch received. Pour was in the area but did not sight the target.	ComSubPac dispatch recolved. At 0753 (GCT) July 23 at 30- 571 137E the Sturgeon sighted a DD and 2 carriers. High seas prevented attack.	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pounance was not in the area on July 23. ComSubPac dispatch received. The Skiplack was in the area	ald not sight the	Comfubbeo dispatch recolved. The Lapon at 0440 (GCT) July 23 at 34-284, 1.0-58E sighted one carrier and 2
Type, No. of Ships, Hade with Positions Given Tarketts) One unidentified ship Rone with destroyer escort with destroyer escort will sail from Nauru to Truck through O ASN.	157-172 at 2000(GCT) July 20 and 06-671, 154- AlE at 0800(GCT) July 21. Two or three carriers Posttive and other variships at speed 18 will reach 31- Olive 136-44E at 0530	positi	Tuly 23. Take station 6 miles None and bearing 270 from Skiningk	Patrol the area. None
ComSubPag Operational Operational Blanarino No. (Pate-Time) Addressed(9) 21. 19-1632 (7.8-f).	22. 20-0943 U.S.B.	Pouranna 20-1018 U.S. R.	Information) U.S.S. Pounano	icoles.

Submarine Type, No. of Ships, Hade with Results of Contact(a)	destroyers on a course to t southeast. Position and course do not agree with th Ultra data.	Lanker will pass None Combubbac dispatch received from through And 157E at the Harmhel suffered from 0200(dCr) July 22 the engine trouble July 24. On July 25 it searched for any July 23 and 35M, 144E southoust.	Nono	1 tanker, Ho. 3 Positive Comsubbac dispatch received Tingsa at 1955(GCT) Tonay Wary, to be July 23 in position 6-55M, July 23 in position 6-55M, at 1000(GCT) July on course 073, Two hits damaged it.	Thence via luwat to South annel, Truk.	
Gomflubfac Operational Dispatches No. (Date-Time)	22. (Cont.)	23.0847		24, 22-1207		5

ORIGINAL ORIGINAL Shanary 1946 sh Results of Contact(s)	or by one day and orth of Puluvat. " See above. Soe above.	ComBubbao dispatch received. The Tingsa had received orders on July 24 to return to Posrl Harbor.	ComBubbac dispatch received. The Narghal was searching for another ditra target east of Awaters course July 25. ComBubbac dispatch received. The falren was fog bound on these days.
Type, No. of Ships, Tarmets Positions divon	Advance the dates given in 22-1207 by one day and change with Puluvate to read Mortin of Puluvate. Wa Tonan Maru to be at 7-0.00 1.03-24E at 7-0.00 (GCT) July 24.	Asakaza Maru and flve None other anips will be at the following 0300 (GCT) positions on July 26, 27 and 28, 15-30N, 145-53E, 13-05H, 149-35E,	Aveta Harn vill pass Nono through 46-150, 156-256 at 0500 (GCT) July 26 at 0100 (GCT) July 26 and 34-350, 139-53E at 2100 (GCT) July 26. None
Comfulbac Operational Dispatches Wo (Date-Time) Addressen(s)		25. 23-0823 U.S.B.	26. 23-0833 U.S.S. U.S.S. U.S.S. Balloon

	MIN 1973		Ontginal, 1946
ConSubbac Operational Disparences	Submarine Type, No. of Ships.	Contacts Made with Tarmot(s)	Regults of Contact(2)
(Cont.)		None	ComBubbae dispatch received. The Rithland at 1540 (OCT) July 25 in position 34-17W. 140-29E sighted one large escorted ship Tokyo bound.
	L.B.B.	None	ComBubbae dispatch received. The Largu was in the area busing the farm of the July 25 and sot its course for Midway July 26.
23-0942	U.S.S. Spearfish and one DD to be at sparch Horth 31-10H 145-40E at 0005(GCT) July 24,14(?)N 154-30E)	Hone	ComBubbac dispatch received. The Spearfish made no con- tacts on these days.
	11.5.8. 12-400 154-1 154-1 154-1 154-1 154-1 154-00E at 6300 (GCT) 154-030 154-03E at 2100 (GCT) 154-00E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pary, patrolling the Empire-Truk lanes July 25-28 made no centucts.
	Steel hand	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Etechnese, troubled with mechanical difficulties, made no contacts July 23-30.

27.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Positive	ComSubPace Operational Dispatches Ro. (Date-Timo) Ac 28. 34-0711	Dasrine dressee(s) ngo ngo ngo	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given A convoy will pass through 03-50N 128-185 at 0300(GCf) July 25 and 06-04N 134-05E at the same time on the following two days.	Contacts Lade with Thrift(3) None Vone	Regults of Contact(s) ComBubPac dispatch received The Mings was not in the area on these days. ComBubPac disputch received The Haddock was pursuing another target on these day ase Case 20.
	29. 24-0817	B.B.	be at 08-550, 167-40E,	Positive	Comsupped dispatch received At 2210 (GCT) July 26 the Se

1 merchantahly will postti be at 08-550, 167-40E, time unknown on July 23 and at 2000(GCT) July 26 will reach Wake Island area cargo. Our bembers will be after the ship also.

The ship is probably dealyed by bombing raids.

Information

additional

27-1932

Information

additional

The ship believed anchored or stranded in Wake area. Destroy her before she unlonds.

This ship, it is believed, will pass through 19-444, 164-38E at 1100(GCT) July 30, 164-33E at 1700 (GCT) July 30, 18-100, 164-

Comsubpac dispatch received.
At 2210(GCT) July 26 the Seg
dragon fired 2 derpedoes at
a Freighter grounded at Wake
and being repaired by the
enemy. One hit. At 0620
(GCT) July 29 the Beadragon:
sighted a small freighter
anchored at Wilkes Island
adjoining Wake, waited till
the freighter left port,
overtook and attacked it at
0149 (GCT) July 31 at 17-40N
163-58E. It fired 3 torpodoes of which one hit
effectively, The freighter
was heavily escerted and use
on a southern course.

Information

30-0307

Onional 1946	Results of Contact(s)		Comsubbae dispatch received. The Tullibee at 1630 (GCT) July 27 (0630 M zone, July 28) sighted an escarted tanker appreaching faraus from the northwest. The submarine was unable to at- tack before the target reached the lagoon.	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 1325(GCT) July 25, the facility attacked two freighters with DD escort in position 31N; 127-30E but missed.
	Regult		ComSubP The Tul July 27 28) stgl tanker from the submarth tack be reached	Comsub At 132 Bayfill freigh in pos. missed
July 1943	Type, No. of Ships, Vade with Positions Given Target(s)	15E at 2200 (GCT) July 30, 17-38H, 164-15E at 0300 (GCT) July 31, 16-54H, 164-15E at 0800 (GCT) July 31, 14-28H, 162-51E at 0300(GCT) August 1 and 12-06H, 160-14E at 0300 (GCT) on August 2.	l morchant ship, small Positivo but important, will pass through 01-25%, 172-56%, time unknown, July 28, approaching from northwest possibly about dawn.	The Kivokawa Mary, 1 Positive merchant ship and a DD eacort to be at 26-35% 121-45% at 29-37% 125-44% at 0300 July 25, at 31-53% 128-50% at 2130 July 25, ac 320 July 28(31-53% 128-50%, at 2130 July 25, ac oording to Japanese ecording to Japanese ecording to Japanese ecording to Japanese ecording to Japanese
	Submarine Addressee(s)		Full Then	Saw San
	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	(Cont.)	24-0931	24-1307

S (ATTENNESS TO SEE THE SEE TH	mation of a minimum of a more than a second professional control of the second control of the minimum of the second control of the s	our official transfer and the second of the	Life a descripted the erast of terms of CAPPens and early address of the Arthur Carlotte and the Arthu
11 January 1946	Combubbao dispatch roceivod. The Stanlhead, in mechanical difficulties, reported no contacts July 23-30.	ComSubPac dispatch (Serial 76) received. The Maryhal searched the area July 25.26 but sighted nothing.	ComBubPac dispatch rocolved. The Baufish did not search for this target but for another nearby, given in ComBubPac's Ultra of 25-0943; Seo Caso 35.
Contacts	Target(s) None	Vone	Nono
Tuly 1943	About 7 escorts and destroyers en route to ald Those 8 target (#3 Tonan Haru) The tanker (#3 Tonan Haru)	Bosrch out and destroy a patrol boat in post- tions 30-51H, 153-43E, 32-40H, 157-30E, 30-20H, 156-08E, 30-40H, 150-00E, 27-37H, 153-14E, 25-33H, 155-50E,	Elx merchentships to be at the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 25, 26, and 27, 31-06W, 124-37E, 26-34W, 122-28E and 25-50W, 120-45E.
	Addresses (s)	Varyhai Naryhai	U.S.B. Sawfish
ConSubPac Operational	(path-71me) -24-1530 -4-1753 -41tional nformation)	25-0733	25-0912
	3.0	.	1 20

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YLLGINAL 1946

	Comgubbao		July 1943		apet granme tt
£ £	Operational Dispational (Inte-Time) 26-0943	Submarina Addravana Laskin Lavilia	Typo No. of Ships, Positions (1von ships will pass through the follow-ing 0300(GCT) positions on July 26, 27 and 28; 28-420, 122-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 125-245, 31-020, 31-	Contuots Nade with Threst(s) None	Combublac dispatch rocolved. At 1006 (GCT) July 26 the Sayfish sighted 4 merchant ships with DD escort on course 050 in position 32-32 n, 127-20E but lost contact. This convoy was 40 hours ahead of the Ultra schedule. At 0235(GCT) July 27 the Sayfish attacked a convoy.
•	25-1011	U.S.S. Briverson	Two heavy cruisers, 1 light cruisor and 1 DD to be at 15-15H, 151-40R at 1030(GGT) July 24 and 32-55H, 140- 80R at 0500(GCT) July 27.	None	comsubbac dispatch received. The Skilping patrolled the sepreaches to Yokosuka July 26-27 but did not sight this Ultra target. Comsubbac dispatch received. The Stirragel patrolled the area of 33% Lilk July 27 but sighted nothing.
17.	25-1617	All subs	The Vogamigana Haru	Positive	ComBubrac dispatahes ro-

Programme 1946	Regults of Contact(s)	CGCT) July 30 sighted 3 ship and DD escort in position 13-5(M) 152-00E. At 1402 (GCT) July 31 in position 11-1(M) 153-3/E it attacked and sank the Morani cayo Maru Bee above for Pony The Breathand at 1900(GCT) July 31 in position 11-20M. 153-30E sighted the Saiko Maru attacking and depaging it at 2107 (GCT).	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Haddesk empended its torpodues attacking an Ultra target July 25-26; see Case 20. ComSubPac dispatch received. The Hing attacked another target travelling course 090 on July 27; see Case 20.
	Contacts Nado with Tarrect(1)	Positiva	None
Tuly 1943	Type, No. of Ships, Positions diven	the Yamariri Haru. I merchant ship (figire Haru) and 1 esgort will pass through the following 0300(00r) positions on July 26, 27 and 28; 29-30N, 145-35E, 25-25N, 147-20E, 21-20N, 149-00E, Additional information in 27-0817 gives the for July 29, 30 and 31; 17-20N, 150-40E, 13-15N, 152-15E and 09-10N, 153-20E.	Two funkers to be at the following 0300 (GCT) positions on July 26, 27 and 28, 4-15W, 137-30E, 3-20W, 126-45E,
	Submarine Addressee(a)	Pogy Williams	U.S.S.
	Comflubbao Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	. (Cont.)	26-0825

		Tuly 1943		ORIGINAL 11 January 1946
Comfubbac Operations Dispatches No. (Date-Time	Bubmarine	Type, No. of Ships.	Contacts Made with Taract(s)	Nosults of Contact(")
39. 26-1017	Value Bar	1 orulsor, 1 tankor, and 2 DD's will pass through 15M, 140E at 2,000 (GCT) July 28, 21-26M, 138-25E at 1030 (GCT) July 29 and 34-14M, 132-33E at 2030 (GCT) July 31,	Positive	Comsubpac dispatch received. At 1325(GCT) July 30 the Saury sighted a tunker, a crulser and 1 DD in posttion 261, 135-56E, The submarine was ranmed and damaged by the DD before it could fire torpedoes.
40. 27-0047	Haffag. 1	Force of warships in- cluding battleships to be at 31-32N 132- 56E at 1100(GCT) July 31. at 30-00N 136-00E at 7100(GCT) July 31 and None 22-40N 138-56E at 2300 (GCT) August 1.	Nono	Combubbao dispatch received. The Banry was damaged in an encounter with an Ultra target July 30 and 30t its course for Midway August 1. Combubbao dispatch received. The Paddle searched the route of the warships but sighted enouy planes only.
27-0148	Walites	Must reach area 15 (Trult) not luter than August 4. Look at 27-0042.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tulliben reached Truk. August & where it contacted the Tunk Force; see Vol. VII Case 1. But the submarine made no contacts on its way to Truk as ComsubPac suggested in this dispatch.

11 January 1946	Negults of Contact(s)	Comsubbac dispatch received. The Saury pursued a more important Ultra target and attacked it on July 30; soe Case 39.	Comsubbac dispatch received, The Prey patrolled the Empire-Truk route August 1 and hoaded for Ulul Island, N.W. of Truk, August 2 but did not sight the Ultra target.	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Steelhead attacked an- other Ultra target at 11-20% 153-50E on July 31. The submarine made no contacts on August 1 and 2.	Geo abovo.
Zu1x_1943	Type, No. of Ships, Made with Positions Given Target(s)	Allcoln Nam will pass None through 29-100 135-1156 at 0300(GCT) July 28 and 24-150 138-138-29.	Alkolu Karu will pass None through 16-100 151-00E at 0300(66f) August 1390(66f) August 2 and then hoad for Worth Channel, Truk,	None	l or nore merchant Mono ships on course 13.8° speed 12 at 0800(GCF) July 29 will pass, 8 hours later, southwest of Ulul Island.
	Subnarino Addressee(s)	U.ff.S. (do not lot this interfere with more laportant jobs)	Poery.	Heelhond	for the star star star star star star star star
	Combubbac Operational Dispatches (Unte-Time)	28-0402	28-0743		

Gontaots Submarine Type, No. of Ships, Made with Regults of Contaot(s) Addressen(s) Positions diven	Hand to the first tree of the	About six ships of un- None Compubes dispatch received by Income type will pass following through the following on July 31. August 1 and 2. Case 39) to set its 25-20M 137-55E. Set 20M 137-55E.	U.S.B. A convoy will pass None ComgubPac dispatch received through 15-12M, 144- Johnston Island August 2. U.S.S. and OS-OGN, 149-00E Hone The Stonlhead Sourched for the Ultra target August 3 to 300(OCT) on August but did not sight it.	through 01-46N 132-32E none ComBubbac dispatch received the Unite was in the viciniate of 0300(GCT) July 30 and of Eorol Island, about 6N, at 06-24H, 133-45H at 130-65H at 0300(GCT) July 31.
ComSubPag Operational Dispatches (Date-Tine)	28-0751	28-0758	29-0926	290937

And the second section of	in a state of the country of the last	accounts a Library II	A STATE OF BUILDING AND A STATE OF THE STATE	to come an about the behalf	and the state of the state of the state of	arm of the land the same	area a ser con harmony record
	Oniginal II Janusry 1946	Results of Contact(s)	ComBubPac dispatch received. The Entitle patrolled the area but did not sight the Ultra targets.	ComBubrae dispatch received. The Pollack sighted two northbound convoys on August 6 in vicinity of 2010, 141E but did not sight the south-	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Paddin patrolled the area of the convoy August	ComBubbac dispatch received, The Pike was in the vicinity of Marcus Island seeking en- other Ultra target, a	on August 5; see Vol. VIII
		Contacts Made with Terror(s)	None	None M	Nong	None	
	July 1943	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Two merchant ships and a DD will pass through 30-55N 1100-22E at 0300(GCf) July 31 and 31-39W 139-32E at the same time on the following day.	A convoy will pans through the following 0300(GCT) positions on August 1,2,3,4,5 and (32-521,139-40E,	26-550 142-00E 23-500 142-45E 20-400 143-50E and 17-400 144-50E		
		Subsering Addrongeo(8)	BKIN Jaor	Politines.	U.S. B. Padd 1.9	H.8.8.	
	ComSubPae	Dispatones (Date-Time)	30-1901	\$0-2046			
		•	•9*				

Chapter VII

July 2, 1943

Case I

Haval Communications Intelligence learned that a convoy, composed of the <u>Tonan Maru</u>, the <u>Koan Maru</u>, one other maru, and an unidentified escort vessel would sail from Yokosuka to Truk between June 25 and July 5. The noon positions for these days were included in the intercepted Japanese dispatch.

On July 2 ComSubPac sent the positions of the comvoy at 0300 (GCT) on July 3, 4, and 5 to the U.S.S. Halibut and the U.S.S. Pogy.

The Halibut reported a contact with two freighters at 8-08 N, 146-13 K at 1100 (GCT), on July 4, but was unable to approach for an attack, and finally abandoned the chase.

To the Pogy, on July 5, at 1801 (GCT), ComSubPac reported that the Halibut had sighted but not attacked the convoy, which seemed to consist of two ships rather than three as had been previously reported.

I - Appendix VII, Case 1, No. A-1, hereafter noted as VII. Case I, A-1.

^{2 -} VII, Case I, B-I.

^{3 -} VII. Case 1, C-1 - C-3.

^{4 -} VII, Case 1, B-2

ORIGINAL II January 1946

But at 0800 (GCT) on July 5 the two-ship convoy had already been intercepted by the <u>Pogy</u> at 7-26 N. 149-33 E. Of five torpedoes fired, only one hit was made in the leading freighter, and the escent forced the <u>Pogy</u> to submerge. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 2

Noon positions of two unidentified merchantmen sailing from Marcus Island to Yokosuka were obtained from an intercepted Japanese dispatch of June 28.

Although ComSubFac's operational dispatch
was sent to the U.S.S. Jack at 1820 (GCT) on July 2,
the C3CO (GCT) positions for July 2 and 3, and the time
of arrival at Yokosuka (2400 GCT, 3 July) were included,
in order that the Jack might plot the vessel's course
and intercept as soon as possible.

The Jack made no contacts on July 3, but at 0520 (GCT) July 4 while patrolling the entrance to Suruga Bay it attacked and sank an escorted merchant ship rounding Iro Saki, i.e., sailing south-west away from Yokosuka. This therefore cannot have been the

^{5 -} VII, Cass 1, C-4 - C-6.

^{6 -} VII, Case 2, A-1.

^{7 -} VII, Case 2, B-1.

ORIGINAL II January 1948

Ultra target which was due in Yokosuka five hours earlier.

8
The Ultra target was not sighted.

July 4, 1943

C258 3

Points through which the Akitsu Maru, would pass on route from the west entrance of Palao to Ujina were listed in a Japanese dispatch intercepted by Communication Intelligence on July 3.

The vessel's positions for July 6 and July 7 were sent to the <u>U.S.S. Sturgson</u>. ComSubPac advised that the ship's course might not be a direct one, since there were indications that it would pass through 51-05 N, 134-47 E as well as between 26-32 N, 134-30 E and 32-10 H, 10 133-21 E.

that the submarine was in the area (it sighted a destroyer on July 5 in position 32-56 N, 133-59 E). However, neither the contact report nor the patrol report for July 6 - 10 inclusive is available at this writing, so that the results of this case are unknown.

^{8 -} VII, Case 2; C-I - C-3.

^{9 -} VII, Case 3, A-1.

^{10 -} VII. Case 3, B-1.

^{11 -} VII, Case 3, C-1.

July 6, 1943

Casa L

It was learned from a Japanese dispatch of July 4 that a convoy designated as "0" #404 Convoy, of which the Kayo Maru was a unit, would sail from 12 Saeki to a location possibly identified as Palso.

with instructions to the <u>U.S.S. Gurnard</u>
to attempt interception, and to the <u>U.S.S. Wingo</u> to
assist if abla to reach the convoy's track without excessive expenditure of fuel, ComSubPac in Serial 11
(06-0551) transmitted the convoy's positions for July 9,
13
10, and 11.

The Gurnard, while patrolling on the shipping lanes north of Palau, sighted a convoy of four
merchant ships and an escort in position 13-10N, 131-55E
at 1754 (GCT) July 10. The submarine attacked and sank
one merchant ship two hours later. With all torpedoes
expended, the Gurnard then set its course for Midway.

This is a positive contact with the Ultra target, which was due to reach 09-55M, 132-05E by 0300 (GCT) on July 11. An intercepted Japanese message 15 of July 11 confirms the sinking.

^{12 -} VII, Case 4, A-1 - A-3.
13 - VII, Case 4, B-1. ComSubPac added a bit more information for the Gurnard in a dispatch of July 10-0840 (see VII, Case 8, B-1).

^{14 -} VII, Case 4, C-2 - C-3.

^{15 -} VII, Case 4, D-1.

II January 1946

The Mingo did not attempt to intercept this convoy since on the advice of a later ComSubPac dispatch, it moved to meet another Ultra target nearer its ReTE

July 7, 1943

Case 5

On July 7 ComSubPac suggested that the U.S.S. Mingo not act upon the information of serial 11 dispatched the previous day (see VII, Case 4, B-1), but that the submarine intercept another ship travelling east in the Truk area July 9-11 (06-15 H, 145-20 E; 7 H, 148 E; 08-15 N. 148-10 B).

From July 8-10 the Mingo patrolled in the vicinity of Satawal Island (7 N, 148 E) but did not sight the Ultra target, which ComSubPac suggested in a later dispatch (see VII, Case 7, B-1) might be a tanker.

Case 6

on July 7 at 0749 (GCT) ComSubPac sent information to all submarines regarding two important task forces sailing from the Empire to Truk-

The first task force, (mentioned second

^{16 -} See VII, Case 5, B-1 - C-2.

^{17 -} VII, Case, B-1. 18 - VII, Case 5, G-2.

^{19 -} VII, Case 6, B-L.

in ComSubPacio 070749) consisting of a carrier Layo, a cruiser Aikoku, and several destroyers leaving Yokosuka on July 6, would pass through 10-26 H, 150-53 E, at 0900 (GCT) July 10 and arrive North Channel Truk 11 hours 20 later, according to intercepted Japanese dispatches. ComSubPac ordered the U.S.S. Post to take station at the above position while the U.S.S. Halibut and the U.S.S. Steelhead were to take positions 5 miles to the northwest and southeast respectively.

The second task force, (mentioned <u>first</u> in ComSubPac's 070749) consisting of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers, would leave the Inland Sea on July 10 and arrive at Truk on the 15th., according to an intercepted dispatch of July 6. Another Japanese dispatch of July 5 reported that a carrier, Chuyo leaving Yokosuka at 0400 (I) on the 10th., would rendesvous with another force at 0800 (I) July 11 in position 27-40 H, 137-38 E. ComSubPac suggested that this carrier was joining the task force from the Inland Sea at the named position and ordered the U.S.S. Sturgeon and the U.S.S. Searaven to take action in that area. ComSubPac added that further information

^{20 -} VII. Case 6, A-1 - A-2.

^{21 -} VII, Case 6, B-1.

^{22 -} VII. Case 6, A-3 - A-4.

^{23 -} VII, Case 6, A-5.

CRIGINAL Il January 1946

would be sent later to our submarines in the Truk area, where the force was due July lo; this is the subject of VII, Case 10.

Steelhead were awaiting the first task force in their appointed places near 10-25 M, 150-53 E. At 1016 (GCT) the Pogy sighted three ships of this force but was compelled to submerge by an enemy destroyer and was unable to 25 attack. The Halibut, a few miles north of the Pogy, sighted a carrier and auxiliary cruiser at 1017 (GCT) and was able to fire six torpedoes at the cruiser, three of which hit. A destroyer forced the submarine under with depth charges. On the next day, at 11-1000, the Halibut, half its erew ill from food poisoning, reported its action to ComSubPace.

The Steelhead, originally stationed a few miles south of the Pogy, witnessed the Halibut's attack and was about to put more torpedces into the damaged cruiser when it sighted the carrier. Firing five torpedces, of which at least three hit, the Steelhead turned away at top speed on the surface, observing in

²⁴⁻⁻ VII, Case 6, B-1.

^{25 -} VII, Case 6, C-2 - C-3.

^{28 -} VII, Case 6, C-4 - C-6,

^{27 -} VII. Case 6, B-2.

the cruiser was listing. The Steelhead reported its action to ComSubPac at 11-1440.

These were all positive contacts with one of the Ultra targets, the task force from Yokosuka due at Truk July 10.

Heanshile the second task force, which left the Inland See on July 10 and which was due at Truk the 15th., was to rendezvous at 2100 (GCT) July 10 with still another force (including the Chuyo) from Yokosuka in position 27-40 E, 137-38 E where the Sturgeon and the Searagen were lying in wait.

At 2103 (GCT) July 10, in 27-42 N, 137-38 E, the Sturgeon sighted a seaplane tender with destroyer escort but was unable to maneuver into a position to attack. An hour later, at 2205 (GCT), the submarine saw two carriers and six cruisers speeding to the southeast but they were so well covered by carrier planes it was not possible to close for an attack.

A few miles to the southeast of the Sturgeon, the Searaven, after first sighting a destroyer on patrol,

^{28 -} VII. Case 6, C-7 - C-9. (The auxiliary carrier Unyo, reached Truk, however, and was able to return to Yokosuka later in July; see VII, Case 22).

^{29 -} VII, Case 6, B-3. 30 - VII, Case 6, C-10 - C-11.

contacted this same task force at 2320 (GCT) and was also mable to close with the fast moving Japanese warships.

second Ultra target, the task force due at Truk July 15, where it was awaited by our submarines in that area; (see VII, Case 10.

July 9, 1943

Cass 7

of July 5 that the No. 20 Mikage Maru, escorted by an unidentified ship would leave Truk at 1650 (I) on July 5,
and an route to Kasjalein would stop at Mauru at 0300 (I)
on July 10. At 1800 (I) on the same day, it would leave
Hauru, arriving at Kasjalein on July 12. Hoom positions
of the yessel for July 6 through July 13 were listed.

ComSubPac gave the maru's positions for July II and I2 and then added further bits of information for the U.S.S.

Halibut, the U.S.S. Pogy, and the U.S.S. Steelhead (see Case 6), for the U.S.S. Gurnard (see Case 4), and for the U.S.S. Mingo (see Case 5).

^{51 -} VII, Case 6, C-12 - C-15-

^{32 -} VII. Case 7, A-1.

^{33 -} VII Case 7 B-1

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

The S-28 was at the Submarine Base at Dutch S4 Harbor from July 5 to 13. No doubt the action eddresses of ComSubPac's 09-1015 should read S-38, which was in the Kwajalein area from July 15 cm. However, the report of the S-38 prior to July 15 is not at the moment available. Therefore the results of this case at the present writing are unknown.

July 10. 1943

Case 8

An unidentified convoy consisting of the Rycyo Maru, the Shoho Maru, and an unidentified number of army transports, and also the Rokkai Maru escorted by two-unidentified vessels, departed Palso at 1000 (I) on July 9, and was scheduled to arrive at Mabaul at 1500 (I) on July 16.

With a parming to match for one of our can submarines which might possibly be near the eastern end of the area, ComSubPac sent this information to the <u>U.S.S.</u>

Wingo on July 10. It was added for the information of the <u>U.S.S.</u> Gurnard that the position given for its target on July 11 (See Case 4) might possibly be 7 miles farther

^{34 -} VII, Case 7, C-2.

^{35 -} VII, Case 7, C-3.

^{36 -} VII. Casa 8, A-1.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

37

east, and that an escort vessel might be added,

On July 10 the Mingo discontinued its search for a previous Ultra target (see Case 5) in the vicinity of Truk and set its course to the southwest to intercept the new target en route from Palau to Rabaul. It sighted the convoy at 2024 (GCT) July II, four freighters in two columns with escerts outboard of the column at 0627 (GCT) July 12. The Mings was able to attack both ships of the left column, Rycyo Maru class freighters, and fired three torpedoes at each. While submerged under a depth charge attack, the submarine heard four of the six torpedoes explode but never actually saw the results of the attacks. The Mingo did not pursue the convoy over the equator since it would than be entering the area of the submarines of the 38 South West Pacific Command. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target,

C288 9

Idsting the usual noon positions, a movement report of a Japanese convoy, sailing between Yokosuka and Truk, was sent on July 9 from the Chief of Staff of the Yokosuka Naval District to an unidentified addresses.

^{37 -} VII, Case 8, B-1, 38 - VII, Case 8, C-2 - C-3,

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

The convoy, which would be made up of three marus, some escort ships and Special SubChaser No. 13, would leave 39 Yokosuka on July 9, arriving at Truk about July 20.

Alerted for this target were the U.S.S.

Flying Fish and the U.S.S. Searaven, and positions were
40
sent for 0300 (GCT) on July 12, 13 and 14.

En route to Midway the Flying Fish cut across
the route of the convoy on July 12 and 13 but did not sight
the Ultra target. On July 12 and 13 the Searaven patrolled
the route over which the convoy was scheduled to pass but
sighted nothing. Bad weather hampered the submarine on
the 15th and on July 16 the Searaven headed for an area
to the south east. No contact was made with the Ultra
target.

July 11, 1943

Case 10

on July 10 the Captain of the Chuyo reported that his ship had just left Yokosuka enrouts to a rendezvous with a task force at 27-40 N, 43 137-38 K. on July 11, 1943. The Captain had previously sent the date of his departure and point of rendezvous on July 5, and on the basis of the

^{39 -} VII, Case 9, A-1.

^{40 -} VII, Case 9, B-1.

^{41 -} VII, Case 9, C-1 - C-3.

^{42 -} VII, Case 9, C-4. -43 - VII, Case 10, A-1.

and U.S.S. Searavan to intercept the varships at the rendezvous (see Casa 6, A-5 and B-1). Both submarines sighted the force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers which was travelling so fast and was so well covered by carrier planes that the submarines could not attack.

Compute Room a Japanese dispatch intercepted on July 6 that this force would arrive off Truk at 10-50 Mg.

151-30 B at 0400 (I) July 15 (1900-GCT, July 14).

On July II, therefore, Computer ordered the U.S.S. Finesa U.S.S. Pogy, and U.S.S. Steelhead to take stations on meridian 151-30 Eg the Finesa at 10-15 M, the Pogy at 08-40 E, and the Steelhead at 08-30 H in time to Frender autable honors.

At 2112 (GCT) on July 13 the Timosa arrived at its station and submerged. At 2057 (GCT) on July 14, the Timosa first sighted two carriers, one suriliary carrier, one seaplane tender, two heavy cruisers and several destroyers in position 10-20 N, 151-25 E. The submarine was never able to obtain a closer range than 9000 yards on the leading section of this group of ships.

^{44 -} VII, Case 10, A-2 (See also VII, Case 6, A-3 and 4). 45 - VII, Case 10, B-1.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

An attack of four torpedoes made on a carrier in the rear section of the group failed when the target 46 sighted the torpedo wakes and turned away.

The Pogy sighted this task force at 0215 (GCT) on July 15 in position 8-41 N, 151-33 E speeding at 25 knots on course south-southeast. The submarine 47 was unable to close to a firing position.

At 0251 (GCT) the Steelhead sighted two Mogamic class cruisers and a destroyer escort in position 8-31 N, 151-30 R but, because of their radical zigs and speed of over 24 knots, was also unable to close the range to 48 attack.

These were all positive contacts with the Ultra target headed for Truk.

Case II

om July 10, at 1725 (GCT), ComSubPac had sent a dispatch informing the <u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u> and <u>U.S.S.</u>

Searaven of a comvoy from Yokosuka bound for Truk and giving noon positions for July 12-14 inclusive. Neither submarine sighted the target (see VII, Case 9). This information was repeated in another dispatch of July 11 which added the

^{46 -} VII, Case 10, C-1 - C-3.

^{47 -} VII. Case 10, C-4 - C-8. 48 - VII. Case 10, C-7 - C-3.

ORIGINAL 1946

noon positions for July 14-17 inclusive and named the 49

This dispatch of July 11 included three more Ultra targets. A second assignment for the Searaven and Haddock was a convey of six ships and escort bound from Chichijima to Saipan down the west side of the Harianas, 19-31 N, 145-49 E July 13; 17-34 N, 145-36 E July 14; 15-52 N, 145-36 E July 15. Assigned to the U.S.S. Gurnard was convey #703 of which the vessels designated as "A" would sail through 15-45 N, 131-00 E July 11; 10-40 N, 131-00 E July 12 and thence to Palau. Assigned to the U.S.S. Halibut was the "B" part of this convey, the Toa Haru, which would leave the "A" vessels on July 10 and proceed alone eastward through noon positions 12-10 N, 142-10 E July 12; 10-30 N, 146-15 E July 13; and 10-10 N, 151-21 E July 14.

The Searagen patrolled south along the lane the convey was scheduled to follow but left it at latitude 21 N on July 16, and patrolled to the east without sighting the Ultra target.

On July 14-15 the Haddock was patrolling

^{49 -} VII, Case II, B-I and A-1.

^{50 -} VII, Case 11, B-1 and A-2.

^{51 -} VII. Case II. B-I and A-J.

^{52 -} VII, Case 11, B-1 and A-3 - A-4.

^{53 -} VII, Case 11, C-1.

CRICINAL II January 1946

just off Fagan Island in the Marianas, a few degrees east of the convoy route and did not move to intercept this convoy, probably because it was waiting for its other Ultra assignment, the convoy of six ships and escort bound for Saipan and scheduled to sail along the Marianas, 19-31 H, 145-49 E (just off Pagan Island) July 13; 17-34 H, 145-36 E July 14; and 15-32 H, 145-38 E July 15. It did not sight the convoy and left the area for Palau late 54 July 15.

tempedoes in an attack of July 10 upon a previous Ultra target (convoy "0" #404, bound for Palau, according to messages intercepted July 4 - see VII, Case 4), had set its course for Midway. The convoy of this ComSubPac dispatch of July II is apparently another group of ships (#705) also bound for Palau over a similar route not many hours later. It was not sighted since the Gurnard was leaving the area.

of Truk in the area through which the Toa Maru was 56 scheduled to travel but sighted nothing. No contacts were

^{54 -} VII, Case II, C-3.

^{55 -} VII, Case 11, C-4.

^{58 -} VII, Case 11, C-6.

ORIGINAL 1946

made with the Ultra target.

Casa 12

The schedule of the Gosyu Maru and another vessel which had departed Yokosuka on July 10 was recovered from an intercepted dispatch of July 10. It was believed that the message was only partially intercepted, since the recovered noon positions took the two ships only half way to Jaluit where the ships were assumed to be 57 headed.

On July 11 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Flying 58

Fish the noon positions of these ships for July 12-14.

In a dispatch of July 12, the U.S.S. Spearfish was given 59

the noon positions of the Ultra target for July 14-15.

The Flying Fish, patrolling near the Bonin
Islands on July 13, was in a position too far to the west
to intercept the convoy which was travelling on a southeast
60
course well to the east of the Bonin Islands. The Spearfish had attacked a destroyer on July 13 in position 11-12N
61
161-50E, northwest of Jaluit. The submarine's report for
July 14 and 15 states that it was an route to its area,
which is not named, however. The Spearfish made no contact

^{57 -} VII, Case 12, A-1.

^{58 -} VII, Case 12, B-1. 59 - VII, Case 12, B-2.

^{60 -} VII, Case 12, C-1.

^{61 -} VII, Case 12, C-4.

^{62 -} VII. Case 12, C-3,

on these days. No contact was made with this Ultra target by any of the subs assigned to the task.

July 13, 1943

Case 13

From a movement report sent by the Captain of the Otaka, Communications Intelligence learned on July 12 that this carrier and one other ship would leave Sasebo at 0800 (I) on July 15, and would arrive at an unknown destination, (near Suruga Bay) at 1200 (I) on July 17. Requesting that an anti-submarine sweep be made on July 15 in the Tanegashima Island area, and on the 17th to the eastward of Zenisu, the Captain included four positions on the route he would travel between the two 63 ports.

ComSubPac informed on July 13 the U.S.S.

Sturgeon, U.S.S. Fompano, U.S.S.Sawfish and U.S.S. Skivjack

of the carrier's route and included four positions for

64

July 15-16.

Because of a storm and poor visibility, the 65
Sturgeon made no sightings on these days. The Pompano,
patrolling in the area, sighted several small boats which

^{63 -} VII, Case 13, A-1.

^{64 -} VII, Case 13, B-1.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

were not considered to be worth torpedo expenditure.

Patrolling in Lat. 50-56 N. Long. 140-12 E at CSIO (GCT) on July 15, the Sawfish was 10 degrees east of the Ultral's position, 31-13 N. 130-10 E. It is not known whether ComSubPac's dispatch was received or whether the Sawfish actually searched for this target.

At 1530 (GCT) July 15 the Skipjack had received an operational order from the Commander of Task Force 17 changing its patrol area to the section just off the coast of Yokosuka. This should have placed the Skipjack in a good position to intercept the Otaka and the unidentified ship due at 2000 (GCT) on July 16 at 54 N, 158-58 E. But though a small tanker was sighted by the Skipjack at 53-55 N, 140-01 E, no other contact was reported on July 16. No contact was made with the Ultra target.

Case 14

On July 13, ComSubPac, utilizing the information contained in a Japanese dispatch of July 5,
sent the positions of a cargo vessel, possibly the Honkan
78
Maru, to the U.S.S.S.338.

^{66 -} VII, Case 13, C-4.

^{67 -} VII, Case 13, C-5 - C-6,

^{68 -} VII, Case 13, C-7 - C-9 69 - VII, Case 14, A-7

^{70 -} VII, Case 14, A-1.

The cargo vessel was due to reach 08-00 H. 167-26 E, less than a degree south of Krajalein, at 0300 (CCT) July 15 and later in this day was due to reach anchorage in the atoll. An imperfect copy of the S-38's Binth Patrol Report at hand at this writing reads that the submarine was patrolling submerged in the southern approaches to Kwajalein at 1805 (GCT), July 14. A break in the report follows, until 0747 (GCT) July 15 when the S-38 surfaced and cleared to the south. On July 16, 0312 (L) (1319 (GCT) July 15), the S-38 report reads "Sent dispatch 15-1222 to ComSubPac regarding attack on freighter. This statement makes it most probable that the S-38 attacked the Ultra target, due at Krajalein soon after 0300 (GCT) July 15th. But the break in the copy of the report at hard and the lack of the sub's contact report for July 15 at this writing compel us to state the results of the case as unknown, since the complete patrol report is unavailable.

Case 15

According to an intercepted dispatch of July 14 a convoy designated as "Fu" 406" was acheduled

^{71 -} VII, Case 14, C-2,

to reach Hayasul Seto at 1200 (I) July 22 along a course 72 for which neon positions were given for July 15-21.

Two separate convoys were also scheduled to reach Yokosuka on July 25. The more important, an unknown number of ships travelling from the Truk area, was due at Yokosuka at 0600 (I) July 25. The other convoy, or a single ship, had left Kwajalein on July 15 and was due in Yokosuka at an unknown time on July 25.

neon positions of the "Fu" 406" convey for July 16-17 to the U.S.S. Haddock and sent the convey's position for July 21 to the U.S.S. Sturgeon. This Ultra dispatch also reported to the U.S.S. Spearfish and U.S.S. Searaven the noon positions for July 17-20 of the convoy (or ship) bound from Kanjalein for Yokosuka. This dispatch concluded with the noon positions (July 16-19) of the convoy scheduled to arrive at Yokosuka from the Truk area at 0600 (I) July 25; the U.S.S. Halibut and Searaven were assigned this target.

In another dispatch sent two hours later (15-0912) ComSubPac gave the July 20-23 positions of the

^{72 -} VII, Case 15, A-1 - A-2.

^{73 -} VII, Case 15, A-3.

^{74 -} VII, Case 15, A-4 - A-5.

Truk-Yokosuka convoy to the U.S.S. Skipjack and the V.S.S. Kingfish. (For the information and possible action of the Kingfish, Searaven, and Spearfish this dispatch contained another Ultra, a convoy (for which the Japanese message is unavailable) travelling southeast on July 18-20 toward the Marshall Islands.-Ed. Note)

set its course from the Marianas for Palau toward the route of the "Pu" convoy at a time probably calculated to meet it. It patrolled the Palau area for the next two days but sighted nothing. By noon July 21 the convoy was due at 30 N, 134 E. The Sturgeon was patrolling in the area, but the weather was heavy and nothing was sighted.

The Scearfish made no contacts from July 18 to 27. From July 18 to 21 the Searaven patrolled between 151 and 152 K north of 21 H, the area through which the convoy from Kwajalein should pass, but it sighted nothing The Searaven was too far to the east to look for the other Yokosuka bound convoy, which the Halibut, however, was seeking. On July 16 the Halibut was patrolling off Gusm and Rota along the Empire lanes where the Truk-Yokosuka convoy was expected that day (noon position

^{76 -} VII, Case 15, B-2.

^{77 -} VII. Case 15, C-2. 78 - VII. Case 15, C-4.

^{79 -} VII, Case 15, C-5.

^{80 -} VII, Case 15, C-6.

and 20. The Isuzu, a light cruiser, and an unidentified ship would pass a point bearing 315 degrees, 60 miles distant from Hauru at 0600 (I) July 19 and would arrive at Nauru three hours later. Also an escorted merchant ship was scheduled to reach Hauru at 1000 (I) July 20 along a series of noon positions given for July 15-19.

the positions of the merchant ship as it approached

Nauru (its 19 July position was 01-12 K, 166-55 E) and

the position of the warships 00-10 N, 166-15 E at 0600

(I) July 19 (2100 (GCT) July 18). The next day, ComSubPac

sent the S-38 a second dispatch authorizing the submarine

to delay its time schedule in order to patrol at Nauru

mutil July 20.

Although the S-38 patrolled off Nauru in the vicinity of 1-37 N, 166-04 E from July 17 to 22, it did not sight the Ultra targets approaching the island. On 88 July 22 it sighted two small freighters in the harbor, one of which may have been the merchant ship scheduled to arrive July 20 and which might have slipped into port unobserved.

^{84 -} VII, Case 16, A-1.

^{85 -} VII, Case 16, A-2.

^{86 -} VII, Casa 16, B-1.

^{87 -} VII, Case 18, B-2. 88 - VII, Case 16, C-1 - C-3.

Case 17

The noon positions of an unidentified unit sailing from the vicinity of Ealikpapan, Borneo, to Truk were recovered from a message intercepted July 12.

89
The unit would arrive at Truk on July 21 at 1400 (I).

Later Japanese messages (July 14 and 16) urged the immediate sailing of the unit, evidently a tanker, because fuel 90
supplies were running low.

Staelhead and U.S.S. Timosa the ship's course and speed,
90 degrees and 12 knots, and two positions: 5-10 M,
143-CO E at 0900 (GCT) July 19 and 5-10 M, 149-20 E at
91

The Steelhead was engaged on July 20 with another Ultra target (see VII, Case 18) somewhat to the 92 north of the tanker's route. The Timosa, however, was searching the Borneo-Truk route on July 17, and sighted a tanker similar to the Hippon Waru at 2113 (GCT) July 19. The submarine, after firing four torpedoes which missed, pursued the target through the next day but was prevented from attacking again by the presence of planes

^{89 -} VII, Case 17, A-1.

^{90 -} VII, Case 17, A-2. - A-3.

^{91 -} VII, Case 17, B-1.

^{92 -} VII, Case 17, C-1.

and a destroyer. The tanker was travelling at an estimated speed of 13 knots on course 90 and was loaded. It had first been sighted at 2113 (GCT) July 19 in position 5-10 N. 147-15 E. This is a positive contact. with the Ultra target.

July 18, 19, 1943

Case 18

A Japanese dispatch of July 16 disclosed that a convoy designated 5702, consisting of three merchant ships and an escort, would leave Japan for Truk at 1200 (I) July 17 and would arrive at the North Channel at 0600 (I) July 21. Four positions through which the convoy was scheduled to pass during July 18-20 were also listed. From a later dispatch Communications Intelligence learned that the convoy's course on the morning of July 18 would be 168 degrees and that the Commander of the Guam Detachment would carry out an anti-submarine patrol for the convoy. A further Japanese dispatch, July 18, gave the noon position of the "Pa 496" convoy for July 21.

On July 17 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S.

^{93 -} VII, Case 17, C-3. 94 - VII, Case 17, C-4. 95 - VII, Case 18, A-1.

^{96 -} VII, Case 18, A-2: 97 - VII, Case 15, A-3.

Tinesa the course and noon position of July 18 only for 98 convoy 3702. In a second dispatch sent on July 18 ComSubPas gave all four positions of convoy 3702 to the U.S.S. Steelhead and U.S.S. Pogy as well as to the Tinesa and added for the U.S.S. Sturgeon the July 21 position of the Fur 405 convoy.

The Tinesa did not search for convoy 5702
because from July 17-20 it was searching out and pursuing
another Ultra target on the Borneo-Truk route (see VII,
100
Case 17).

were evidently looking for convoy 3702 on July 20. At O438 (GCT) the Pogy sighted a convoy of four freighters and an escort in position 8-22 N, 149-44 E. It attacked, missed, and was then attacked in turn. At 0942 (GCT) the submarine cleared the area to the northeast. Convoy 3702 was scheduled to pass through CS-42 N, 149-45 E at C300 (GCT) July 20. This is a possible contact with the Ultra target since the time and place agree although there is a discrepancy in the number of ships. The Pogy failed to report the course of this convoy.

^{98 -} VII, Case 18, B-1.

^{99 -} VII, Cass 18, B-2.

^{100 -} VII, Case 18, C-1. 101 - VII, Case 18, C-2 - C-4.

A few hours later the Steelhead, after successfully evading a series of attacks by four sirplanes and two patrol boats, sighted a convoy of one large and two small freighters with an escort (destroyer or torpedo boat) at CS26 (GCT) July 20 in position 8-08 N, 150-12 102 E. The submarine was about to attack when forced to dive. The target dispersed and contact with them was lost. The three freighters and escort were on a southeast course. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

on July 21 the Sturgeon was patrolling under typhoon conditions in the area through which the "Fu" 104 convoy was to pass, but it made no contact. This convoy, the subject of several other ComSubPac dispatches (see VII, Case 15), was never sighted.

Case 19

On July 16 a Japanese message was intercepted which gave the noon positions (July 16-24) of a convoy of several ships carrying personnel and supplies to 105 Palsu.

Cn July 18 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S.
Halibut and U.S.S. Haddock the convoy's noon positions,

^{102 -} VII, Case 18, C-5 - C-8.

^{103 -} VII, Case 18, C-7.

^{104 -} VII, Case 18, C-8.

^{105 -} VII, Case 19, A-1 - A-3.

18-20 N. 134-00 E July 20 and 15-15 N. 134-00 E July 21.

The Halibut, which had been patrolling in the vicinity of the Marianas, left the area for Midway on July 21. The Haddock, however, searched for the convoy and at 2315 (GCT) July 20 sighted four ships on a southerly course in position 16-48 H, 134-00 H. The ships, leaded with troops, were arranged in two columns accompanied by two escorts. Carefully planning its approach, the Haddock fired seven torpedoes in two attacks, hitting all fourships before the escorts sighted the submarine and forced it down with depth charges. One ship was heard breaking up and was believed sunk.

This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Cass 20

According to a Japanese dispatch of July 17 two large tankers, the Missho and Kenyo Marus, were scheduled to leave Singapore on July 18 and arrive at Truk July 29 at noon.

On July 18 ComSubPac, giving the noon positions

^{106 -} VII, Case 19, B-1.

^{107 -} VII, Case 19, C-2. 1C8 - VII, Case 19, C-3 - C-5.

^{109 -} VII, Case 20, A-1.

for July 25-28 inclusive, instructed the U.S.S. Mingo, U.S.S. Haddosk, and U.S.S. Timosa to intercept the tankers.

On July 24 the Tinosa was occupied with another Ultra target north of Truk and at the end of this day was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor. The Mingo was in the area. On July 26 it sighted a tanker which was not the Ultra target. The Mingo reported the contact to ComSubPac as involving a tanker, a freighter, and an escort on course 090 at 3-40N, 134-28 E. ComSubPac returns this information to the Haddock in the dispatch of July 26-1056 and asked that the Haddock patrol in the vicinity of 5 M, 138 E. The Missho and Kenyo Harus were due at 5 H, 138-40 E by 0300 (GCT) July 26. But the Haddock had moved south of Palau after its successful attack of July 21 on four troop ships (an earlier Ultra target; see VIII Case 19) and had already sighted the two large tankers at 2229 (GCT) July 25 in position 2-52 N, 137-40 E. The submarine engaged the unescorted Ultra targets in a running attack for many hours and fired fifteen torpedoes on one of the tankers, but made only two hits. The damaged tanker kept afloat and maintained-its speed.

^{110 -} VII, Case 20, B-1.

^{111 -} VII, Case 20, C-1.

^{112 -} VII, Case 20, C-3.

^{113 -} VII, Case 20, B-2.

Pinally, at 1812 (GCT) July 27, having expended all but one of its torpedoes, the Haddock broke off the pursuit leaving the two tankers still under way at 4-59 No. 139-04 E. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Cass 2I

Having arrived at Nauru at 0630 (I) on July 19, the Captain of the Urakaze disclosed in an inter cepted transmission that his ship would complete unloading and would sail with a destroyer escort for Truk at 1000 (I) on the same day. After passing through the two listed positions the ship would arrive at North Channel at 0500 (I) July 22.

In dispatch 19-1632 ComSubPac sent this information to the U.S.S. Pogy.

The Pogy was patrolling northwest of Truk and on July 20 it attacked a convoy at 8-22 N. 149-44 E (see VII, Case 18). After this the submarine moved to the northeast to patrol the Guam-Saipan-Truk route. Though the Pogy evidently received dispatch 19-1632, there is no evidence that it searched for this Ultra

^{114 -} VII, Case 20, C-5 - C-6.

^{115 -} VII, Case 21, A-1 - A-2.

^{116 -} VII, Case 21, B-1, 117 - VII, Case 21, C-2 - C-3.

^{118 -} VII, Case 21, C-1.

target sailing from Nauru to Truk.

July 20, 1943

Case 22

On July 6 the auxiliary carrier Unyo, the auxiliary cruiser Aikoku, and destroyers (including the Ushio) left Yokosuka for Truk (see VII, Case 6, A-I and 2). The carrier and cruiser were attacked by our submarines off Truk(see VII, Case 6, C-i - C-9). Both were damaged, the Aikoku more severely.

Chuyo (see VII, Case 6, A-5; also Case 10, A-1) left Yokosuka, joined a force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers from the Inland Sea, and arrived safely at Truk July 15 (see VII, Case 10).

arship movements, a Japanese message made arrangements for the return of the warships from Truk to the Empire at some later date in the same month. On July 17 and 18 other intercepted Japanese messages added further information. Three carriers (Hayataka, Hyuho, Unyo) with destroyers would leave Truk keeping in the Truk

^{119 -} VII, Case 22, A-1 - A-3.

Communication zone until-0400 (I) July 20 when they would enter another zone (MA51) and finally still another, the 120 Kure Communication zone. Moreover, the Unyo (and the Chuyo) accompanied by several destroyers including the Ushio would part from the rest of the force bound for Kure at 1430 (I) July 23 in position 31-00 N, 136-44 E 121 and would proceed to Yokosuka.

on July 20 ComSubPac sent two dispatches regarding this carrier force. The first (serial 56) sent at 0943 to the <u>U.S.S. Sturgeon</u> and <u>U.S.S. Pomesno</u> stated that warships including two or three carriers at a speed of 18 knots would arrive at 0530 (GCT) July 23 in position 31-01 N, 136-44 E. The second dispatch (Serial 57) sent at 1018 (GCT) was addressed to the same submarines and also to the <u>U.S.S. Laton</u> and <u>U.S.S. Skipjack</u>. The latter was instructed to take a position July 23 at 34-30 N, 139-07 E while the <u>Pompano</u> was to take station six miles distant and bearing 270 from the <u>Skipjack</u>.

The <u>Lapon</u> was to patrol the area meanwhile.

The Sturgeon reported a typhoon and mountainous waves on July 19. On July 23 the seas were still very high when the submarine at 0753 (GCT)

^{120 -} VII, Case 22, A-3.

^{121 -} VII, Case 22, A-4.

^{122 -} VII, Case 22, B-1.

in position 30-57 N, 137 E sighted a destroyer and then 124 two carriers. The Sturgeon was unable to attack.

This is a positive contact with part of the carrier force, which was scheduled to reach 31-00 N, 136-44 E at 0530 (GCT) July 23.

The Pommano apparently did not attempt to look for this Ultra target since on July 23 it was patrolling at 34-10 N, 148-34 E, ten degrees east of the 125 carriers route. The Skipjack, patrolling in the assigned area, attacked an escorted AX at 34-12 N, 138-31 E on July 22. On July 23 it sighted a patrol boat at 34-10 H, 128-49 E, but it did not sight the carriers.

The <u>Iapon</u>, while patrolling two degrees to the east of the <u>Skipjack</u> on July 23, sighted at 0440 (GCT) two destroyers and a carrier travelling at 20 knots to the southeast. Attacked by airplanes and the destroyers the submarine was forced to remain submerged 127 while the target escaped. This carrier cannot have been one of the Ultra targets since its course and position entirely disagree with the Ultra information. Of the four submarines assigned to this target, only the

^{124 -} VII, Case 22, C-1 - C-2.

^{125 -} VII, Case 22, C-3 - C-4.

^{126 -} VII, Case 22, C-5.

^{127 -} VII, Case 22, C-8 - C-8.

Sturgeon contacted it.

July 21, 22, 1943

C238 23

A Japanese message intercepted July 21 described the sailing of an escorted tanker from Paramushiru Island July 21. The tanker would arrive at Yokosuka July 26. Three positions through which the ship 128 would pass were included.

On July 21 CincPac notified ComNorPac of 129
this Ultra target. On July 22 ComSubPac sent the same information to the U.S.S. Harmhal and U.S.S. Salmon with a warning to watch out for S boats (the submarines of the North Facific Command) which would also be looking 130 for the target.

The Narwhal reported engine trouble on July 24. On July 25 it was searching for another Ultra target (given by ComSubPac's 25-0733) considerably to the south and east of the tanker's route (see VII, 131 Case 33).

The Salmon during this time was en route from its base at Hidway to its patrol area, where it arrived on July 25. From July 25 until July 31 it

^{128 -} VII, Case 23, A-I.

^{129 -} VII, Case 23, B-1.

^{150 -} VII, Case 23, B-2.

^{131 -} VII, Case 23, C-2.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

132

patrolled in dense fog and made no contacts.

July 22, 23, 1943

Case 24

number 3 Toman Haru, a large tanker, reported a change in the course of his ship to take effect at 1900 (I)
July 21 (7 probably July 22) at 03-25 N, 138-00 E,
thence to a point 25 miles south of Sataval Island at
0330 (I) July 23, thence via Puluwat to South Channel,
133
Truk. Later, at 1105 (I) July 23 the Captain reported
that his ship would rendezvous with escerts at 07-04 N,
134
140-24 E at 0930 (I) July 24.

At 1207 (GCT) July 22 ComSubPac in serial 63 sent this information to the U.S.S. Timosa and U.S.S. Steelhead and gave two positions: 03-26 H, 138-60 E 1000 (GCT) July 21 and 07-00 H, 147-05 H 1830 (GCT) 135 July 22. On the following day, after the Captain's second report had been intercepted, ComSubPac sent two more dispatches. The first (23-0911, Serial 68) advanced by one day the dates given in Serial 63 and changed "Pulusat" to read "north of Pulusat". The second (23-175)

^{132 -} VII, Case 23, C-3 - C-4.

^{133 -} VII, Case 24, A-1 - A-2. 134 - VII, Case 24, A-3 - A-4.

^{135 -} VII. Case 24, B-L.

^{136 -} VII_ Case 24, B-2.

gave the tanker's expected position at CO30 (GCT)
137
July 24 as 7-C4 N, 148-24 E.

The Steelhead, preoccupied with mechanical 138 difficulties from July 22 on, made no contacts.

The Tinosa, at 1955 (GCT) July 23, sighted a tanker at 6-55 N, 147-10 E on course 073 and in two attacks fired six torpedoes, of which at least two hit effectively. The tanker stopped, began to settle, but did not sink. In the next two hours the Tinosa fired nine more torpedoes, one by one; all hit but none exploded. Neanwhile, a destroyer arriving on the scane forced the submarine down with depth charges.

This is a positive contact with the Ultra target and is confirmed by a message from the Isusu, a light cruiser, coming with a destroyer (the Asanagi) 140 to the relief of the stricken tanker.

Case 25

A convoy made up of the Asakaze Haru and about five other ships was scheduled to leave Yokosuka on July 19 and to arrive at Truk on July 29. The intercepted Japanese message giving this information

^{137 -} VII, Case 24, B-3.

^{138 -} VII, Case 24, C-1 - C-2.

^{139 -} VII, Case 24, C-3 - C-5. 140 - VII, Case 24, D-I - D-2.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

141

included the noon positions from July 20 to 29.

On July 23 ComSubFac sent the positions for 142 July 28, 27, and 28 to the U.S.S. Timosa. The Timosa, however, had expended most of her torpedoes in an attack on a tanker July 24 (see VII, Case 24) and was ordered at the end of that day to return to Pearl Harbor.

Cass 25

A Japanese dispatch of July 22 revealed that the Awata Maru, had left Paramushiru Strait for Yokosuka and after passing through 45 N, 156-25 K and 34 N, 146 K would arrive at its idestination at 1000 (I) 144 on July 27.

pessible were the U.S.S. Harshal, the U.S.S. Salmon, the U.S.S. Skipjack and the U.S.S. Lapon if it were still in that vicinity.

on July 26 the Narwhal was searching for another Ultra target in an area somewhat to the east of 146 the Awata's course; see VII, Case 33. The Salmon was bound by heavy fog at this time.

At 1540 (GCT) on July 25, the Skipjack sighted one large ship and two escorts bound for Tokyo

^{141 -} VII, Case 25, A-1.

^{142 -} VII, Case 25, B-1.

^{143 -} VII, Case 25, C-1.

^{144 -} VII, Case 26, A-1 - A-2.

^{145 -} VII, Case 26, B-1. 148 - VII, Case 28, C-1.

^{147 -} VII, Case 26, C-2.

Bay at 34-17 N, 140-29 E, but could not maneuver to 148 attack.

patch, however, the Awata Maru would be found at 34-39 K, 139-53 K, at 2100 (GCT) on July 26. The convoy discovered by the Skipjack was near this approximate position thirty hours before the time estimated for the Ultra target. The times given by ComSubPac were only approximate, based on calculations at operational head-quarters, since the specific times for the positions were not listed in the intercapted Japanese dispetch. However, the sighting made by the Skipjack on July 25 can hardly be considered a possible contact with the Ultra target since the discrepancy in time is so great.

The Laron patrolled to the east of the approaches to Yokosuka on July 25 but sighting nothing, and 149 on July 26 it set its course for Midway. No contact was made with the Ultra target.

Casa 27

The Commanding Officer of the Otaka, sending a movement report on July 23, listed the noon posi-

¹⁴⁸⁻VII, Case 26, C-4 - C-5. 149-VII, Case 26, C-7.

tions (I time) through which his ship would pass on route from Yokosuka to Truk. Accompanied by the destroyer the Maikage, the Otaka would depart that morning and was scheduled to arrive at 1450 (I) on July 150

Three submarines were assigned to search for this important carrier. The <u>U.S.S.</u> Spearfish and the <u>U.S.S.</u> Posy were instructed to patrol in areas north and south, respectively, of 14-33 W, 154 E, and the <u>Steelhead</u> was to intercept it between 8 and 12 degrees north should the target escape the other two 151

The Spearfish, searched in the assigned area but made no contacts, and on July 28 set its course less for Midway.

Patrolling the Guam-Saipan-Truk route on July 22-25, the Pogy moved to the Empire-Truk lane where it remained searching through July 28. It did not 153 contact the target.

The Steelhead continued to search in the vicinity of Truk as long as its defective mechanical condition permitted, but made no contacts from July 23 to

^{150 -} VII, Case 27, A-I.

^{151 -} VII, Case 27, B-1.

^{152 -} VII_ Case 27, C-2.

^{153 -} VII. Case 27, C-4.

July 30. He contacts were made with the Ultra target.

July 24. 1945

Case 28

Scheduled to sail at 0700 (I) on July 22, a convoy of six Japanese ships would depart from Tarakan Bornso, three sailing to Palao, two to Ambon, and one to Davao. One of the ships in the group en routs to Palao was identified as the Shinyu Marn and the arrival was scheduled for 1800 (I) on July 27. Listed in the movement report were noon positions for the separate 155 groups.

ComSubPac sent the noon positions for July 25, 25, and 37 of the convoy en route to Palao to 156 the U.S.S. Hingo and U.S.S. Haddock.

The Haddock was at this time pursuing the Kenyo and Hissyo Harus which were en route to Truk from Singapore and which were contacted south of Palau at 2229 (GCT) on July 25: (see VII, Case 20). No search was made for the convoy reported in this Ultra 157 dispatch by the Haddock.

The Mingo, patrolling the southern approach

^{154 -} VII. Case 27, C-6.

^{155 -} VII, Case 28, A-I.

^{158 -} VII. Case 29, B-1.

^{157 -} VII, Case 28, G-1. This dispatch Serial 71, was cancelled in a later dispatch to the Haddock, Serial 88, 26-1056; see VII, Case 20, B-2.

the vessel leaving Kwajalein and added the information that it would arrive at Wake at 2000 (GCT) on July 28.

comsuble further suggested that the submarine attack it at anchor when American dombers 162 would be after this target too.

In a dispatch of July 27, ComSubPac pointed out that the tanker had probably been delayed by bombing raids. If the Seadragen had not already contacted this ship, the submarine was to remain patrolling the southern 163 approaches. On the next day, ComSubPac added that the target was anchored or stranded at Wake, and advised that every possible effort be made to sink the ship before 184 it could unload. However, later intercepted Japanese dispatches led operational headquarters to believe that the tanker scheduled to refuel the Wake Air Base was approaching from the north, touching port at Wake and proceeding scuthwest. ComSubPac listed positions and 165 specific times for July 30, 31 and August 1 and 2.

Patrolling south of Wake at 1400 (GCT)
on July 25, the Seadragon sighted only a grounded freighter

^{162 -} VII, Case 29, B-I.

^{165 -} VII, Case 29, B-2 and A-5.

^{164 -} VII, Case 29, B-3 and A-6 - A-8.

^{165 -} VII, Case 29, B-4 and A-9 - A-11.

on the beach at Wake at 2210 (GCT).

Two torpedoes, one a "dud", and another which was believed to have hit the target or a small bargs nearby, were fired before the Seadragon was forced to submergs. On July 27, a periscope observation showed no other ship at wake and no other vessel was sighted in the vicinity until 0620 (GCT) on July 29 when a small freighter of 3,000 tons was found to be anchored at Wilkes Island adjoining Wake. The Seadragon waited in the vicinity until 1920 (GCT) when the freighter sailed from port. At Ol49 (GCT) July 31 the submarine overtook the target and fired three torpedoes, one of which was heard hitting aft with a low-order explosion. Since the small freighter was accompanied from Wake by two small escorts and one Mitsubishi 96 bomber, the Seadragon was depth charged and did not get another chance to attack, though it later sighted the target underway, It is possible that the vessel was smoking heavily. able to unload its supply of fuel at Wake before it was attacked. The amount of protection afforded the freighter indicates that the ship attacked on July 31 was

^{168 -} VII, Case 29, C-I - C-2.

CRICINAL 11 January 1948

important. The Ultra target was scheduled, after a brief stop at Wake, to pass through 17-38 N, 164-15 E 0300 (GCT) July 31. The Seadragon attacked the freighter travelling course 188 at 0150 (GCT) July 31 in position 167 17-40 H, 163-58 H. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target of ComSubPac's fourth dispatch in this case (30-0307).

July 24, 1943

Casa 30

on July 24 in an Ultra dispatch (for which the Japanese source message is unavailable) ComSubPac ordered the U.S.S. Tullibee to intercept an important target approaching position Ol-25 W, 172-56 E (near Tarawa Island) from the northwest possibly about dawn 168 cm July 28.

At 0535 July 28 (M some time 1735 GCT July 27) the Tullibee submerged ten miles northwest of the entrance to Farawa lagoon. An hour later it sighted a tanker escorted by a plane and a PC type boat approaching on radical sign. The submarine was unable to close

^{157 -} VII, Case 29, C-3 -168 - VII, Case 30, B-1.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

with the target before it reached the lagoon. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Casa 31

A special convoy, the L2, composed of the Kiyokawa Haru, an unidentified merchantman, and a destroyer escort, had sailed on July 23 from an unidentified port, possibly Takao. The Kiyokawa Haru would arrive at Sesebo at 1500 (I) July 26, while the other ship, hugging the coast, would arrive at an unidentified port at 1300 (I) 170 on July 26.

Positions where the <u>U.S.S. Sawfish</u> could find these ships at 0300 (GCT) on July 24, 25, and at 2330 (GCT) on July 28 were included in ComSubPac's Ultra dispatch of July 24. It was added that the ships would separate at the position given on July 28 with the <u>Kiyokawa Maru</u> going to 33-07 H, 129-44 E.

At 1325 (GCT) on July 25, the Sawfish intercepted two freighters with a destroyer escort in position 31 N, 127-30 E. Although four torpedoes were fired at the larger of the two targets, all missed, 172 and the pursuit was abandoned.

^{169 -} VII, Case 30, C-I - C-3.

^{170 -} VII, Case 31, A-1.

^{171 -} VII, Case 31, B-1. 172 - VII, Case 31, C-1 - C-3.

The Ultra target, two freighters and a destroyer, was scheduled to pass through 29-37 N, 125-44 E at 0300 (GCT) July 25 and through 31-53 N, 128-50 K at 2130 (GCT) the same day (according to the Japanese message, although ComSubPac had given the time and date as 2330 July 28). The Sawfish contacted the three ships at 1325 (GCT) July 25 in position 31 N, 127-30 E on course 050, evidently en route to the 2130 position given in the Japanese message. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 32

her torpedoes in demaging an important Ultra target,
the tanker #3 Tonan Maru (see VII, Case 24.) A number of
intercepted Japanese messages disclosed the attack
tagether with the measures taken to protect and salvage
the stricken ship. A light cruiser (the Isuzu), a
destroyer (the Asanagi), special subchasers #5 and #12,
the #2 Chonan Maru, and the Hoko Maru were dispatched to
173
the scene of the torpedo attack.

^{173 -} VII, Case 32, A-1 - A-6.

On July 24 ComSubPac sent two dispatches to the U.S.S. Steelhead in the Truk area. The first, at 1530, warned the submarine of the seven odd ships 174 which were going to assist the torpedoed tanker; the second, at 1753, gave its position at 6-51 N, 147-54 E.

The Steelhead, however, was having machanical difficulties which hindered effective patrolling. The submarine reported no contacts from July 23 176 to July 30.

July 25, 1943

Case 33

Directed by ComSabPac's Serial 76 on July 25 to search in several positions north of Wake Island for a patrol boat (the Japanese source message is unavailable), the U.S.S. Narahal noted in its narrative account that it had received the dispatch, and had conducted an uneventful patrol in this vicinity.

Case 34

Communication Intelligence recovered from an intercepted message of July 23 the moon positions of a six-ship convoy satling southwest from a position in

^{174 -} VII, Case 32, B-1.

^{175 -} VII, Case 32, B-2.

^{176 -} VII, Case 32, C-1.

^{177 -} VII, Case 33, B-1.

^{178 -} VII, Casa 33, C-1.

the East China See to a port on the island of Formosa 179 between July 24 and 28.

Cn July 25 at 0912 (GCT) ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Sawfish of this convoy and gave its noon positions for July 25, 31-06 N, 124-37 B; for July 28, 180 28-34 N, 122-28 E; and for July 27, 25-50 N, 120-45 E.

sighted and attacked in position 31 H, 127-30 E another Ultra target sailing northeast from Formosa to Sazebo; (see VII, Case 31). Upon breaking off its attack on this target, the Sasfish did not turn south to search for the Formosa bound convoy of ComSubFac's 25-0912. Instead, it turned to the west, probably because the submarine had received dispatch 25-0943 informing it of another Ultra target, another north bound convoy which was scheduled to pass only a few degrees west of the Sasfish (see VII, Case 35). Consequently, no contact was made with the south bound convoy of ComSubFac's dispatch 25-0912.

Case 35

on July 25 at 0945 (GGT) ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Sawfish of one or more merchantmen satiling

^{179 -} VII. Case 34, A-L.

^{180 -} VII. Case 34, B-1.

^{181 -} VII. Case 34, C-1.

ORIGINAL II January 1948

northeast through the East China Sea. This information
was derived from part three of an intercepted message
which had been sent by the Resident Haval Officer at
Keelung in northern Formosa and which gave three noon
positions; 28-42 H, 122-24 E July 26; 51-02 H, 125-28 E
183
July 27; and 53-15 E, 128-08 E July 28.

At 1008 (GCT) July 26 the Saufish sighted a convoy of four small merchantships with a destroyer escort on course 050 in position 32-32 N, 127-20 E. The convoy made a radical change of course and the submarine lost contact. Unless the Ultra target was very considerably shead of schedule by some forty hours, this cannot have been a contact with it. At 0235 (GCT) July 27 the Sawlish sighted and attacked another convey, five merchant ships and one destroyer, at 32-32 N, The Patrol Report fails to give the course 127-41 E. of this convey, which cannot positively be identified with the Ultra engage for the Ultra target (an unknown number of ships was scheduled to be at 31-02 N, 125-28 B at 0300 (GCT) July 27, more than a degree south and two degrees west of this contact at 0235. Thus the Sastish, patrolling the route of the Ultra, made two

^{182 -} VII, Case 35, B-1.

^{183 -} VII. Case 35, A-1.

^{184 -} VII, Case 35, C-12- C-2.

ecutacis, sinking a destroyer in the second convey.

But because of the incompleteness of the information,

neither can be established as even a possible contact

with the Ultra target of ComSubPac's 25-0943.

G130 35

The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese

Second Float originated a movement report on July 23

commanding the sailing of the cruisers Ataxo, Takao, and

Magara and a destroyer, the Summane. According to the

Intercepted dispatch the ships would be at 15-15 H,

151-40 K (east of Saipan) on course 340, speed 20, at

1930 (I) July 24; then at 1400 (I) July 25 they were

scheduled to reach position 52-55 H, 140-30 K on the

185

approaches to Yokusuka. The ships could not, however,

cover the distance in a day's time, but rather three days

sculd be required at a speed of 20 knots. Consequently,

Commander-in-Chief of the second

186

position as July 27.

The <u>Skipjack</u>, patrolling along the approaches to Yokosuka on July 25, sighted a large ship and escorta

^{185 -} VII, Case 36, A-1.

^{136 -} VII. Case 36, H-1,

CRIGINAL II January 1948

(see VII, Case 25). On July 27 the submarine mighted improvement of the color patrol vessels.

The Sturgeon had begun its return to Midway on July 25 but delayed in the vicinity of 55 M, 141 H to patrol the area on July 27. The cruisers and destroyer were to reach 32-55M, 140-30 H at 0500 (GCT) July 27 according to ComSubPac's dispatch, but the Sturgeon 188 did not sight this Ultra target.

C239 37

In a dispatch of July 24 the Yokosuka
Chief of Staff listed the noon positions of convoy #3724
which was en route from Yokosuka to Truk, where it was
scheduled to arrive on August I. The convoy would be
composed of the Mogamigawa Maru, the Yamaviri Maru(?),
189
the Seiko Maru, and the Fukus Maru.

to all subs and gave noon positions for July 26, 27, and 190
28. The convoy escaped datection, however, along the northern portion of its route and on July 27 ComSubPac sent another dispatch adding the noon positions for July 29 and 30 and addressing them to the U.S.S. Pogy

^{187 -} VII, Case.36, C-2 - C-3.

^{188 -} VII, Case 36, C-4 - C-5.

^{189 -} VII. Case 37, A-1 - A-22 190 - VII. Case 37, B-I

and U.S.S. Staelhaad.

The Pogy at 1818 (GCT) July 30 sighted a convoy of three ships and a destroyer escort in position 13-66 H. 152-00 H. The submarine began pursuit at a distance on the surface. At 0900 (GOT) July 31 it sent a contact report which the Steelhead, which was miles to the south, picked up and utilized. At 1402 (GCT) the Pogy, submerged within range of the targets at II-16 H. 153-34 E, fired four torpedoes at the largest ship and than dove to avoid the attacks of the escort. torpedoes were heard to hit the Mogamigana Maru, which sank in ten minutes according to an intercepted message from her Captain, who reported that the survivors were being taken aboard the Fukus Haru. Evidently the Pukue remained to pick up survivors while the Seiko (or Saiko) continued on route to Truk-

Meanwhile the Steelhead, having received the Pogy's contact report some hours before had altered its course to intercept the convoy. In position 11-20 Ng 153-30 K at 1900 (GCT) July 31 the Steelhead sighted a single freighter escorted by a PC boat. At 2007 (GCT)

^{191 -} VII Case 37, B-2.

^{192 -} VII. Case 37, C-I - C-3. 193 - VII. Case 37, D-I - D-4.

it fired four torpedess and dove to avoid depth charges 194 from the execut. Two torpedess were heard to explode. They had hit the Saiko Marm at 0610 (I) August I (2110 GCT July 31) according to the intercepted message sent by the Captain of the Mogamigawa Maru.

This Japanese message, sent at 1037 (I), added that the Saiko had been hit by one torpedo in the #4 hold and was able to continue at 11 knots despite 193 flooding. The Commanding Officer of the Steelhead, however, heard the target's screws stop and later heard the last of the breaking up noises at 0702 (I), so 198 concluded that the target sank.

These, them, are positive and confirmed contacts with the Ulira targets,

July 26, 1943

C230 38

A partly decrypted message intercepted July 23 gave the noon positions for July 25-29 of the <u>Hichiel Marm</u> and perhaps one other tanker due to arrive at Tarakan, Borneo, at 1000 (I) July 30.

^{194 -} VII, Case 37, C-4 - C-65

^{198 -} VII, Case 37, D-1;

^{196 -} VII Case 37, C-6,

^{197 -} YII, Case 38, A-1;

Enddock and U.S.S. Hingo of two tankers passing through positions 4-15 H, 137-30 H July 28; 3-20 H, 132-15 E July 27; and 3-20 H, 125-45 E July 28.

The Haddock on July 26-27 expended its

torgedose while pursuing two tankers sailing from

199

Singapore to Truk. The Mingo on July 27 sighted a tanker
in the vicinity of 5-40 H, 134-28 E, but the tanker was

travelling on course C90, due east, and therefore could

200

not have been the Ultra target. Ho contacts were made

with the Ultra target.

Cass 39

According to a message sent by the Captain of the Irako at 0734 (I) July 25, a force composed of the Irako at 0734 (I) July 25, a force composed of the Tankar Irako, the Cruiser Aoba, the Destroyers

Amatsukase and Irakase would be sailing from Iruk to

Kure from 1615 (I) on July 25 until 0530 (I) on

August 1. This information was telephoned by Communication Intelligence Officers to ComSubPac at 1840 (I) on

July 25.

Assigning to the U.S.S. Saury the task

^{198 -} VII. Case 38, B-I.

^{109 -} VII. Case 38, C-1.

^{200 -} VII, Case 38, C-2

^{201 -} VII. Case 59 A-I

of searching for this force, ComSubPac listed the positions of the group for 0400 (GCT) on July 28, 15 N, 140 H; for 1030 (GCT) on July 29, 21-28 H, 138-25 H; 203 and for 2030 (GCT) on July 31, 34-14 N, 132-33 H.

a formation consisting of a tanker, a beauty contact with the Ultra targets.

Jaly 27, 1943

Case 40

it was learned that a ship, possibly the Battleship

Yamato, the Unyo, and Destroyer Division 7 would depart

from the Western Inland Sea on July 31 proceeding to

Truk where they would arrive on August 5. The routes

taken by this force were listed in a separate dispatch

which was also intercepted by Communications Intelligence.

^{202 -} VII, Case 39, B-1

^{203 -} VII Case 39, C-1 - C-5,

^{204 -} VII, Case 40, A-I; 205 - VII, Case 40, A-2 - A-3

ORIGINAL IL January 1948

In a dispatch of July 27 at 0042 (Serial 89D) ComSubPac gave the U.S.S. Saury and the U.S.S.

Paddle position 31-32 H, 132-56 E for 1100 (GCT)

July 51; position 30 N, 136 E for 2100 (GCT) July 31;

and position 22-40 H, 138-56 E for 2300 (GCT) August I.

ComSubPac in a second dispatch of July 27, at 0848,

instructed the U.S.S. Tullibee, while travelling to Truk

where it was due August 4, to search along the route

207

Ultra target at 25 M, 135-56 K (see VII, Case 39), was ranged and so damaged that it set its course for its base on August 1.

The Paddle searched along the course of the task force for several days. On August 1 at 2000 (GCT) it patrolled at the exact position, 22-40 M, 138-56 E, where the Japanese warships were due at 2300 (GCT).

Only planes were contacted in the area. Visibility 209 during this period was variable because of showers.

The Tullibee, leaving Tarawa July 28 where it had sighted an Ultra target (see VII, Case 30), set

^{206 -} VII, Case 40, B-1.

^{207 -} VII, Case 40, B-2.

^{208 -} VII, Case 40, C-1. 209 - VII, Case 40, C-3.

its course for Truk. En route the submarine made no 211 contact with the warships. It did contact them, however, on August 4 off Truk (seeChap. VIII for the month of August, Case 1).

July 28, 1943

Case 41

From an intercepted Japanese message of July 26 Communications Intelligence learned that an unidentified ship leaving Bungo Channel July 27 and travelling at 16 kmots, would arrive at Morth Channel, Truk, at 0600 (I) August 3. Hoom positions were given 212 from July 28 through August 2. Another message intercepted the same day gave the positions of an unknown ship or ships approaching Truk from the west at a speed of 213 lenots and due at North Channel at 1500 (I) July 30.

At CAC2 July 28 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Saury the noon positions of the ship (perhaps an Aikokn Haru type) leaving Bungo Channel July 27.

Its noon position for July 28 would be 29-10 N, 135-15 E, and for July 29, 24-15 N, 138-30 E. The Saury was instructed, however, not to let this Ultra interfere with

The end of the second

^{210 -} VII, Case 30, C-4.

^{211 -} VII, Case 40, C-5.

^{212 -} VII, Case 41, A-1 - A-2.

more important jobs. At 0743 July 28 ComSubPac sent to the <u>U.S.S. Steelhead</u> and <u>U.S.S. Pogy</u> this same target's positions for ©300 (GCT) August 1, 15-10 H. 151-00 E, and for 1330 (GCT) August 2, 9-25 H, 152-40 H. To the <u>Steelhead</u> only was assigned the other Ultra target, one or more merchantmen on course 133.9, speed 12, at CSCO (GCT) July 29, passing southwest of Ulul 215

The Saury reported nothing from July 28 to July 30. On the 30th it attacked another Ultra target at 28 H, 135-58 E (see VII, Case 39). This target, which included a heavy cruiser, was more important than the Ultra of ComSubPac's 28-0402, which was not sighted.

Cn July 30 the Pogy sighted at 13-56 N,
152-00 E an important Ultra convoy which it pursued to
the south and attacked the next day (see VII, Case 37).
Cn August 1 it patrolled the Empire-Truk route and on
August 2 it set its course for Ulul Island. The sub217
marine made no contacts.

The Steelhead had been troubled by

^{214 -} VII, Cass 41, B-1.

^{215 -} VII, Case 41, B-2.

^{216 -} VII, Case 41, C-1.

mechanical difficulties from July 23 to 29 and made no 218
sightings on those days. On July 31 however, having moved north to intercept the convoy which the Pogy was pursuing, the Steelhead attacked one of the ships at 11-20 H, 153-50 K (see VII, Case 37). No contact was made with the Ultra target approaching Truk from the west, south of 219

Case 42

From a message intercepted July 28

Communications Intelligence learned that the Choun Haru

would leave the West Channel of Palau at 1500 (I) July

28 on course 256 at a speed of 9.5 knots. At 1200 (I)

July 29 it would reach position 06-45 N, 131-37 E.

The July 29 position of this ship was sent to the U.S.S. Mings together with the information that the two large tankers sighted by the Haddock (see VII, 221)

Case 20) were heading toward the Mingo.

Cn July 27 the Mingo was lying at 5-20 M, 135-40 R. On July 28 and 29 the submarine moved slowly to the northeast on its sumiliary engine. It did not seek the Ultra target sailing west from Palau (due at

^{218 -} VII. Case 41, C-5.

^{219 -} VII, Case 41, C-4.

^{220 -} VII, Case 42, A-1. 221 - VII, Case 42, B-1.

6-45 N. ISI-37 E noon July 29) nor did it sight the 222 tankers damaged by the Haddock on July 25.

C339 43

A Japanese message of July 25 reported that two groups of a convoy would leave the Falsu area on that day. Group "A", composed of about six ships, would sail to Ujims. Group "B", one ship and an escort, would sail to Yokosuka. Noon positions were given.

Sawry the noon positions of the "A" convoy for July 31 224 and for August I and 2. The Sawry, however, when attack-ing another Ultra target on July 30, was rammed and damaged (see VII, Case 30), and on July 31 the Sawry set its course for Midway.

July 29, 1943

Case 44

Leaving Yokosuka at 1700 (I) on July 27, the #37 convoy composed of the Koogyo and two other marus would arrive at Truk on August 3, according to an

,从在10个位置的公司。但是10个人

^{222 -} VII. Case 42, C-1.

^{225 -} VII. Case 43, A-1 - A-2.

^{224 -} VII, Case 43, B-I. 225 - VII, Case 43, C-I.

Case 45

A dispatch from the Captain of an unidentified warship disclosed that a convoy, possibly made up of
the Hansei and the Missho Herus, would leave Ambon at
1700 (I) on July 28 and would arrive at Palau at 1000
(I) on August I. Hoom positions were listed for July
230
29, 30, and 31.

To the <u>U.S.S. Hingo</u> ComSubPac sent the 231 positions of the two transports for July 30 and 31.

The Mingo on July 30 and 31 was in the vicinity of Sorol Island, (8 H, 140 E), considerably northeast of the route of the convoy, approaching Palau from the southwest. He search was made for the Ultra 232 target.

July 30, 1943

Case 48

A Japanese message intercepted July 24
gave the noon positions from July 25 to August I of the
Chihaya Haru, an unidentified maru, and a destroyer
233
escort travelling from Truk to the Empire.

Since the message was not read until July

^{230 -} VII, Case 45, A-1.

^{231 -} VII, Case 45, B-1.

^{232 -} VII, Case 45, G-1.

30, ComSubPac did not receive the information until 1805 (GCT) on July 30. In less than an hour the convoy's positions for July 31 and Jugust 1 were transmitted to 234 the U.S.S. Skipjack.

The Skipjack, patrolling along the routes to Tokyo Bay, sighted only patrol ships and trawlers 235 from July 31 until August 5.

There was no contact with the Ultra

Case 47

, au .

According to a dispatch intercepted July 30 a convoy of three ships and an escort was scheduled to leave Yokosuka at 1200 (I) on July 31 for Saipan. The convoy's noon positions from August I through August 6 236

assigned by ComSubPac to the <u>U.S.S. Pollack</u>, which was to be assisted by the <u>U.S.S.Paddla</u> and the <u>U.S.S. Pike</u>.

All six recovered positions of the ships from August 1 through August 6 were included in ComSubPac's dispatch.

^{254 -} VII - Case 46, B-1

^{235 -} VII, Case 46, C-1 - C-3,

^{236 -} VII, Case 47, A-1.

^{257 -} VII, Case 47, B-1

CRICIPAL 11 January 1948

Ho ship contacts were made by the Pollack between July 31 and August 4. Cn August 6, two freighter were sighted at 29-05 N. 141-12 E. the chase of which was abandomed when a three-ship convoy was seen in position 29-10 H, 141 H. The first convoy was headed north, the second southwest and both were well north of the positions scheduled for the Ultra target on these days, with which no contact was made by the Pollack,

The Paddle patrolled the area through which the convoy was scheduled to sail on August 4-5 but made no contacts.

The Pike did not search for this Ultra target, for it was in the vicinity of Marous Island seeking bigger game, an aircraft carrier, also an Ulbra target, which it damaged on August 5 (see Chap. VIII for August Case 8]

APPENDIK VII

Intelligence, Orgrational Dispatches, Submarine Assion Records and Varifications - July 1943

Case I

A - Source of Intalligence

No. A-I

FROM: (Chief of Staff 25/1300 June
Tokosuka Haval
District)
TO: (Surface Escort
Unit (2)
(Chichijina Special Base Porce)
(Seipen Communication Unit)
(Ath Fiset)

Econyoy \$3625 consisting of Tonan Hart, Blank sen Hart and Koan Mart escorted by - unident ship) departed 1200 the 25th for PT blanks. Hoom positions from 25 June to 5 July are as follows:

MEGAT COMMUTE: (See next part timed & minutes later);

(pars 1 of 2)

OF COMESTY PT is Truk

(Continuation of one timed & minutes earlier).

Ture 26th, 32-12 North, 139-00 East, 27th, 28-48 Hearth, 139-00 East, 28th, 25-blank H., 139-00 East, 29th, 22-00 Horth, 139-00 East, 30th, 16-36 Horth, 139-00 East, 15-12 Horth, 139-00 East, 2nd, 12-blank H., 141-21 East, 3rd, 10-26 Horth, 143-50 East, 4th, 08-05 Horth, 149-30 East, 5th, 07-25 Horth, 149-30 East,

Case 1. No. A-1 (Cons.)

(3chedulad to pass point H at 0300 the 6th (?).

(Part 2 of 2)

WEST TO THE PARTY OF THE PARTY

OI COMMIT: Above information phoned Cordy. Vogs at 2025 (9) July 2.

esdotereid legalfersco - E

10+ B-1

70: ALL SUES COPYLING EFH FOX

CHEDULES -Table Curch PREC: OP OP OP

GOOD NEWS X WITHA X SERIAL 2 X I LEECH 3 FOFLARS PROBABLY HIG ONES AT 3 HOURS COT 3 JULY COUR 2650 (10-25 HOPTH LA3-50 EAST) ALGAROBA INTE 0520 3-05 ECRIH 146-20 HAST) BUIL 2530 (7-25 HORTH 149-30 BAST) HALLBUT AND POGY ATTEMPT INTERESP-TION X WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER

DO. B-2

05/1801 7117 FECH: COMPUPED

TO: CINCPLO ALL SUES COFYLEO-

HPM FOL PRECE CP CP CP

ULTRA TO POST A HALTBUP HEPORTS CONVOY MENTIONED MY SERIAL 2 IS 6 HOURS LATE X 1 AK MISSING BUT HAMESON DED HOW APPARE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Hallbut

Fifth Bar Patrol

Case 1, No. C-1 (Cons.)

Radio Reception: Communications were generally satisfactory throughout the patrol. Radio reception was good and no serials were minsed.

Ho. C-2

2100 (11

July 2

UNC (E) Hade sound contact (??) with high speed

serems. Not sighted. The night was black
with frequent rain squalls. Maneuvered to

avoid and lost contact twenty minutes later.

0436 (K) Submerged 1921 (K) Surfaced.

July A Conducted surface paired west of Truk Sighted West Fayu Island, bearing 295

degrees T distance 15 miles Signied black sucks on our starboard bear, bearing 245 degrees T. (contact 68) Earsly made cut a ship, estimated range 4000 yards. It was very dark with rain squalls all around. Sound could not pick up tarest. A minute or two later sighted a escond ship which scon disappeared in a squall. Rengs to smoker seemed to be alceing but we were unable to make an commate estimate of the range, tell the angle on the box or even get a good Tos bearing. It was an ideal set up for a radar estack - if we had had a radar. Decided that our best bet was to make an ond run to a position sheed on the track to Truly and attempt interception during daylight. Avoided further contact and hended scuth and then cast.

Joly 5 Up to (k) Changed course to the northeast to close target's estimated track. O536 (k) Just as it was getting light sighted smok

That as it was getting light sighted amoke broad on our port box. We were still 20 miles off estimated target track so decided

94

Case 1. No. C-2 (Cont.)

to gain a little more distance before closing the track and turned back to the eastward. Had originally planned interception between Tarang Reef and Condor Bank but now saw that we would have to make our attack to the eastward of Condor Bank and before the convey reached the vicinity of Fray Feather Bank. Has not ourse of our position as a heavy overcast had prevented obtaining rorning star nights

0730 (X) Cot a sun line which gave us a fair check

on our longitude and at

Changed course to the northeast again to close the track. Obtained occasional bearings on the macks which seemed to indicate that the convoy was heading for the safety of the shoel mater around Condor Ennk.

0954 Submerged when estimated distance to track

was five miles.

1000 (E) Threed north to further close treat but ofter an hour it became apparent that either the convoy had been further north than we had calculated or else it had reached Confor Bank and headed to the north-eastward for Gray Feather Bank. Could not see the ships but the snoke was keeping the convoy well located for us. Changed to normal approach course.

1130 (K) Sighted stacks and masts of the two chirs as they passed north of us at a range of

1220 Reluctantly abandoned chase and turned south.

Ho. C-3

Description of Contact

Mo: 8
Time: 2100 (K)
Date: July 4
Position: 8-00H
1A6-138

Type: Two freighters

Case 1. No. C-3 (Cont.)

Init. Hange: 1000 Course: 110 T Speed: 9 knots

Ecar Combast: SI

Remarks: Later sighted 1130 (E)/5

U.3.3. POOT

Second Wer Patrol

NO. Con

Eadio Reception: Eadio reception was complete with no difficulty experienced in copying HFM on high frequency.

No. C-5

July 1

Patrolled submerged east of Wake Inland during the day. He shipping or planes sighted. Wreek still high on reef.

mly 2 to A

En route patrol area.

חיור ב

1500 (E) Entered area.

On station, patrolling submerged east of Pulap Island.

1300 [E] Sighted two ships to westward. Commenced approach.

1815 (K) Sumset.

1901 (K) In rapidly failing tailight, fired three torpedose at leading ship and two torpedose at second ship. One hit (INT) only in first ship.

1907 (K) Dopth charges and gunfire.

Case 1, No. C-5 (Cont.)

2002 (K) Surfaced in pursuit. Sighted glow of cearchlight over horizon estern. Be-

2115 (E) Radar and sight contact on the two chips at 15000 yards. At this time escort. who had overhauled us astern, sighted as and turned on his light. Submerged to evoid escort. No dayth charges.

23CO (K) Surfaced.

7217 6 to 9

Surface and submerged patrol tetreen Masonito and Hall Islands.

No. C-6

Description of Contact

Time: 1204 (E)
Date: July 5

Position: 7-201

Type: Convoy of two

Init. Fanga: 18000 Est. Speed: 9 knots

How Contact: P Remarks: Attacked both ships

with torpedoes. One hit in leading chip. Escort trailing 30 miles

astorn.

Case 2

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Parcus Inland 28/1405 June

02/1820 July

Case 2, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Yokosuka Chief of TO: Statt) (Yokosukur District Transp. Office) Yokomika Emiliana IMFO: - Spotion Chim') (Yokosuka Haval Hospital) (Yokosuka Civil Enginearing Chief)

unident Harus | depart at

2200 today.

Noon posita (North and East):

29th 25-30, 152-23 30th 27-32, blank-36 let 29-35, 146-50 2nd 31-37, 143-55

Arrive Yokosuku at 0900 on Ath. (rest deals with passengers and cargo, but unable to read).

GI COMMIT: Subs have by phone at 0250 1/3 July.

B - Operational Discatch

10. B-1

PECEL COLSUEPAO TOP JACK (SS 259)

PRISC: OP OP

IN A HURRY THIS ULTRA X AT 0300 CCT 02 JULY 2 POPLARE (MERCHANIMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) POSIT 31-37 MORTH 143-55 EAST ALGAROBA 33-35 NORTH 141-05 BAST AND ARRIVE YOKOSUKA 21 HOURS LATER

THE ROLL .

Case 2 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Jeok

Pirst War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete ond satisfactory.

HO. C-2

July 1 to 3

Patrolling western opproaches to Segari

miy b

Took station at the mouth of Suruga man on a line between Cami Saki and Iro Saki. Dedged three patrol boats during the day and as

1520 (E)

Say a ship hull down and smoking (contact 69) coming around Iro Saki. After two observations which indicated his bearing was drawing toward the north a rain squall set in which reduced the visibility to about 3000 yards and he was lost from views Turned north and had almost concluded that the ship had entered the bay instead of coming across it when the soundman, 2016beam, D.M. picked up heavy screen bearing 56 degrees relative another set at 63 degrees relative and a light fast screw 72 degrees relative. The rain lifted a little and a large morchanteen ves mighted with about a 70 degree port engle on the bow range 3600 yards. He obligingly sigged toward at a range of 3200 yards and eway again at 1800 yards. At this time a second ship was sighted about 1500 yards estern of the first. The Jack

Case 2. No. C-2 (Cont.)

1613 (11)

beat of about 200 tens) and the target. At Colebrated Independence Day by firing three terpedoes from a rongo of 1130 yards on about 67 degrees port tracks, three degrees dirergent spread target speed nine knots, three hits. This target sank so quickly that it was at 250 feat deform to were. ea closed it considerably after firing and turned to opposite course. The sucking, commenting noises of its sinking were clear ly audible through the hull. The escort Cropped only two depth charges - neither of them close and the second ship in the column turned and ran back to Tokyo. An attempt to shoot at the other vessel in the convey was not made because the range was rather long and at the time of firing. the escort was about 400 yards astern and in excellent position to deliver a quick attack. On regaining periscope depth an hour later 5000 yards from the scene of the attack no ships were in sight - the visibility at this time was excellent. There were no counter measures other than the two depth sharges dropped at randon. The ship sunk was similar to AVOKKO MARU page 191, OHI 208-J). She was riding light in the mater.

no. C-3

Description of Contect

Hot Time: Date: Position:

1520 (K) July 4 34-321 138-352 2 ship ecayoy 260

Type: Course: Speed: Remarks:

9 knots Sumk ATCARO MARU class vessel [6783 ten gross] Other vessel unidentified. Escort was a converted work boat of about 200 ten.

Casa 3

A - Scurce of Intelligence

Ho. A-I

TO:

03/1203 7017

INJO:

(Sasebo Defense Force) (B)

"Aritau Maru (chartered (?) yessel) departed Palao Fest Entrance at 0700 July 3 for Ujina. Speed 18 kmots. Fill pass through following points:

(Part 1 of 2)

GI COMMIT: Weather sent out as first part of this part.

Point A. 08-30 N. 134-16 E. Point B. 10-20 N. 135-20 E. Point C. 21-15 H. 134-23 E. Point D. 31-05 H. 134-47 E.

Arrive Pokakora (?) 1700 July 7. Hoon positions 3rd to 7th July:

July 3, 08-44 H, 134-24 E.
July 4, 14-15 H, 134-56 E.
July 5, 21-15 H, 134-23 E.
July 6, 26-32 H, 134-30 E.
July 7, 32-1 H, 133-21 E.

HYPO COMMENT: Time of bassing points: Point C (1200/July 5). Point D (0615/July 7 approximately). Positions were slightly garbled but believed correct as written.

Case 3. No. A-1 (Cont.)

(HPEC-OLOLO2-July) (Part 2 of 2)

CI COMMENT: Phoned to ComSubPackor at 0955 (-9) Ath July-

B - Operational Dispatch

No. E-I

FRCH: COMMUNE TO:

04/0917 July

SEURGEON CIETEPAC

ALL SUBS COPYLING RPM FOX

PEEC OP OP OP

ULTRA SEPILAL 7 ELUE NARGEAL I L POPLAR EZILTEVED TO BE IMPORTANT AND POSSIBLY MAKING 18 KNOTS BY PIT LCG K AT 3 HOURS GOT 6 JULY ESLC 3230 (26-32 H 134-30 E) ALGAROBA DEEY 1021 (32-10 H 133-21 E) X ROUTE BETWEEN 2 POSITIONS CHASH MAY HOT BE MIRECE AS THERE ARE INDICATIONS SEE WILL PASS TEROTOR FCIC 0547 (31-05 H 134-47 B) I AREAS 7 AND 8 ARE VACAUT

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh Har Patrol

No. C-1

Description of Contest

Mot Pine: Dato Position:

133~593

1 Seguri ID

Pansed out of range. Romarks:

Cane A

A - Source of Intelligence

Mo. A-I

This is part I of Jap 2 parter, 2nd part of which was translated in HYFO 060546.

FEGN: (Ath Fleet)

04/1358 July

DAFO: (Chichijina Special Basa Force)

1. "Blank 404 Convoy (A vessel, blank maru (JEND), Kayo Maru, blank maru, and blank maru (will depart Saekd at 0700 blank) July date - missing). Passing through Point A (Borth 31-30, East 134-00).

Point B (North 24-00, East 134-00).

Point C (North 16-00, East 132-00).

Point D (North 10-00, East 132-00).

Point E (North 07-50, East 133-05).

It will arrive Palao at blank July 12. Speed 8

It will arrive Palao at blank July 12. Speed 8 blank knots. Have the blank escort as far as Palao. The blank as far as North 29-00.

GI COMMENT: Received in HEGAT'S 071724. NEGAT calls convoy the "# #404 Convoy; and did not mention it's leaving Sacki.

No. 4-2

Following is part I of despatch reported in HYPO 050546

FROM:

(Naval Minister and Chief Nav. Cen. Staff) 0A/1358 July

DRIGHAL 11 January 1946

Case b. Ho. A-2 (Cont.) TO: (4th Fleet) (8th Flest) (Saipan IF) (lst Section Haval Ceneral Staff) (Yokosuka Naval District) (Combined Fleet) Chichijima Special Base Force) "Convoy o 2604 blanks maru blanks) blanks will pass through Kayo Maru the following points. 31-30 Morth, 134-00 East, 24-00 Horth, 134-00 East, 16-00 Horth, 132-00 East, 10-00 Morth, 132-00 East, 07-50?Horth, 133-15 East, Arrive PP ? at 1500 ? on the 12th blanks escort." OT COMMENT: - ComSubPac informed at 0600(-9). HYPO's 060546 gave noon posits for this con-10. A-3 04/1358 July PROMI . TO: INFO:

或的特殊的特殊的特殊。 第二章

Case L. Mo. A-2 (Cont.)

"Mayo Maru-and others in convoy. Moon positions:

July 5, 30-00 H, 134-00 E.

July 6, 26-35 H, 134-00 E.

July 7, 23-15 H, 133-45 E.

July 8, 19-55 H, 132-55 E.

July 9, 16-35 H, 132-10 E.

July 10, 13-15H, 132-00 E.

July 11, 9-5H, 132-05 E.

Arrive Palso dlank.

CI COMMENT: Consubree informed 0935 (I)/6th July.

B - Operational Dispatch

Ho. B-1

TO: ALL SUBS ON HEM FOX
PREC: OP OP

PECAH AT 3 HOURS CCT 9 JULY AT EMST 35-10 (16-35 HORTH 132-10 EAST) ALGAROBA ZKST 15-00 (13-15 HORTH 132-00 EAST) SEXT 55-05 (09-55 HORTH 132-05 EAST) CONSUMPAC MENTAL 11 ULTRA X CURMAND ATTEMPT INTERCEPTION X MINCO AUTHORIZED TO ASSIST IF ABLE TO REACH TRACK WITHOUT EXCESSIVE FUEL EXPENDITURE X MATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Green

Becord For Patrol

Case & (Cont.)

Ho. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was satisfactory.

Inst serial received was 67

(261021 July 443)

Ho. C-2

July 9-10 Surface patrol on convoy lanes.

July II

0254 13-169 131-552 Sighted four AX's and escort bearing 2700.

1,000 yards on southerly course (Ship Contact #18). (No indications of these ships on SJ Radar. Radar hasn't had a pip since leaving Midsey.) Commenced trailing ships precaring to attack. Escort noves bank and forth across bow of leading ship. Visibility is variable with cloudy background. Ships of convoy zig both in column movement and by ship turn movements. No receive from Radar; training sound head by hard in torpedo room and having range projector in comming tower have not been able to obtain echo range.

C445 (I)

Taking advantage of break of down with convey silhousted to eastward fired tubes, 1, 2, 3 and 4 at ship \$4. No hits observed in spite of spread. Shortly after firing, Radar had a faint pip approximate range 1,500 yards. (Range unit is definitely not working as crystal is grounded.) Decided I had over estimated speed and range and that angle on how estimate was pour. Saung ship to make sterm tubes bear. Meanwhile \$4 and blinking a signal light. Ships \$2 and \$3 saung to right and as \$3 presented better target at 0,51 fired tubes 7, 8, 9 and 10 at \$3. Meanwhile ship \$2 had managered so as to overlap shead of \$3. One torpedo hit \$3 inst about his bridge, another hit the

Case No. 4 (Cont.)

D - Veriffeation

Ho. T-I

From: (Namu) (C)
(Sasebo Defense 26655
Force Unit) (C)
(Coff Kure) (B)
Thfo: (Guard Division #43) (B)
(Patrol Boat #46) (B)
(Det. Civil Tag. Section 4) (C)

"At 0500 the 63 ship (-unident) received a torpedo attack and sank in posit 13-blank H, 132-00 E."

COMMENT: Torpedo attack by Gurnard.

CHIGHAL 11 January 1946

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. 4-1

TO:

06/1700 3017

"Schednle changed as follows: at 1200 on 9th, 6-13 Morth, 145-20 East. At 0000 on 10th, 7-00 Morth, 145-00 Hast. At 0400 on 10th, 7-15 Horth, 143-50 East. At 0500 on 10th, 7-15 North, 149-43 East. At 1200 on 10th, 7-26 North, 150-33 East."

MEDAT COMMENT: Unable to determine what unit

COMMENT: Transmitted as TUTA:; Treated as

COMM: routed to Commind Fleet.

Comd:. Yogs had this at 070700 (-9)

July: HIPO's version added "At

blank pass Forth Channel."

Identity is not known here either.

B - Operational Dispatch

Ho. B-1

PROME CONSUMAC

07/0911 7017

me Hero

ALL SUBS HEM FOX

TITO: CIMUPAL PREC: OP OF CP

THIS COES ULTRY TO MINCO I 1 OR HURS POPLARS (MERCHANIMAN TYPE URKNOWN) 0300 GCT 9 JULY AT MIKI 1520 (06-15H 145-20E) POSITION 12 HOURS

Came 5, Eo. E-1 (Cont.)

LATER BAVE (07H 145E) AND A HOURS AFTER THAT BAVE 1550 (08-15H 146-10E) AND THEY THEN HEAD BUE EAST X SUCCEST YOU GO AFTER THEE INSTEAD OF THYLEO TO REACH MY SERIAL 11 X COMSUMPSO HUMBER 16

C - Submerine Action Reports

U.S.S. Hingo

First War Patrol

Ro. (1-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete

FO- 0-2

July 8

Passing through Caroline Islands just

anly lo

Still patrolling south of Sateral Island.

1300 (E) Discontinued patrol north of Tanthe Shoal

and proceeded on course 258 degrees for

our area.

2200 [K] Changed course to 231 degrees.

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

So. A-I

TROMY SOTA 6 (Unyo)

05/1423 7017

Cess 6, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Unyo. Alkoku Mars and perhars enother ship or two will be in 10-26 H., 150-33 E. at 1800 on the 10th. Will pass through point are at 0330 on 11th and errive North Channel at 0515. Making 17 knots. Requests acrial patrol at entrance. Unyo is carrying 60 shipboard fighters (es cargo) and other items.

. A-2	
	(Unyor) 06/1423 July
FRCM:	
	(Combined Fleet)
	(Yokosuka Hayal
	District)
	(2nd Fleet)
III/0:	(4th Fleet)
	Mark Strain Control
	(Chichijima Special
	Base Force) (Solpen Base Force
	Fig. 12 Committee to the control of
The same property and the same same same same same same same sam	Deperts Yokonaka blanks 6th Jul

Le Unyo

With Aikoku Maru

72 DesDiv 7/

with Aikoku Maru

72 DesDiv 7/

which is the state of t

OHIGHAL II January 1946

Case 6, No. A-2 (Cont.)

2. Unyo cerrying following:

650 passengers.

60 fighter shipboard planes (including those for Air Group 201

80 tons of supplies for blanks Naval

Stores Section plus about 20 tons of other numitions.

Periscore for -unident sub) and other military stores.

HEGAT CONTENT: This is complete version of Hegat's 060659.

CI COMMENT: The reference contained nothing beaides what appears in the above translation. Commander Voge (Submarine Laison) sat this at 070700 (-9) July.

MOL A-3

The state of the s			
	k originator	בנד וסט	o wil
TO:			
THEOS	Lack Control of the Control	7	

"From Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet.

1. This force will sortie from Inland Sea on
10 July and arrive PT about 1400 on 15th. Request
errangements for anti-subscrine patrol from 0700
on 15th. Position at 0400 on 15th will be 10-50 N,
151-30 E. Thence on course 180 degrees speed 24
knots until 1300 when will change course to head
for Forth Channel."

MEGAT COMMENT: Since originator is Chief of Staff

Jrd Fleet and he uses expression

"Tootai" it is impossible to say

for cortain what units he has with

him. The literal translation of

"Tootai" in this spot would be

"This fleet" but obviously that

phrase would give an incorrect

Case 6. No. A-3 (Cont.)

impression since much of his fleet is already in southern waters. Suspect Cardiv I and CruDiv 8 are principal units concerned in this movement. Date of departure from Inland See probably 10th or 11th.

CI COMMENT: PT is Truk.
Phoned CincPac 070825 (-9) July
Phoned ComSubPac 070830 (-9) July
Code group July date confirmed as 10 July
by MES 071401.
Original eppears on P. 64 and 65 of Book for July
6, 1943.

HO A-Is

FROM:	Blank 0	riginal	107	•	16/1354	1 mil
TO:		A				1/2
				3.5		
THO:						

From Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet.

1. This force will sortie from Inland Sea on

July date) and arrive PT about 1400 on 15th.

Hequest arrangements for anti-submarine patrol from

6700 on 15th. Position at 0400 on 15th will be

10-50 H. 151-30 E. Thenes on course 180 degrees,

speed 24 knots until 1300 when will change course
to head for North Channel.

MEGAT COMMENT: Since originator is Chief of Staff
Jrd Fleet and he uses expression
"Tootai" it is impossible to say
for certain what units he has with
him. The literal translation of
"Tootai" in this stot would be
"this fleet" but obviously that
phrase would give an incorrect

ORIGUIAL 11 January 1946

Case 6, Ho. A-4 (Cont.)

impression since much of his fleet is already in southern vaters. Suspect Cardiv 1 and Crudiv 8 are principal units concerned in this novement. Date of departure from Inland Sea probably 10th or 11th.

OI COMMENT: PT is Truk. Phoned ComSubPacFor 070830 (-9) July.

HO. A-5

FROM: Blank Originator 05/1032 July
TO:

(garbled)
(Yekosuka
Naval District)
(Air Group #802)

This ship is scheduled depart Yokosuka at 0400 on 10th, passing to westward of -Oshima?) and between - Unident Island) and Hachijojima?) After offecting rendezvous with blank at 0600 on 11th in 27-40 North, 137-35 East, will proceed to PT (Truk).

B - Operational Disputch

No. B-1

ORIGINAL II January 1946

Cosa 6, No. B-1 (Cont.)

07/0749 July FROM: CORSUIPAO TO: ALL SUBS CUARDING HEM FOX

PREC: OF CP

SERVAD LA RED HALLBUT SEARAVEN SEVEGEOU BLUS NAPARAL ULTRA: A EMERY TARREORCE PROBABLY COE-SISTING 2 CARRIERS SEVERAL CHUISERS AND DESTROY-ERS WILL DEPART THLAND SEA ABOUT 10 JULY FOR TRUK ARRIVING 15TH K STURGEON AND REARAVEN HOWE IT IS POSSIBLE THIS IS THE OUTSIT 026 PEADUR MEETS IN POLITION LEGA 4038 (27-40 HORTH 137-38 EAST) X WILL CIVE EXACT INFO ON THIS PASK FORCE LATER TO THE ROYS HEAR THUK X ANDTHUR 026 PRANCT PLUS OAS POPCORM AND SEVERAL DESTROYERS DEPARTED YOKOSUKA 6 JULY HAKING 17 MIOTS X THEY WILL PASS HETUKEN 200 AND 250 BILLES WEST OF MARIAMAS ISLANDS CHAIN AND WILL ARRIVE GOJA 2653 (10-26 NORTH 150-53 EAST AT 9 ECURS COT JULY 10 AND NORTH CHARREL TRUE 11 HOURS LATER X POGY TAKE STATION IN POSITION AND SOUTHEAST RESPECTIVELY OF POGY X RELADIONS DETECTION TO PERVEYED DIVERSION OF TARCETS AND MAKE EO APPACES NITHEN 100 MILES OF POSITION EXCEPT ON MAJOR TARGETS & ATTACK NO-OTHER SUES UNLESS ENEMY IDENTIFICATION IS POSITIVE I SEARAVED STARTE FOR AND APPROXIMENS GROUP IN POSSIEUR MILLS ENROUPE. TO POSITION FOR FL SERIAL 10 :

Fo. B-2

11/1000 July FROM: ENLIGHT

COMSUMPAC TO: INFO: CINCPAC PREC: OF OF

TASK FORCE SO HINUTES LATE X 2 DD'S ACV HOL X 3 HURS IN AUXILLARY ORDISCR X ESCOUTE AREA X CRE HALF OF CHES HAS PROMATHE POISONING X 18 FISH X UJJL 3762 0670 *UJX 11-00 NORTH 119-00 HAST

No. B-3

11/1440 July PROM: STEELERAD

Case 6, No. B-3 (Cont.)

TO: COMSUMPACINGO: CIMOPAC PRACE: OP OP

TASK FORCE 86 MINUTES LATE X 2 ESCORTS FLAT TOP AND DAMAGED XOL X 5 FISH AT CV 3 PROBABLE HITS X LAST SEES BELCHING HUGE COLUES OIL SHOKE APPARENT— LY STOPPED X 19 FISH GOLU (10 H 151 E) PROCESDING AREA

C - Submerine Action Reports

U.S.S. PORT

Second War Patrol

Mo. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete and satisfactory.

No. C-2

July 10

Subserged patrol on Ampire-Truk route.

1926 (E) Surfaced. SJ radar out of commission.

2016 (E) Sighted three ships to westward about

12000 yards on scutherly course.

2019 (K) Subserved in bright moonlight as destroyer headed toward us. Radar still out.

Heard several distant explosions. Destroyer closed to about 5000 yards and then opened out.

2130 (K) Surfaced.

Mo- C-3

Description of Contact

No: 2
Description: 3 unidentified snips

Caso 6. No. C-3 (Cont.)

Time: 2016 (E)
Date: July 10
Position: 10-24 N
150-53 E

Course: South Speed: 18 knots

Type: 3 Unidentified ships
Remarks: No attack made. Forced down
by escorp. Redar out of

commission.

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

HOW Col

Radio Reception: Radio reception see VII Case

Ho. C-5

July 10

OAAO (K) Subcorged.
2017 (K) Sighted two large ships on starboard bow (Contact #10). Hange 7000 yerds, angle on the bow zero. Light from a helf-full moon with an overcast sky made visibility fairly good for a submerged approach.

Cornersed approach. Formation zigged to
the right putting us in a favorable attack
position. Identified leading ship as a
converted carrier, second ship as auxiliary cruiser. Sound picked up screws of
one excerting destroyer on our starboard beam.
Hange and angle on the bow was difficult to
estimate but got a quick set-up on the

carrier.

2026 (K) Lost depth control. Believe we took some rater in forward while making tubes ready. Then control was regained a few minutes later the carrier had gotten by a favorable firing bearing. Shifted target to the auxiliary ordiser and at.

Case 6, No. C-5 (Cont.)

- 2032 (K) Fired six torpedoes at the cruiser. Three hits. East the first torpedo hit, reising a large column of smake and debris from the vicinity of the bridge. Heard but did not see the other two torpedoes hit as was
- looking for the escort.

 2034 (K) Made stern tubes ready for possible shot at the escort who had turned in the direction of the cruiser and was crossing our stern.

 Took enother look at the cruiser. It was stopped, down by the stern and red flares were being fired. The carrier was signalling to the cruiser with blinker tube.
- 2035 (K) Heard a series of about six explosions which sounded like internal explosions in the
- 2036 (E) Sound reported the noise of a torpedo on our port quarter. Checked the bearing and new it coincided with the bearing of the destroyer. Went deep. It could have been one of our torpedoes running erratic or one fired down our torpedo track by the destroyer. Did not hear the torpedo again after we started deep. A few minutes later, the sound can reported that all he could hear was one set of heavy screws estern. These slowed down until they were almost stopped and they present the grain.
 - and then speeded up again.

 2114 (K) Four depth charges, not close. The sounds of the depth charges dropped on this attack were different from any previously heard by this vessel. Three distinct noises were heard for each charge. First, there was a low muffled explosion which was followed about two seconds later by the customery click. Four to five seconds after the click, the lord explosion and water noises were heard.
 - 2120 (R) Destroyer commenced searching for us using echo ranging on 18 kcs.

Case 8, No. C-5 (Cont.)

Four ners depth charges

Pinging became fainter and finally foded

cut or stopped

2343 (E) Surfaced

Ho. C-S

Dascription of Gintact

Lo: 2017 (I) July 10 Time: Dates

IC-37 II Positions

150-45 E One XCT, one XCL and 2 DD's

Init. Hange: 7,000 Courses ... 17 knots Spend: ..

How Contact: P (might)

Fired 6 torpedoes at Rommitta ICL (AIRONU MARU class) - 3 Mts.

U.S.S. Steetherd

Second War Patrol

10- C-7

Radio Reception: Ho difficulty was experienced in copying the submarine schedule. Serial 25 of early July was missed.

Eo. C-8

July 10

Latitude 100 - 227 H. Longitude 1500 -1900 (L) 57 E.

Surfaced and decided to patrol up and 1913 (L) down moon, five miles on either side of our ---- position. Were heading westward when at

Cano 6. No. Cas (Cont.)

during the morning. Nothing sighted all day, not even a plane. They must have

zigged, either away or down.

1910 (L) At Latitude 090 - 48' H. Longitude 151

CO* E. Surfaced and proceeded towards
patrol area.

2300 (L) Sent our 111A40 to ComSubPac reporting estion. Decided to patrol east of Truk along the Empialein routs.
(L time in this report is an error for K time, -10 hours, - Editor's Hote)

Ho. C-9

Description of Contact

No: 1
Time: 2016 (L)
Date: July 10
Position: 10-214
150-49E

Course: 1620°T

22

Speed: 16 knots to 18 knots

Type: Convoy - 1 CV or ICV 1 AP or ACL 2 ID's

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Petrol

No. C-10

July 11

Patrolling submerged. Have seen nothing since the seventh.
Sighted carrier type zero - 27-44, 137-33.
Sighted one Chitose class seaplane tender escorted by one destroyer. Commenced approach. At 6625 when we were not for a 90 degree port track stern shot, and range

Casa 6. No. C-10 (Cmt.)

2500 yards, he zigged to the loft. We were then 300 yards from the track, too close for a bow shot and too far to cross his bow for a starn shot. Went shead full on the port screw and saung right. Hoped we might got him with a storm shot. Then we had saung half way around he passed over us making 18 knots. When I next looked he had passed too far to shoot. He has a charmed life. This is the second time in two successive patrols I have tried to get him with the same results. This is carriers and the carriers, range about 14,000 yards

0705

to get him with the same results.
Thile on course 270 sighted 6 craisers and two carriers, range about 14,000 yards beading to the southerst and zigging radically. They were making 20 kmote and the closest we could get to them was 2500 yards. This formation was well covered by carrier planes. It was very disheartening to just match those ships so by.

1947 (II

Surraced and hoaded back to Shicho Misaki.

(End meather - Editor's Hote)

Eo. C-11

Description of Contact

Time: 0700
Time: 0700
Date: 7017 11
Position: 27-128
137-388

Type: 1 CV - 6 CA Remarks: Least range 8500

Hany planes

U.S.S. Searaven

Seventh War Patrol

2016 [L] CONTRACT (1) Latitude 100 - 21 %. Longitude 1500 49 % E. Sighted two dark objects on the
horizon bearing 3400 T. distance 9 to 10
miles. Visibility was excellent at the
time although rain clouds which were later
to prove very useful were already gathering
in the east and overhead. Went to Battle
stations and commenced trailing from shead.
As contact developed it appeared to consist of one large vessel, on AF or an
auxiliary CL and three escorts of varying
mixes estimated at the time to be enything
from DD's to torpedo boats. Our first
plotted speed of the force was 16 knots.

2040 (L)

Sew an orange flash in the direction of one of the escorts and heard a number of explosions from the bearing of the task force. It appeared from the "miskel seats" that an attack was being made by either the FOGY or the MALIBUT at this time. When the ensuing meles had cleared a little we continued to trail first from shead of the convey and then from the port beam. The ACL now chowed a speed of 8 to 9 knots, and was mig magging radically on a base course of 1620 T. She appeared to be damaged. At

July 10

Latitude 10° - 07° N. Longitude 150° 52° E. When range to ACL was 9,000 yards
discovered vessel which had come from the
2315 (L) westward to take position sheed of the ACL
was a CV or NCVI Shifted targets and condusted attack on this target. With a range
of 2000 yards and an angle on the bow of
95° port at

2378 (I)

Latitude 10° - 02° H. Longitude 150° - 46° E. Fired five torpedoes and turned away. Beliave we obtained at least 1 hits. Target turned away, began cuitting clouds of black smoke and apparently stopped. Rotired at flank speed on the surface and at

Casa 6, Ho. C-8 (Cont.)

2356 (L) Hoard two loud explosions, probably depth charges, from the direction of the nearest escort, a large DD, which was at that time directly estern of us. We were probably never sighted, as at

July 11

- CCCO (L) This escort returned to the vicinity of the damaged ACL which she had been guarding closely all evening. As we continued to retire on the surface, heard several resultory explosions and as the range opened the target appeared to have a list of about 100.
- 100 At 0030 (L) Lost redar contact on ACL at 19,000 yards end contemplated roversing course to see if it could be regained. It was now nearly pitch black dark and raining intermittently. We were in the POOT's cree, with no know-ledge of what she or the HALLEUT were doing, With the poor visibility obtaining it was decided that the best procedure would be to run ahead of the task force and attempt to intercept it at dam. If the carrier were only demand the would be with it and we could then get in enother attack without endangering other subs in this area. A TOS at this time for if we had known the FCCY and HALIEUT were not in the vicinity, we would have maintained contact for enother attack. Plotted in estimated dam position of convoy and at

MIA II

O450 (L) Latitude C90 - 18° M. Longitude 1500 - 59°E.

Dove five miles south of the plotted position and reversed course heading towards task force, running at periscope depth, visibility excellent. Heard several distant explosions

Case 6 (Cont.)

No. C-12

July 11

0644 (J) Sighted lone enemy seventeen hundred ten destroyer. A single stacker. Her course 270°, speed about twenty knot. Mistock her at first for a cruiser. She was bearing 030° distant about 10,000 yards. Came to course CCCO for ninety track. Figured she was probably part of a screen of a larger force. Planned to let her go by unrolested hoping for bigger gome. Then at a range of 3500 yards destroyer care to loft to course 1700 presenting a zero angle on the bow. Eased down to 120 fast while she came down starboard side at 215 HPM. No pinging. 0720 (J) Dostroyer out of sight bearing 1600 (T) had been zig zagging radically. Came to course 090°. 0739 Changed course to 1300 Changed course to 1400 0800 Sighted formation of ships and planes bearing 034 distant 20,000 yards. First 0820 appeared as four large ships and a number of smaller case. Angle on bow appeared quite small. Range did not change and bearing bauled rapidly to southward. Care to course 1200. 4580 Identified two of ships as aircraft cerriers of the Shokaku Class. Masts were rigged on the trailing carrier and lowered on the leading carrier. They were still hull down and masts had given impression of more ships. Islands and foremast had given impression of a small angle on the bow where the angle was now seen to be about eighty, starboard. Our position Lat 270-34! H Long 1370-27* E.

Case 6, No. C-12 (Cont.)

Identified leading ship as Chitose Class scaplane tonder and trailing ship as Tone. Class heavy Cruiser. Could make out tops of what must have been about three destroyers. Two float type planes and two single engine carrier planes provided a closa screen. 0925 Formation over horizon. Rad checked them on base course 1550, speed of advence fifteen knot. Started back down steamer lanes to area fourteen. See track chart. 2039 Sent SEARAVER serial one to ComSubPac. Cleared to Radio New Caledonia efter considerable interference from a Jap. Paraphrase of Message: Saw one Tone Class CA two Shokaku Class CV one Chitose Class AV pass Lat 27-33' N 1370-32' E at twenty three thirty zebra on course 1550 speed 15 knot but unable to attack. Aumber one air bank carried away. Number one engine smokes least, number three most. Indications point toward lube oil being limiting factor. Lesting until nineteenth at one engine speed. Unless otherwise ordered intend return via Marous for additional survey as other attempt skotchy due to surface and air potrols. Japs had P-38 type plane here and radar near beach on middle east side. Cur position Lat 270-36'H Long 1370-40'E.

Ho. C-13

Description of Contact

No: 3
Time: 0820 (K)
Date: July 11
Position: 27-64N
137-30E
Course: 155
Speed: 15 knot

Casa 6, No. C-13 (Cont.)

Typo:

Two Shokaku class CV page 25, one Tone class CA page 41, one Chitose class AV page 59, all of OHI 14.

Remarks:

Protected by close alrereft screen, about three destroyers and a distant screen about 20 miles shead.

Cass 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

TO:

05/1731 July

INFO:

Torawa)
(garble)
(Chief Transportation Section Tokyo)
(Marcus Island
Force)

(Base Force #3

(Combined Fleet)

(4th Flest) (Air Flotilla

"#20 Hikage Haru escorted by (
unident ship) departed PT for PQ via RTC at
1630 on the 5th. Will arrive RTC on 0300 on the
10th end depart at 1800 the same day arriving PQ
at blanks on the 12th. Noon positions (6th
through 12th):

6th, 05-43 North, 154- East. 7th, 03-56 North, 158- East.

Case 7. No. A-1 (Cont.)

8th, 02- North, 161-38 Enst. 9th, 00-25 North, 165-00 Enst. 10th, BYC 11th, 02-20 North, 167-02 East. 12th, 06-157Forth, 167-30 Enst.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPac informed at 0445 (-9)
July 8th: PT is Truk, PQ is
Ewajaloin, HTC is Nauru. #20
Mikage Maru is a 2718 ton vessel.

B - Operational Discatch

Mo. B-1

FROM: COMMUNICATION 09/1015 July TO: ALL SUBS COFFIEND NEW

INFO: CLECPAC PREC: OP OP

COMSUMPAC SERIAL 22 X VIITA X RED PORPOISE VILVIUM HERCH (FREIGHTER) HLANK BLANK X MINUS 0900 X MINUS 4 I HPPE 2012 (2-20 FORTH 167-12 HAST) ALGAROBA ZMPE 1530 (6-15 H 167-30 H) X S 28 CAN WORK ON THIS AS FORFOLSE HAS REEN ORDERED TO LEAVE AREA I FOR INFO HALTEUT PCGY AND STEELERAD 043 POFCORM HENTIONED MY SERIAL 14 IS IN AUXILLIARY COTTONHOOD (CRUISER) I FOR GURHARD PECAN LENGTONED HY SERIAL 11 TILL HOT STEER DIRECT ROUTES BETWEEN POSITIONS CIVER AS IT IS SCHEDULED PASS THROUGH CONT (10-N 132 E) AND BJEY (7-50 H 133-15 E) I ALL DATES HAY POSSIBLY BE 1 DAY LATER THAN STATED X FOR CAPTAIN eromi on harmeal strong indications your 3 side kicks are savely instite their assiched area and PLENTY ACTIVE I HO EVIDENCE AS YET OF ANY DEFINITE COUNTER MRASURES X MINCO NOTE MY SERIAL 16 MAY Concern Larch Euros (Tanser)

C - Submarine Action Reports

Case 7 (Cont.)

U.S.S. S-28

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception extremely poor and usually impossible at night.

No. C-2

July 5

At Sub Ease, Dutch Harbor. Fueled and provisioned. Conducted practice approaches and occapensated compass on 9 and 10 July.

July 13

1100 (7) Departed Dutch Harbor.

U.3.9. 5-38

Minth War Patrol

No. C-3

July 15

0505 (L) Submarged. Patrolling southern approaches to Evajalein.

Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

No. 4-1

FROM: KITO 8 TO: REME 3 UEO 3

09/1012 July

Case 8. No. A-1 (Cont.)

INPO:

I. Hlank convoy, consisting of "A" vessels Ryoyo Maru Shoho Maru unident ermy transports), and "B" vessel HORKAI Maru escerted by Unident ships) departed PP (Palao) at 1000 on 9th. Speed 8.5 knots. Will pass through following points:

7-13 H, 134-30 E.
6-14 H, 134-32 E. 2-02 S, 148-52 E.
3-42 H, 136-20 E. 2-56 S, 149-36 E.
0-08 H, 144-93 E. 4-03 S, 152-097E.
Will arrive RR (Rabaul) at 1500 16th.
2. Noon positions 10th - 16th:

1-20 H, 135-52 E. 1-00 S, 146-55 E. 2-50 H, 138-32 E. 2-42 S, 149-27 E. 1-38 H, 141-22 E. 4-03 S, 152-11 E. 0-20 H, 144-10 E.

3. Convoy is carrying following material and personnel.

(a) The Force: 295 men, 10,000 blank of ensoline, 27 automobiles.

(b) The Ryoyo Maru Force: Blanks (c) Shono Maru: 1500 tons of coal

-Subs by phone 1025 (I) 10 July.

10/0840 July

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

TROM: COMSUSPAC TO: ALL SUBS ON HPH FOX IMPO: CINCPAC - CTS 72

PREC: OP OF OP

SERIAL 24 ULTRA I 2 LOCON (ESCORT VESSEL) 1

Case 8, No. B-1 (Cont.)

POPLAR (MERCHANT TYPE UNKNOWN) 149, 235 AND 048
POPCOEM HLANK MINUS 1.5 MINUS 900 MINUS 4 HEUX
5030 (2-50H, 138-31E) ALGAROBA CPEO 3822 (1-38 H
141-22 E) WEPK 2610 (0-26 N 144-10 E) X MINCO CAN
WORK ON THIS BUT WATCH OUT FOR OUR SPRUCE (SUBMARIES) WHICH MAY POSSIBLY BE PLANTED BY JIMAY
FIRE HEAR EASTERN END OF THE PASTURE X FOR INFOGURNARD DOPE FOR JULY 11TH IN BY SERIAL 11
FOSSIBLY SHOULD BE 7 MILES FARTHER EAST AND THEY
MAY BY ADDITIO A DASH OF LEESH (ESCORT VESSEL)

C - Submerine Action Reports

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was satisfactory—

No. C-2

July 10

Still petrolling south of Setawal Island.

1300 (K) Discontinued patrol north of Ionthe Shoal and proceeded on course 258 degrees for our area.

2200 (K) Changed course to 231 degrees.

July 11

on course 231 degrees at three engine speed; extremely smooth, calm sea, bright day, unlimited visibility.

1745 (K) Sighted smoke bearing 187 degrees T. about 25 miles distant moving to the Southeast.

Took a converging course 125 degrees T. and with two engines made "and rum" to gain position sheed. Bright mocnlight and oily calm seas prevailed.

Case 3, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 12

- 0000 (K) Cut in shead of convoy's advance and patrolled back and forth ecross his track
- cat alca speed.

 calo (K) Sighted speke to north of us; we had made too much sheed and south last night.

 Esaded up to north east, then at-
- 0624 (E) Submarged when high lookout reported seeing ship's masts. Found to were on his southern flank and about parallel to the convoy's course when on normal approach course, so at-
- 0800 (E) Surfaced and commenced Fend rum" again to gain position ahead for late efternoon attack. Out in cheed and reached the convoy's track at-
- 1545 (E) Then we care to course 293 degrees T., and headed in at full speed.
- 1619 (K) Sighted moke deed shead, followed shortly
- 1627 (X) Submerged and commenced approach in a glassy smooth see. Convoy zig-zegging radically in close formation. Four freighters in the convoy were in two, two ship columns about 1000 yards apart.

 Escorts were outboard of the column about 600 yards.
 The largest ship, identified as a Ryoyo Maru class freighter was loading the left column and was selected as the first target. The right column leader was identified as the Sycho Maru. The second target was a 6000 con freighter of the serio
- stark freighter.

 1752 (K) Fired three bow torpedoes at largest ship leading port column....(Attack #1)

 Immediately shifted the set-up to the next large ship.

size and identical in appearance to the Ryoyo Maru class ship. The fourth ship

Case 8, Ho. C-2 (Cont.)

1753 (K) Fired next three terpodees from the bos...

Immediately started deep so could not see
the results. Heard first distant explosion
right after firing sixth torpode, followed
by another five seconds later. 55-62 seconds
later, the third and fourth explosions were
heard.

1757 (X) Pattern of three dapth charges. Not too

1935 (X) Pive more depth charges in rapid succession.

2055 (K) Surfaced and sent contact report.
2350 (K) Decided further pursuit of this convoy would carry kingo too far into South West Subs

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Ho: 1745 (K)
Date: 1745 (K)
Position: 2-41 H
139-582

How Contacts Sighted smoke Convoy-sighted smoke only until next day

Not Best day. Some

Time: 1819 (K)
Data: July 12
Position: CO-581
143-052

Typo: 4 freighters-2 PC

How Contact: Sighted

Remarks: Base course 113 degrees

mig-magging (Attack #1)

Attack Report

Time: 1752 (K) Date: July 12

Cass 8, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Position:

1-007

Description:

142-59B Convoy-4 freighters and

2 FC escorts. Evoyo Hard and similar type. Sighted smoke. Visibility excellent.

Ship(s) sunk-Ship(s) Demaged

or probably

aunit-

Two Ryoyo Maru class freighters, 6000 tons each.

Coss 9

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FECT

(Chief of Staff, Yoko09/1701 July

gula)

TO: IIIFO:

Marcus Island Area Force or Chichijima Activity)

#Convoy #3709 (blank maru, blank maru, blank maru, escort ships, blank, blank and Special Suichaser #13) et 23700 July 9 will depart Yokosuka for Truk. Noon positions (10-20): July 10th, 33-01 North, 139-40 East, July 11th, 30-00 North, 139-30 East, July 12th, 27-30 North, 141-30 East, July 13th, 24-20 North, 140-20 East.

Case 9, No. A-1 (Cont.)

July 14th, 21-10 North, 140-55 East.
July 15th, blank-COHorth, 141-30 East.
July 16th, 14-50 North, 142-00 East.
July 17th, 11-45 North, 143-15 East.
July 18th, 10-00 North, blank - blank east.
"Blanks and more blanks. At 1200 July 20, scheduled to pass 10 miles to the southward of Point "T".

BAKER CONSERT: Hoon posits for 18, 19 and 20
July missing, but will be furnished promptly when recovered.

GI COMMITT: Phoned SubPac et 2120 (-9) July 10.

B - Operational Dispatch

Ho. B-1

PROM: COMEURPAC

10/1725 July

10:1

FLYING FISH, SEARAVEN

CIECPAC

ALL SUBS COPYLEG HPM FOX

PREC: OP OP OP

THIS ULTRA SERIAL 26A TO FLYING FIGH IP PUEL PERMITS AND SEARAVEN X 3 MAPLES SIZE 3 LEMONS COURSE BLANK SPEED BLANK TIME 0300 DATE 12TH IHEQ 3030 (27-30 N 141-30 E) ALGAROBA MERI 2020 (24-20 N 140-20 E) X VRRJ 1055 (21-10 H 140-55 E) X FLYING FISH HE ON LOOKOUT FOR THOUS BAG OF FEARUIS NEXT 24 HOURS

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Sixth War Patrol

Case 9 (Cont.)

Ho. C-I

Radio Reception: Radio reception of the NFM for schedule was complete in all respects.

Ho. C-3

July 11

- 1830 (I) (Contact No. 17) (Attack No. 3) Easts on the horizon bearing 2020 To. distance 10
- 1555 (I) Tentatively identified ship as travler type on northerly course. Submerged
- 1648 (I) Vessel too small for torpedo. A careful study at close range indicated the presence of no large caliber gums. There appeared to be a mount for small caliber gums forward. Three radio antennae were between masts. The ship was about 125 feet in length having heavy timber hall with tall sail-equipped masts, fore and aft and diesel or gas engine auxiliary power. The bow was clipper type and the stern was equare resembling that of a large junk. The center island was composite and exceedingly high for his length. She appeared to be new and newly painted and had a row of Japanese characters painted on her box.
- 1855 (I) Estile surfaced and destroyed ship with grafire. Energy first turned sway upon sighting us but, after the tenth shot, he reversed course and closed rapidly. Rifle fire from his bow was the only resistance. A 3° hit in the bow and on top of pilot house turned him away and his crew began to abandom ship by jumping overboard. A few hardy souls soon climbed back aboard, despite the reging fire aft, and succeeded in

Case 9. No. C-2 (Cont.)

Inumching a raft from the forecastle.
The cree was surprisingly large. Firteen non were counted in the water and that many more must have been casualties. Ship on fire from stem to stern. Cleared docks, obtained photographs and resumed course enroute to Bonin Islands.

July 13

(Contact No. 18) Sighted submarine on port quarter bearing 275 T. Placed him dead (I) 0000 astern. Coached radar on and obtained range 4700 yards. He was crossing our stern on a southerly course approaching the slick of a setting moon. We circled to the north to bring him into the moon alick. While on anortherly heading with him on the edge of the moon slick, we suddenly and simultaneously lost both sight and radar contact. Concluded that he had sighted us when we presented our broadside to him at 6300 yards range and that he had subverged. I believed it to be the Secreten with whom we had been warmed of probable contact. Not desiring to participate in any "unfortunate incident" particularly with Flying Fish in the role of the "unfortunate", we cleared the area to the eastward. (No entry made in narrative report from July 14-21 inclusive. - Editor's Hote)

July 22

Arrived at Hidray.

	Description of Contact	
Ho. C-3		
No: 17		
Time: 1530 (I Date: July 11		

Case 9. No. C-3 (Cont.)

Position:

24-0511

Type:

135-33E Scall auxiliary

-42--

sailing cargo vessel

Course:

TOOOOT

Speed: Remarks:

10 kts. on engine Destroyed by gunfire.

Attack No. 3.

Ho: Time: 13 0030 (I) July 13

Dato: Position:

140-283

Type: Course: Submarine 160°T

Speed: Romanka: 6 kts. Believed to be

Secraven.

U.S.S. Searayen

Seventh War Patrol

Ho. C-L

July 12

(Zone Plus 9 1/2 Time)

2245

Heading down best estimated steamer lanes.

2308

SJ Radar Repaired SJ Radar broken down.

July 13

0134

SJ Radar back in operation. Indications of another radar operating in

vicinity

0135

Radar contact bearing 100°T distant 6500 yards. SEARAVEN silhoustted against moonset. Changed course to 27 while

developing contact. Got one pip on this course at 6700 yards then contact disappeared.

Case 9. No. C-L (Cont.)

Indications of other rader still strong and appeared to be on us constantly. As far as could be judged the frequency was the same as ours-

Olah Cama back to cour

Came back to course 170°. Other radar getting weaker, still bearing about 100°T. Weather very clear and would have seen ship of any size for at least ten thousand yards. Decided this might be one of our can subsarines. Increased speed and noved on down on course 170° Lat 24 - 54 N Long 140 - 13 E

Submerged

Surfaced and continued down lane.

July 14

1942

eather started acting up with rain squalla and choppy seas from about 120° (T). Took two tremendous seas aboard, one right behind the other. Our position Lat. 23-54N Long. 140-23E. Changed course to 280° to

o712 Fad cleared short in p

Had cleared short in pumprocm power enough to permit running the hydraulic plant. Submarged and came to course 170°. Spent rest of day until 2200 clearing grounds in battery and pump room power. Weather worked up to pretty heavy seas and almost continuous rain squalls by noon. By 2000 squalls were intermittent but sean were still heavy.

Surfaced with 160 volt ground still on ofter bettery. Came to course 130° for better riding.

July 15

O550 Docided to move over to eastern portion of area. Came to course 060°. Our position Lat. 21°-29%, Long. 140°-55E. 2335 gallons of lube oil remaining on hand. Ground on after battery dropping as well dries out.

Casa 9, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 15

1417

Sighted Farallon de Pajaros Island
bearing 112(T) distant 15 miles.
Decided to move on to Enstward. Have
SECO gallons lube oil romaining. Sent
Searaven serial two to ComSubfac
stating: "Searaven leaving area at
lat 21°H, long, 150°E and will patrol
between long. 151°E and 152°E, north
of lat. 21°H from the eighteenth
through the twenty-first of July".
Entirate six hundred gallons reserve
lube in excess remain on board.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Casa 10

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM: Blank Originator

11/0400 July

"From Captain of Chuyo

Chuyo and blank left Yokosuka at 0300 (blank scheduled to head for Bungo Channel from Point "A").

At 0600 on 11th will join up with Striking Force at Point "A" (27-40 North, 137-38 East)."

NEGAT COMMENT: The two blanks are the same unidentified ship.

This rendezvous was also mentioned in NSS 051725.

Case 10, No. A-1 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Reference is preliminary schedule for this trip. Departure was set for 0400 loth. "Striking Force", including Kongo, Haruna, Zuikaku, Shookaku, Zuiho, Hayataka, Ryuuhoo, and CruDiy 8, etc, scheduled arrive Truk July 15th. Phoned SubPac at 0115 (-9) July 11th.

No. A-2

FROM: Blank Originator 06/1350 July TO:

From Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet.

1. This force will sortie from Inland Sea on 10 July and arrive PT about 1400 on 15th. Request arrangements for anti-submarine patrol from 0700 on 15th. Position at 0400 on 15th will be 10-50N, 151-30E. Thence on course 180 degrees speed 24 knots until 1300 when will change course to head for North Channel.

NEGAT COMMENT: Since originator is Chief of Starr 3rd Fleet and he uses expression "Tootai" it is impossible to say for certain what units he has with him. The literal translation of "Tootai" in this spot would be "This Fleet" but obviously that phrase would give an incorrect impression since much of his fleet is already in southern waters. Suspect CarDiv l and CruDiv 8 are principal units concerned in this movement. Date of departure from Inland Sea probably 10th or 11th.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 10, No. A-2 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: PT is Truk. Phoned CincPec 070825 (-9) July. Phoned ComSubPac 070830 (-9) July. Code group - July date confirmed as 10 July by NSS 071401. (Original appears on p. 64 & 65 of Book for July 6, 1943).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

11/0947 July

O: TIMOSA -

POGI

STEELHRAD

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X ORDERS FOR TIMOSA POGY AND STEELHEAD I

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 28 X ABOUT 3 CRUISERS 2 CARRIERS 1 AUXILIARY CARRIER SEVERAL DESTROYERS X COURSE 180 SPEED 24 KNOTS X 1900 GCT 14TH X 10-50 NORTH 151-30 RAST X

TAKE STATIONS AS FOLLOWS IN FIME TO RENDER SUITABLE HONORS X TINOSA 10-15 NORTH 151-30 EAST, POGY 08-40 NORTH 151-30 EAST AND STEELHEAD 08-30 NORTH 151-30 EAST X

AVOID DETECTION IN VICINITY UNTIL AFTER CONTACT X DON'T SHOOT EACH OTHER AND MATCH OUT FOR LAND BASED-PLANES COMMENCING BLANK X BLANK X 2200 GCT X 14TH X IF POSSIBLE FIX POSITIONS EXACTLY WITH LANDMARKS X

IY NO SOAP AFTER WAITING 24 HOURS PROCEED TO REGULAR AREAS

Case 10 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were received. Last serial received 040840.

No. C-2

July 7

1300 (Y) Departed Submarine Base, Midway, enrouts area, air escort.

July 9-13

Crossed 180th Meridian. Omitted 8
July 1943. Short daily trim dives.
Fire control and gun drills conducted on surface. Running at two and three engine speeds to arrive as scheduled.
Nothing sighted.

July 14

0712 (K) Arrived on station. Submerged.
Calibrated magnetic compasses. Patrolling station.

1953 (K) Surfaced. Continued patrol.

July 15

O441 (K) Submerged. Maintaining periscope watch with short frequent observations.

Case 10, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0653 (K) Sound picked up fast screws bearing 315 T. Own course 180 T. Eattle stations. Nothing in sight.

0657 (K) Sighted destroyer, bearing 350 T, angle on bow 10 port range 6000 yards.
Visibility spotty. Six foot swells; no chop or white caps. Tracked DD at 23 knots. Changed course to close.

0712 (K) Carrier appeared out of haze, bearing 280 T, angle on bow 110 port. Course 210 T. Closing.

0714 (K) One heavy cruiser leading two carriers in column, range 9000 yerds, now in sight. Speed checking 22 knots; zigzagging radically; never able to obtain closer range. Isst seen with angle 180. Continued closing track looking for further contacts.

0720 (K) Sighted cruiser similar in appearance to YUBARI, bearing 243 T, course 154, angle on bow 85 port, range 3100 yards.

Immediately thereafter target zigged away, angle on bow 170 port.

0728 (K) Sighted cruiser leading seaplane tender and auxiliary carrier, one DD screen on port side. Began approach on carrier, last ship, angle on bow 60 port, range 5600 yards, course 170 T.

0734 (T) Target zigged to 130 T. Range 3800 yards.

0742 (T) Fired four torpedoes. Target sighted wakes and turned away.

0747 (T) One very heavy depth charge, followed by several smaller explosions which sounded all around ship, as if from airplane bombs. At this time made careful search for planes. Mone had been and none were sighted. No other AS measures. Remained at periscope depth and watched ships go off at 180 engle on how. Four torpedoes were considered

Case 10, No. C-2 (Cont.)

maple to allow for possible errors. With sea conditions and range my estimate was that target would avoid and at that range six could be avoided as easily as four.

No. C-3

Description of Contacta

Contact Number:
Time and Date:
Contact Number:

10700 (K) July 15
Cong. and Lat:
10-201 151-258

Types: 2CV, LACV, LAV, 2CA, Several DD Course: 180

Course: 180
Speed: 24 knots

Remarks: Formation zigzagging ACV & AV estern

U.S.S. Pory

Second War Patrol

Fo. C-&

Radio reception: See VII, Case 1, C-4,

No. C-5

July 14 - 15

Surface and subnerged patrol between East Fayu and Norwin Islands,

July 14

1705 Heard distant scho ranging.

attack. Unable to close

to firing position.

Case 10. No. C-5 (Cont.)

1805 Sighted patrol vessel to S.E., distant 15,000 yards on northerly course.

July 15

1216

Sighted TF of 2 aircraft carriers, 1 auxiliary carrier CLs and DDs. Unable to close to firing position. Enemy speed about 25 knots. course south-southeast.

No. C-6

Contact Report

Contact Number: Time and Data: 1216 (K) July 15 Long. and Lat. 8-41N 151-33E Тура: Task Force Est Course: 150 Initial Range: 12,000 Speed: ... 25 knots How Contacted: Remarks: 2CA: FICA bina CA's and DD's. No

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7.

No. C-8

1000 (L) Latitude 80 - 31 N. Longitude 1510-31E

Made 300 foot test dive end found
gasket in engine induction line leaking
badly. Determined to effect repairs
in the evening as they had to be made

Case 10, No. C-8 (Cont.)

rainy and overcast now and the visibility had dropped to 5 or 6 miles. At

1251 (L) Latitude 8° - 31 N. Longitude 1510

CONTACT 30 E. Sound heard screws and when periscope was trained on that bearing, made out indistinctly, 2 MOGAMI class cruisers, bearing 040 T. distance six miles, angle on the bow 70° starboard. Targets were zig zagging radically end from the meagre data obtained, appeared to be making 24 knots. Commenced attack but as range was never less than 6500 yards rejected long range shot in the hope of obtaining a better target later on. But at

1310 (L) When sound heard the heavy screws of several ships bearing 270° T. Nothing could be seen in the rain squall to the westward. At

1535 (L) Latitude 8° - 30' N. Longitude 151° - 32' E. Sighted a DD bearing 300° m distance 6 miles, zig-zagging at high speed to the northward. Could not close

1855 (L) latitude 80 - 22 N. 1510 - 30 E. Surfaced; proceeded westward.

2100 (L) Received orders changing our area and proceeded towards PULUWAT ISLAND.

Case. Il

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

(Chief of

09/1701 July

Staff Yokosuka)

TO:

(Marous Island

Area Force or Chichijima Activity).

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 11, No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Convoy #3709 (blank Maru, blank Maru, blank Maru, escort ships, blank, blank | and Special Subchaser #13) at 23700 July 9 will depart Yokosuka for Truk.

Noon positions (10-20):
July 10th, 33-04 North, 139-40 East.
July 11th, 30-00 North, 139-30 East.
July 12th, 27-30 North, 141-30 East.
July 13th, 24-20 North, 140-20 East.
July 14th, 21-10 North, 140-55 East.
July 15th, blank-00 North, 141-30 East.
July 16th, 14-50 North, 142-00 East.
July 17th, 11-45 North, 143-15 East.
July 18th, 10-00 North, blank - blank East.

Blanks and more blanks. At 1200 July 20, scheduled to pass 10 miles to the southward of Point T.

BAKER COMMENT: Noon posits for 18, 19 and 20 July missing, but will be furnished promptly when recovered.

GI COMMENT: Phoned SubPac at 2120 (-9) July 10.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed 1422 (-9) 10th:

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 11 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: (Chichijima : 09/1035 July Special Base Force)

TO:

"Blanks force (consisting of blank Maru, #13 Nikyu Maru, #3 blank Maru blanks and #7 blank Maru) departed NMA (Chichijima) for PS (Sairan) at 0800 on 9th. Scheduled to arrive at 1600 on 15th. Escorted by blank. Noon Positions 10th to 15th:

> 25-03 North, 142-44 Esst. 23-14 North, 143-37 East. 21-23 North, 144-49 Esst. 19-31 North, 145-49 Esst. 17-34 North, 145-36 Esst. 15-32 North, 145-36 Esst.

No. A-3

FROM: 09/0900 July 43

INFO: (2nd Fleet)
(8th Fleet)
(Yokosuka CofS)
(DF Station)
(Unit at)

Case 11, Ho. A-3 (Cont.)

I. Convoy number blank 703 ("A" vessels Nigitsu Maru blanks) and "B" vessel departs Saeki at 1400 on 7th and after passing through the following points blanks on the 13th: (all North and East):

31-30, 134-00, 15-45, 131, 10-40, 131,

Toa Maru?) will leave convoy at 0600 on 10th in posit 20-55 N; 134-00 E, and proceed alone, arriving at Truk northeast pass at 1500 on 14th after passing through following posits:

11-35, 142-40, 9-35, 150-15.

Umikaze

blanks escort as far as 29N.

2. Noon posits of "A" vessels (8th to 12th): (All Morth and East):

[8] 29-35, 134-00. [9] 24-35, 134-00.

(10) 19-35, 134-00. (11) 15-45, 131-00.

(12) 10-40, 131-00:

"B" vessels (after leaving convoy, from 10th to 14th)

(10) 19-50 134-55

(11) 16-05, 138-35. (12) 12-10, 142-10. (13) 10-30, 146-15.

14) 10-10, 151-20.

3. Hlanks Nigitsu Meru carries ordnance ammunition, and blanks Toa Marul-carries blank 0000 tons of heavy oil.

Case 11, No. A-3 (Cont.)

《集》的表示文本的是图印

4. Supply blanks heavy oil: 500 tons, fresh water: 1500 tons.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0255 (I) 11th.

No. A-4

FROM: 09/0900 July TO: (4th Fleet)

INFO:

*Including Took Maru noon posits 10th to 14th.

10th, 19-50 North, 134-55 East.
11th, blank-05 North, blank - blank East.
12th, 12-10 North, 142-10 East.
13th, 10-30 North, 146-55 East.
14th, 08-10 North, 151-20 East.

GI COMMENT: NSS 101421 reported above posits with variations for 13th and 14th. Above positions are much more likely. Phoned SubPac at 1840 (-9) July 11th.

Case II (Cont.).

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBSPAC

11/1039 July

TO: ALL SUBS NPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

[李/弘为 T. (1) 4-17 (4)

FOLLOWING ADDITION INFO ON MY 26-A FOR SEARAVEN AND HADDOCK I WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER X

COMSUBSPAC ULTRA SERIAL 27 X PECAN X BLANK X BLANK X HIANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 1 X YRRJ 1055 (21-10N 149-55E) ALGAROBA PSEQ 0300 (18-00N 141-30E) WZHR 5000 (14-50N 142-00E) UJUF 4515 (11-45N 143-15E) X

FOR GURNARD PECAN X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 4 FBSA 4500- (15-45N 131-00E) ALGAROBA GCSA 4000 (10-40N 131-00E) THENCE TO THE RAMPARTS YOU WATCH X

ANOTHER FOR CASSEDY AND DAVENPORT 6 FOPLARS
(MERCHANTHAN TYPE UNKNOWN) 1 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X
BLANK X BLANX X MINUS 900 X MINUS 3 X VRPK 2349
(21-23N 144-49E) OFKI 3149 (19-31N 145-49E)
PEXI 3436 (17-34N 145-36E) FEXI 3236 (15-32N
145-36E) X PHIL ROSS CAN HAVE FOLLOWING BUT DO
NOT FURSUE OR ATTACK EAST OF XL EITHER 072 OR 264
POPCORN X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 3 X
LRHR 1010 (12-10N 142-10E) ALGAROBA GGHS 3015
(10-30N 146-15E) GGDU 1021 (10-10N 151-21E)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC

12/0917 Tuly

TO: ALL SUBS ON

NPM FOX

IMPO: CINCPAC

PRIC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Case 11, No. B-2 (Cont.)

ULTRA TO SUES CONCERNED SERIAL 32 X PHIL ROSS CORRECT MY SERIAL 27 TO READ 264 POPCORN BLANK BLANK MINUS 900 (0300) MINUS 3 (12TH) IRHR 1010 (12-10N 142-10E) ALGAROBA GCHS 3055 (10-30N 146-55E) DKDU 1020 (8-10N 151-20E) X

MY NUMBER 28 IS VERY IMPORTANT TO TINOSA POGY AND STEELHEAD X GO EASY ON YOUR LUBE OIL CASSEDY X EXPECT WE MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP YOU BUSY FOR THE REMAINDER YOUR PATROL X NOTE THAT AREA TO NORTHEAST OF YOU IS BEING ASSIGNED SPEARFISH X

FOR PORPOISE WE ARE UNABLE DECODE YOUR 101335 X HLUE SPEARFISH X MINGO WHEN YOU FINISH WITH OTHER JOBS SERIAL 7 OR 16 HEAD WEST AND TAXE AREA 10 NORTHWEST WHICH IS NOW VACANT X MORE DOPE LATER X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Searaven

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 9, C-4.

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

Ho - C-2

Radio Reception: Radio Reception during this patrol was consistent with that experienced on previous patrols. While in the area it was not

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

possible to copy NFM on 16.69 KC. The higher frequencies came in well, however, particularly 8230 KC.

No. C-3

July 6

Crossed International Data Line.

July 12

Throughout Japanese waters maintained continuous periscope watch whenever on the surface.

July 13

Arrived off Pagan Island, Mariana Group, commenced patrolling the area 6 miles bearing 215 T from Pagan Island.

July 14

Submerged patrol off Pagan Island, high periscope observation.

July 15

Submerged patrol off Pagan Island, High periscope observation.
Surfaced, set course for Palau.

1900 (K) Surfaced, set course for Palau.
Nothing sighted during the two day
patrel in this area.

U.S.S. Gurnard

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

See VII, Case 4, C-2.

Cass II (Cont.)

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

Ho. 0-5

Radio reception: See VII, Case 1, C-1.

Ho: C-6

July 11 - 12

Uneventful. Conducted submerged petrol northwest of Truk. Majority of crew was still feeling effects of food poisoning.

July 13:

Surface patrol northwest of Truk.

July 14

Conducted submerged patrol. Upon surfacing, headed north towards new area. The crew was back in normal health with the exception of two men who were still unable to keep any food down.

July 15

0445 (K) Submerged, conducting patrol enroute area.

1940 (K) Surfaced.

2100 (K) Entered area.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

Case 12

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

"Goshu Maru and blank departed NAA (Yokosuka) ... 0900 on the 10th (many blanks):

32-38 North, 143-22 East. 28-51 North, 145-39 East. 25-29 Horth, 149-32 East. 22-29 North, 152-53 East. 18-56 North, 155-14 East.

NEGAT COMMENT: Although message appears to be a two parter last position is only about half way to Jaluit where assume ships must be bound.

Must be some more somewhere.

GI COMMENT: Phoned Subpac at 1850 (-9) July 11th.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-I

TROM: COMSUBPAC TO: ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX 11/1954 July

ORIGINAL 1946

Case 12, No. B-1 (Cont.)

INFO: GINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS MAY INTEREST FRANK MATKINS X ULTRA X SUBPAC SERIAL 29 B X PECAN INCLUDING 049 POPCORN X HLANK BLANK MINUS 900 MINUS 3 (COURSE UNKNOWN SPEED UNKNOWN TIME 0300-DATE 12) OBKJ 5139 (28-51N 145-39E) ALGAROBA TIXE 2932 (25-29N 149-32E) RCCF 2953 (22-29N 152-53E)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC 12/0833

TO: SUES COPYING

NPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC.

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUBPAC COMMANDER SENDS ULTRA SERIAL 30 X ORDERS FOR SPEARFISH 049 POFCORN AND SEVERAL POPLARS (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) BLANK (COURSE BLANK (SPEED) -900 (TIME 0300 GCT) -1 (DATE 14TH)RCCF (POSIT 22-29 NORTH 152-53 EAST) ALCAROBA PSAR (18-56 NORTH 155-14 EAST) X

RENDER SUITABLE HONORS AND THEN PATROL AREA BETWEEN PS (18 DEG NORTH) AND KC (23 DEG NORTH) AND BETWEEN JA (150 DEG EAST) AND AR (155 DEG EAST) X

OTHER SUBS WILL PASS THROUGH THIS AREA X ATTACK NO OTHER SUBMARINES UNLESS ENEMY IDENTIFY CERTAIN X DEPART THIS AREA AT NORTHEAST CORNER NOT LATER THAN SUNSET 28 JULY AND STEER RHUMB LINE TO MIDWAY Case 12 (Cont.)

C - Submerine Action Reports

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-I

See VII, Case 9, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Spearfish

Seventh War Patrol (5 June - 1 August)

No. C-2

Radio Reception: The reception was good at all times.

No. C-3

July 14

Enroute on surface, made dive at dawn for trim.

July 15

Enroute on surface, made dive at dawn for trim.
0713 (K) On station, patrolling on surface.

July 16 - 27

Patrolling on surface, made trim dives at dawn, No Contacts.

Case 12 (Cont.)

No. C-4

Description of Contact

Number: 9
Date and Time: July 13 - 163

Date and Time: July 13 - 1635 (L) Lat. and Long: 11-12N 161-50E

Type: DD

Remarks: Fired 3 torpedoes

No hits.

Case 13

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM: Blank Originator 12/1930 July
TOr (Yokosuka Naval
District Commander)

IMPO:

(lst Section
N.C.S.)
(Busero)
(Empire Military
Stores Section)

From Captain of Ctaka I will depart
Sasabo at 0800 on 15th with Ctaka and
unident ship). Scheduled to arrive
Shibaura?) at 1200 on 17th.

Case 13, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Will take following route:

At 1500 in 31-13 N. 130-10 E. At 2100 in 30-10 N. 130-52 E. At 1200 on 16th in 30 N. 136 E. At 0500 on 17th in 34 N. 138-38 E.

Speed about 17 knots. Request anti-submarine sweep be made on the evening of 15th in the Tanegashima Island area and in early morning of 17th to eastward of Zenisu."

NEGAT COMMENT: Tanegashima is southeast of Kyushu. Zenisu is in approximately 33-55 N. 138-50 E.

Phoned to ComSubPacFor at 130830 (-9) July.

GI COMMENT: Negat 102005 version unknown originator 101128 July "Please make arrangements for loading on Otaka about 100 additional personnel for Surabaya at both Kure and Sasebo".

B - Operational Dispatch

5年70年1月7日本共

No. B-I

TROM: COMSUBPAC TO: STURGEON POMPANO

POMPANO SAMPISH SKIPJACK

IMPO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

13/0739 July

Case 13.No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA SERIAL 35F X DON'T SHOOT EACH OTHER X

026 PEANUT AND 1 MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (COURSE) X ABOUT PLUS 7 (SPEED 17 KNOTS) X MINUS 600 (TIME 0600 GCT) X ZERO (JULY 15TH)X FG YL 13 10 (POSITION 31-13 NORTH 130-10 EAST) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X ZERO (1200 GCT) X ZERO (JULY 15TH) X DG YL 1052 (POSITION 30-10 HORTH 130-52 EAST) X BLANK (GOURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X MINUS 900 (0300 GCT) X PLUS 1 (JULY 16TH) X DG SN (POSITION 30 NORTH 136 EAST) X BLANK (GOURSE) X HLANK (SPEED) X PLUS 800 (2000 GCT) X PLUS 1 (JULY 15TH) X GS UX 00 38 (POSITION 34-00 NORTH 138-38 EAST) X

C - Submarine Action Recorts

U.S.S. Sturgson

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-I

Radio Reception: Radio Reception was on the average good. No serials were missed.

No. C-2

July 14 - 17

Patrolling to the southward of Kii Suido and Shiono Misski, nothing sighted. From the 15th to the 17th the wind became increasingly strong from the southeast....

U.S.S. Pomcano

Sixth War Patrol

Case 13 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Radio Reception: NPM reception was good though Subpac serials 15 and 55 were missed. (page 17)

No. C-4

July 15

33-59N, 136-38E, sighted patrol boat on 0138 (I) horizon 9,000 yards. 0540 (I) 33-59N, 136-42E, sighted smoke and 2

0540 (I) 33-59N, 136-42E, sighted smoke and 2 low land planes. Started approach, made out 2 ships under 4,000 tons. Unable to attain attack position.

0750 (I) 34-01N, 136-39E, sighted 2 subchasers
type patrol boats patrolling down coast.
42 hours later sighted same boats
patrolling in line up coast.

1440 (I) 33-50, 136-40E, sighted smoke, closed and identified as 2,000 ton Freighter not worth expenditure of last two torpedoes.

1920 (I) 34-01 N, 136-39 E, sighted medium bomber

2219 (I) Received Comsubpec serial 42 Blue authorizing 5 day extension in area.

July 17

33-03 N, 137-35 E, sighted light,
2000 (I) closed and identified a good sized sampan
with all lights on tending nets.
Hade battle surface and destroyed
with gunfire. Attack #6.

Cass 13 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Sawfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Last serial received; 41 Abla.

No. C-6

July 12

0945 (L) Plane contact by radar at 3 miles in Lat 310 - 20N Long 159-27Z. Plane not sighted. Dove to 150 ft. Surfaced at 1103 (L).

July 14

0215 (K) Sighted Sampan in Lat 31-10N Long 147-00E.

July 15

0830 (K) In lat 30-59N Long 140-243 made redar contact on plane at 10 miles closing.

Dove to 100 feet. Checked all torpedoes while submerged. Ran periscope patrol until 1300 (K) when we surfaced.

1310 (K) Plane contact on radar at 20 miles, closed to 16 miles then faded out.
Did not dive. Lat 30-56N Long
140-12E.

NOTE: No entries in action report for July 16, 17, 18.

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: Last serial received 69 Tare
August. Last serial sent 182101
August. Radio reception through— 163

Case 13 (Cont.)

No. C-8

July 13

2330 (K) Received ComTaskFor 17 Serial 130719 of July modifying operation order. SKIPJACK ordered to new patrol area.

July 14

0000 (K) Departed standard routing; set course for Area 4 at three engine speed.

1119 (K) Submerged upon sighting patrol (Par. G-1).
Do not believe we were sighted.

1150 (K) Surfaced; continued at 3 engine speed.

July 16

0440 (I) Sighted two patrol boats 7 miles shead (Par. F-1). Submerged to svoid detection. Patrol boats not picked up by periscope.

0651 (I) Surfaced. No. 1 engine out of commission due to flooding and subsequent damage.

1203 (I) Entered Area at Lat. 34-00; Long 140-52E.

1405 (I) Submerged. 61 miles bearing 158(T) from ROJIMA SAKI

1829 (I) Sighted MINURA SHIMA bearing 258 (I) - 25 miles.

25 miles. 2017 (I) Surfaced. Very bright moonlight.

2033 (I) Passed a small open boat close aboard.

Lat. 33-53; Long 140-01. No signs of life aboard. Resembled an ordinary steamer lifeboat.

2325 (I) Sighted ship bearing 233 (T) distance 6 miles on an easterly course (Par. F-2). We had been sighted, as the target, a small tanker with usual escort, changed course to northward to pass west of MINURA SHIMA.

Case 13, No. C-8 (Cont.)

July 17

In very poor position, astern and up moon, in restricted waters, pursuing target making 12 knots with only three engines available, 15.5 knots. They can see us continuously and change course frequently to keep a 180° track.

- 0040 (I) Range 3300 yards astern of target.

 Do not consider torpedo expenditure advisable under such circumstances. With bright moonlight giving almost daylight visibility torpedoes could be sighted and easily avoided.

 Escort swung around to close but would not leave his convoy very far.
- 0052 (I) Sighted two additional patrol vessels heading down from the direction of MIYAMI SHIMA (Par F-3). Assistance is not long in arriving in this locality.
- OC58 (I) Due to lack of knowledge of targets
 destination, and general unfavorable
 conditions, decided to break off and
 proceed to desired position for daylight submerged patrol. Set southwesterly course and shook off patrol at 15.5
 knots.
- 0145 (I) Sighted patrol boat bearing 230 T distance approximately 4 miles (Par. P-4). Maneuvered and passed around him down moon.
- 0225 (I) Sighted another patrol boat bearing 225 T, 4 miles (Par. F-5). Avoided.
- 0334 (I) Submerged south of ZENISU on a westerly course.
- 2020 (I) Surfaced. Fix placed us considerably south of Area.

July 18

Patrolling West of IZU SHOTO.

Case 13 (Cont.)

No. C-9

Description of Contacts

Ho:
Date and Time: 17 July - 0052 (I)
Let. and Long: 33-59 - 139-25
Types: 2 Patrol ships
Initial Range: 5 mi. 350 T
Course Speed: 170 Unknown
How Contacted: Lookout
Remarks: Apparently called in to help #2 contact.

No:
Date and Time: 17 July - 0145 (I)
Lat. and Long: 33-47 - 139-12
Types: 1 Patrol Boat
Initial Range: 4 miles 230T
Course Speed: Unknown - 10
How Contacted: Lookout
Remarks: Avoided on surface.

No:
Date and Time:
17 July - 0223 (I)
Lat. and Long;
33-48 - 139-05
Types:
1 Patrol Boat
Initial Range:
4 miles 225T
Course Speed:
Various - 10
How Contacted:
Lookout
Ramarks:
Avoided on surface.

Case 14

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

.05/0635 July

Case 14, No. A-1 (Cont.)

:OEMI

Stores Section) (B)

(Makin Detachment) (B)

(Kwajalein Military Stores Section)(B)

"This ship's (Honkan) schedule:

1.	PLACE:	ARRIVE	DEPART
4. 7	Blank Jaluit	Blank	7th ::
	Makin	8th Blank	Blank
	Tarawa.	10th	9th
	Blank	12th	12th (?)
	Blank Kwajalein	13th	13th
	THE TETATI	15th	Blank

2. Noon Positions:

Blank 08-23 North, 177-blank East.

11th 01-10 North, 172-blank East.

Blanks

15th 08-00 North, 167-26 East.

J. Cargo:

Meat blank tons.

Blank 17 tons.

Miscallaneous 24 tons.

GI COMMENT: Given to Subs at 1715 (I) 13th July.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC TO: S-38 IMFO: CINCPAC

13/1037 July

Case 14, No. B-1 (Cont.)

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

DOUG RHYMES AND HIS S-38 GETS COMSUMPAC ULTRA SERIAL 39 FOR PARTING SHOT AND IS AUTHORIZED DELAY DEPARTURE FROM AREA 1 DAY PROVIDED FUEL PERMITS X 1 BEECH (FREIGHTER) BLANK BLANK MINUS 90 DEPE 0026 (08-00 NORTH: 167-26 EAST) X

ENROUTE KNAJALEIN ARRIVING THAT DAY

C - Submerine Action Report

U.S.S. S-38

Ninth War Patrol

No. U-I

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good. Last SubPas serial received 57.

No. C-2

July 15

- 0505 (L) Submerged. Patrolling Southern approaches to Kwajalein.....
- 1847 (I) Surfaced and set course to clear area in accordance with operation order, as modified by dispatch.
- modified by dispatch.

 2300 (L) Cleared area to South of us after cutting across Eorthwest corner. The dispatch which extended our patrol was interpreted as allowing this deviation from our scheduled routing.

July 16

0312 (L) Sent dispatch 151222 to ComSudPac regarding attack on freighter.

Case 14, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0512 (L) Submerged. About 500 miles to go to Nauru.

1230 (L) Surfaced.

1811 (L) Made trim dive.

Case 15

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM:

14/1022 July

INDO :

(Maru) (4th Civil Engineering Section Chief)

*1. Convoy "FU 406" consisting of "A" vessels blanks Hyuyo Maru, Umekawa Maru, and Taka Maru (all bound for Ujina) and B vessel Yamafuku Maru? bound for — unident place), escorted by — unident ship) as far as 10 degrees North, departed at 0330 on 14th. Speed 9 knots. Will pass through following points and arrive Hayasui Seto at 1200 on 22nd: Point A. 10 North, 134-10 E.

Point B. 20N, 134-30? East.

Point C. 25N, 134-30 E.

Point D. 30-N, 134 E.

2. Noon positions 15th to 21st: 10-50 N. 134-30 E. 14-05 N. 134-30 E. 17-20 N. 134-30 E.

Case 15. No. A-1 (Cont.)

20-30 N, 134-25 E. 23-45 N, 133-40 E. 26-02 N, 133-40 E. 30 N, 134 E.

3. Principal cargo: Blanks. 88 passengers. 78 bags of mail.

(MSS-14/1741-July)

- No. A-2

FROM:

14/1032 July

INFO:

"I. FU 406 Convoy: "A" group (all for Ujina)
unident unident Ryuyo Maru

, Umekawa Maru, Taka Maru; "B" group
(for blank - as far as the 10 degree
North Latitude line. Departing blank
at 0830 the 14th. Speed 9 knots.
Point A. 10-00 N, 134-10 E.
Point B. 20-00 N, 134-?(30) E.
Point C. 25-00 N, 133-30 E.
Point D, 30-00 N, 134-00 E.

Going by way of these points expect to arrive Hayasui Seto at 1200 on the 22nd.

2. Noon positions: (15th to 21st);

10-50 N, 134-30 E, 14-05 H, 134-30 E, 17-20 N, 134-30 E, 20-?- N, 134-? E, 23-? N, ?-? E, 26-55 N, 133-40 E, 30-00 N, 134-00 E,

Case 15, No. A-2 (Cont.)

3. Principal cargo: The Yamafuku Maru has blank 00 tons of boxita (bauxite) and 88 passengers. Also 78 bags of mail"

(July 14 '43-DI)

GI COMMENT: Received in Negat 141741 July. Phoned ComSubPac at 1800 (-9) 15 July.

No. A-3

FROM: TOL

13/1617 July

(Chichijima Special Base

Force)

(Yokosuka Naval

District Comdr)

(Yokosúka Defense

Force Unit)

(Chief Transportation

Section, Tokyo)

(Yokosuka Local Trans

Section) (lst Section Nav

Gen Staff)

(2nd Fleet) (4th Fleet)

"Convoy blanks will arrive NAA at 0600 the 25th. Noon positions 14th through 24th:

> 08-?? North, 148-22 East. 11-33 North, blanks-30 East. 14-45 North, 145-52 East. 17-17 North, 145-32 East. 18-54 North, 142-04 East. -10 North, 140-40 East. 23- North, 138-58 East. 26-24 Horth, 138-58 East. 29-10 North, 138-58 East. 31-56 North, 138-44 East

Case 15, No. A-3 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0545 (-9) Posit for 24th missing in text above.

NAA is Yokosuka.

No. A-A

FROM: TO: INFO: 15/1330 July

*Blank ship departs Kwajalein at 1200 the 15th, expects to arrive Yokosuka blank hours the 25th. Heen positions:

16th - 10-30 North, 164-15 East, 17th - 11-05 North, 160-45 East, 18th - 14-05 North, 158-15 East, 19th - 17-10 North, 155-50 East, 20th - 20-05 North, 153-10 East, 21st - 23-10 North, 150-20 East, 22nd - 26-13 North, 147-43 East, 23rd - 29-52 North, 145-50 East, 24th - 32-08 North, 141-58 East,

HYPO COMMENT: Improved version of message sent in HYPO 152132 which also had incorrect originator date time group.

GI COMMENT: Phoned SubPac 1115 (-9) July 17. CORRECTED COPY - ORIGINAL NOT REMOVED

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Casa 15 (Cont.)

No. A-5

FROM: TO: INFO:

15/1300 July

Fragment: These believed to be noon positions

16th - 10-30 North, 164-15 East. 17th -11-05 North, 160-45 East. 18th - 14-05 North, 158-15 East. 19th - 17-10 North, 155-50 East. 20th - blank -05 North, 153-10 East.

COMMENT: HYPO continues to work.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacPor informed at 0520 (-9). Plot indicates 20-05 North for posit on 20th.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

IMPO:

FROM: COMSUBPAC

15/0711 July

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING

CINCPAC

PREC; OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Case 15. No. B-1 (Cont.)

HERE COMES ULTRA 45 X FOR HADDOCK IF ANYWHERE CLOSE X PECAN I COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME MINUS 900 (0300) X DATE PLUS 1 (16TH) X BFLQ 0530 (14-05 NORTH 134-30 EAST) ALGAROBA JTLQ 2030 (17-20 NORTH 134-30 EAST) X

STURGEON NOTE SAME PECAN X COURSE BLANK X SPRED BLANK X TIME MINUS 900 (0300) X DATE PLUS 6 (21ST) KCLQ (30 NORTH 134'EAST) X DURING NEXT FEW DAYS THRESHER HEADING EAST IS SCHEDULED USE LANG THROUGH AREA 14 X

HADDOCK SPEARFISH AND SEARAVEN MAY SEE HER X
FOR SPEARFISH AND POSSIBLY SEARAVEN X PECAN X
COURSE BLANK X SPRED BLANK X TIME MINUS 900
(300) X DATE PLUS 2 (17TH) WETU 0545 (11-05
HORTH 160-45 EAST) ALGAROBA BFNQ 0515 (14-05
HORTH 158-15 EAST) JTXM 1050 (17-10 NORTH 155-50
EAST) NQXK 0510 (20-05 NORTH 153-10 EAST) X

ANOTHER PECAN FOR SEARAVEN AND HALIBUT X
COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME MINUS 900
(0300] I DATE PLUS I (16TH) X BFMQ 4532 (14-45
NORTH 145-32 RAST) JTMQ 1752 (17-17 NORTH
145-52 EAST) UFSD 5404 OR 5440 (18-54 NORTH
142-04 or 142-40 EAST) FIMA 1032 (21-10 NORTH
140-32 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: COMBUBPAC TO: CINCPAC 16/0912 July

ALL SUBS COPYING

NPM FOX

INFO: ----

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Case 15. No. B-2 (Cont.)

FOR INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE ACTION KINGFISH SEARAVEN AND SPEARFISH ULTRA X

PECAN COURSE BLANK SPEED BLANK X 0300 GCT X 18TH ZHQQ 2340 (22-23 N 150-40 E) ALGAROBA DDVQ 0510 (19-05 N 152-10 E) 0005 (16-00 N 154-05 E) X

ABOVE DATES POSSIBLY 1 DAY WRONG X

IF ROSS AND CASSEDY LET IT GET THIS FAR ANOTHER PECAN FOR SKIPJACK AND MAYER KINGFISH IF IN VICINITY X COURSE BLANK SPEED BLANK X 0300 X 20TH X 4558 (23-45 N 138-58 E) ALGAROBA 2458 (26-24 N 138-58 E) LSHV 1058 (29-10 N 138-58 E) 5644 (31-56 N 138-44 E) X COMSUEPAC SERIAL 46 K

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No: C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 11, C-22

No. C-2

July 15

Submerged patrol off Pagan Island,
high periscope observation.
1900 (K) Surfaced, set course for Palau.
Nothing sighted during the two-day patrol
in this area.

July 18

Entered area at Latitude Ilo-11'N Longitude 1370-07'E.

Case 15, No: C-2 (Cont.)

July 18 (Cont.)

2000 (I) Set course to patrol north of Palau at Latitude 18 N, Longitude 134 R to cover shipping lenss from Empire.

U.S.S. Sturgen

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Radio Reception was on the average good. Ho serials were missed.

Bo. C-4

July 19

We cannot be very far from the center of a typhcon. The seas are mountainous:...

July 20-22

Patrolling to southward of our area. Nothing seen.

July 23

Heavy seas and strong winds from the southeast.

U.S.S. Spearfish

Seventh War Patrol (5 June - 1 August)

No. 0-5

See VII, Case 12, C-2 - C-4.

Case 15 (Cont.)

No. C-6

July 16

2200

Decided to move on to eastward. Have 2200 gallons lube oil remaining. Sent SEARAVEN serial two to ComSubPac stating "SEARAVEN leaving area at Lat. 21 N Long 146 E and will patrol between Long 151 E and 152 E north of Lat 21 N from the eighteenth through the twenty-first of July". Estimate six hundred gallons reserve lube oil in excess remain on board.

July 17

Raining and squally.

July 18

Rainy and squally.

1511 Commenced patrolling

Commenced patrolling on course 338

and reverse. Our position Lat. 21-29 N

Long. 151-10E.

2043. Visibility much better.

July 19

Patrolling on 338 - 158.

1940 Moved over to eastward.

July 20

Patrolled on course 328 and reverse.

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-1.

Case 15 (Cont.) No. C-8 July 16

1215

1938

0035 Sighted Rota. 0105 Sighted Guam.

0450 Submerged, turned south heading for

Port Apra.

Sighted small patrol vessel, patrolling 1210

outside of Port Apra (contact #11). Sighted two large freighters in Port

Apra (Contact 12)

Surfaced. Patrolled Empire-Guam track

during night.

July 18

0502 Submerged. Weather still stormy. 0935 Within sight of Port Apra. The two freighters were still there. These may have been the same two freighters which the Tunny reported upon leaving this area. Took bearing from different positions to determine their location and found them to be practically on the reef in the far northeast corner of the harbor. Their continued presence in. Port Apra may indicate that they are

damaged ships which have been beached. Surfaced. Turned south planning to pass around south end of Guam and then head for our departure point.

July 21

1941

1800 Departed area enroute Midway.

No. C-9

Description of Contact

Number: Data and Time: Lat. and Long: Typer

July 16 - 1210 (K) 13-28N - 144-37E Small Patrol Vessel

Case 15, No. C-9 (Cont.)

Initial Range: Est. Course: Speed:

How Contacted:

Remarks:

9,000 Various 8 Knots

Patrolling off Port Apra

U.S.S. Kingfish

Pourth War Patrol

No. C-10

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete.

No. C-II

July 20

1300 (K) Submerged for 15 minute trim dive.

Sea condition 3, wind from SE force 3.

Noon Lat. 23-51N, Long. 145-47E. Fuel
used 1661, miles 216.

July 21

Weather rainy and heavy swells from SW. Noon Lat. 23-19N, Long. 142-02E. Fuel used 1671, miles 233.

July 22

1440 (I) Submerged for two hours to routine torpedoes. Held fire control drills. Weather rainy and heavy swells from SW. Hoon Lat. 21-55N, Long. 138-01E. Fuel used 1615, miles 240.

Case 15 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-12

Radio Reception: Last serial received 69
Tare August.
Last serial sent 182101 August.
Radio reception throughout the patrol was excellent.

No. C-13

July 22

0120 (I) Sighted small boat 4 miles NW of

0612 (I) Sighted first of several patrol boats or fishing vessels in vicinity of ZENISU (Par. F-6)

2104 (I) Radar contact (Par. F-7) bearing 255 (T)
12,700 yds. Developed into a merchantman
and two escorts astern, zigzagging
radically, approximate base course 030T.
Want to battle stations and management

for surface attack.

2143 (I) Target zigged, presenting zero angle on the bow, range about 5500 yds. Could not tell if we were sighted. Headed directly away to await developments.

2150 (I) Target zigged about 90° left, leaving us rapidly. Headed about to close the range expecting to fire on next zig.

2206.10 Fired first torpedo on 122 track, range

30 Fired second torpedo.

.52 Fired fourth torpedo. Spread used covered 160% of target length

2207 (I) Turned away and hauled clear of immediate vicinity.

2209 (I) Target turning away.

Case 15, No. C-13 (Cont.)

July 22 (Cont.)

- Torpedo explosion. Target sheered back to right presenting approximately 1000 starboard angle on bow. This apparently was the left (fourth) torpedo, after a 4200 yard run.
- 2211 (I) Depth charging in target's vicinity. Target and one escort commenced shooting at something - not us.
- 2213 (I) Several more depth charges. 2218 (I) Ranga 9100 yds., slowed to 6 knots to remain in vicinity and observe.
- 2223 (I) One escort sighted bearing 030 T closing at high speed. Went to full power. Although escort closed to 3600
- yds and was still closing slowly at 2234 (I) He pulled clear to the west and abandoned chase. Slowed and resumed battery charge. This escort dropped about one depth charge every minute during this chase. He may have run out of charges.

July 23.

- Patrolled western side of area during
- Sighted plane (Far. G-2) bearing 023 T distance 2 miles.
- 2145 (I) Sighted patrol vessel (Par. F-8) on westerly course bearing 045 T 3 miles.
- Maneuvered to avoid detection on surface. 2204 (I) Lost contact with patrol vessel.

July 24

Standing in direction of O'SHIMA from southwest, proceeding to desired patrol station off TO SHIMA.

Case 15. No. C-13 (Cont.)

July 24 (Cont.)

- 0205 (I) Sighted lights of sampans bearing 060 T (Par F-9).
- 0238 (Il Submerged to avoid detection. Continuous periscope observations of sampans until sunrise.
- 0440 (I) First of about one dozen distant depth
- OA50 (I) Sighted two (2) float typs monoplenes bearing 068 T. 2 miles, on southwesterly course and low (Par G-3).

 0512 (I) Sighted patrol boat bearing 068 T 4 miles
- on southerly course. (Par. F-10)
- 0520 (I) Patrol boat no longer in sight. 0559 (I) Sighted one plane of type previously sighted. (Par. G-4). 0605
- 0609,
- 0612-Three more depth bombs becoming
- increasingly closer. 0615 (II Sound reported fast screws coming in from south. Went desp. There followed
- nine (9) depth charges none very close. 0907 (I) Periscope decth. All clear. Set course toward 0 SHIMA. Sighted a half dozen sampans in the neighborhood of O SHIMA and TO SHIMA during the day, most of which had a Rising Sun insignia

July 25

Patrolling TRUK-TOKYO traffic routes. Upon surfacing determined average drift to be 2.9 knots, setting 055 T, while andmerged during daylight

Case 15 (Cont.)

No. C-14

Description of Contacts

Number: Time and Date: Lat. and Long. Types:

William State State

Initial Range: Course and Speed: How Contacted: Remarks:

Number: Time and Date: Lat. and Long. Types:

Initial Range: Contract Contracts

Course and Speed: How Contacted Remarks

Number: Time and Date: Lat and Long: Typest Initial Ranger Course and Speed: How contacted: Remarks:

Daylight - July 22. 33-52 - 138-45 3 Patrol boats or fishermen -4-6 miles Various - 15 knots Periscope . One resembled net tender.

2104 (I) - July 22 34-12 - 138-31 1 AK 2 escorts 12,700 255 T Zig-zag - 050/12 K SJ Radar Attacked with four torpedoes .

2146 (I) - July 23 34-10 - 138-49 1 Patrol ship 3 miles 045 T Patrolling/270: Lookout Avoided on surface

Case 15, No. C-14 (Cont.)

Number: 9
Pime and Date: 0205 (I) - July 24
Let. and Long: 34-21 - 138-56
Types: 3 sampans
Initial Range: 4 miles - 055 T
Course and Speed: 050/ 2 knots
How Contacted: Lookout
Remarks: Lighted at Night

Number:
Time and Data:
O512 (I) - July 24
Lat. and Long:
Types:
I patrol ship
Initial Ranga:
Course and Speed:
How Contacted:
Remarks:

Case 16

A - Source of Intelligence

Ho. A-I

FROM: 15/2021 July To: (Nauru Air Ease)

IMFO:

"Isuzu - unident ship) blank will depart Truk at 0700, 16th and arrive at a point bearing 315 degrees from Nauru Island distant 60 miles at 0600, 19th and will arrive Nauru at 0900. Request appropriate antisubmarins measures be carried out."

GI COMMENT: Phoned to ComSubPacFor at July 161615 (-9).

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 16 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM:

150922 July

TO:

(Wake Air Base) (Mauru Air

Base

INFO:

[CofS Yokosuka]

I. The blank KAWA Maru (escorted by unident ship)) is scheduled to depart from PT at 0800, 15th, and arrive RYC at 1000, 20th. Noon positions (15th through 19th).

15th - 07-43 North, 152-10 East. 16th - 06-10 North, 155-24 East. 17th - 04-21 North, 158-39 East. 18th - 02-32 North, 161-14 East. 19th - 01-12 North, 164-10 East.

2. Entering course: From position 01-12 North, 166-55 East, steer 180

NEGAT COMMENT: Not so sure of last two moon positions. Also message says course 18° in Para. 2, but inasmuch as the position given in this paragraph is good and lies due North of Nauru we read #180° m.

GI COMMENT: PT is Truk: RYC is Fauru. Informed ComSubPacFor at 1005 (-9).

Case 16 (Cont.)

B - Operational Distatches

No. B-I

FROM:

COMSTIRPAC

16/1830 July

TO:

ALL SUBS COPYING

. NPM POX.

IMFO:

CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

S 38 CETS THIS ULTRA X 1 POPLAR (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X -900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 3 (DATE 18TH) KFDA 3214 (02-32 NORTH 161-14 EAST) ALGEROBA KFRL 0010 (02-00 NORTH 164-10 EAST) AND THEN 1230 (01-12 NORTH 161-30 EAST) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X BLANK (TIME) UPON REACHING WRZD 1255 (01-12 NORTH 166-55 EAST) X

ALSO 046 PEANUT AND 1 HICKORY (MAN OF WAR TYPE UNKNOWN) (COURSE 135 DEGREES) X PLUS 10 (SPRED 20 KNOTS) X PLUS 900 (TIME 2100) X PLUS 3 (DATE 18TH) SMZD 1013 (00-10 NORTH. 166-13 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM:

CTF 72

17/0027 July

COM 3RD FLEET

- RDO NOUMEA TO

CINCPAC FOR INFO

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HAVE ULTRA INFORMATION INDICATING S 38 CAN BE USEFULLY EMPLOYED VICINITY NAURU UNTIL JULY 20TH I REQUEST AUTHORITY DELAY HIS ARRIVAL ESPIRITU 2 DAYS IN ORDER SO EMPLOY HIM X THIS MOST SECRET Case 16 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. S-38

Ninth War Patrol

No. C-I

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good. Two serials from ComTask For 72 were missed as a result of misinterpretation on our part. At 1145 GCT the 17th, we received ComSubPac's 161830. Last SubPac serial received - 57.

No. 0-2

July 17

2245 (L) Received ComSubPac 161830 (no serial) authorizing us to spend an extra day. or so North of the equator. Changed course to Westward. Present position 1-37N, 166-04E.

Mo. C-2 July 18

0530 (L) Submerged.

2200 (L) patrolling chosen station. (Lat. 1-44N, 165-15E).

July 19

0533 (L) Submerged. Nothing sighted all night.

July 20

0533 (L) Submerged, 100 miles northwest of Nauru;

July-21

0045 (L) How 40 miles from Nauru.

Casa 16, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

- 0145 (L) Inspection revealed that starboard motor will require at least 12
- hours for emergency repairs... 0230 (L) Received CTF 72 dispatch 201203.
- 2110 (L) Sent dispatch 210938 to CTF 72 telling of having bypassed Nauru due to motor
- 2111 (I) Set course for Nauru.

July 22

- 0040 (I) Received CTF 72 21246 (no serial).... Sighted Nauru bearing 083 degrees T.
- 0510 (L) Submerged 12 miles northwest of Nauru.
- ... Came to periscope depth and observed one ship standing out slowly from south and of Nauru. Started approach.
- 0715 (L) Ship turned and headed back into Nauru. Continued closing and observed a second ship apparently anchored or moored. Later observed two patrol craft to seaward of freighters.
- 0923 (I) Went to battle stations as first freighter started standing out to northwest ... He was a small freighter
- similar to Yomei Maru (2861 tons). 0948 (L) Broke off approach....to close the anchored freighter (similar to Samarang Warn - 3802 tons)
- 1900 (L) Surfaced 16 miles Southwest of Nauru. Set course to head for Espiritu.

Case 16 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

Date:
Time:
Position:
Type:
Description:
(Yomei Maru)

Data:
Time:
Position:
Type:
Description:

July 22
0715
Nauru Island
Preighter
(Samarang Maru)

Case 17

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO: (Guard By 12/1330 July
Truk) (B)
(Combined Fleet
Flagship) (B)

Following are some of the noon positions in NUTR 2 message reported by HYPO 150944. BAKER still working posit for 19 July and missing numbers in 18.

"Moon positions lith through 19th July:

Case 17. No. A-1 (Cont.)

14th - 00-35 North, 119- East, 15th - 02-20 North, 123-30 East, 16th - 03-00 North, 128-20 East, 17th - 03-30 North, 133-03 East, 18th - 30 North, 138- East, 19th - blanks.

At 1900/20 July position 05-10 Horth, 149-20 East, thence 170 miles on course 450, thence

Time of departure Balikrapan was 1600/13 July.

GI COMMENT: Heading supplied by HYPO'S 150944 which also says: "This ship will depart Balikrapan on 13th at blank hours and expects to arrive Truk blank date (14403-21st July?); speed 14 knots. Noon posits 14th to 19th ??."

Add this to BAKER'S 161748 for the windup.

"Scheduled time of arrival Truk is 1400, July 21. Noon position 18th is North blank " degrees 30 Minutes, East 138-40, 19th - 05-10 North,

MOTE: * - From the Track this should be 40 but

GI COMMENT: BAKER'S 161748 gave noon posits for unident ship departing Balikpapan July 13th for Truk; HYPO'S 150944 contained first part of this message and recovered Truk arrival as probable 21st July (This message was originated by (Unident)

ComSubPacFor informed at 0935 (-9), 18th July.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946 Case 17, (Cont.) No. A-2 FROM: Unknown Originator 14/1040 July (Balikpapan Arsa -INFO: "From Chief of Staff 2nd Fleet. In view of the fuel shortage situation in this area your ship is scheduled to proceed to PT immediately. (Request your inform me of your) * operating schedule.* NSS COLUENT: * Verb garbled followed by desiderative verb ending. Above is guess. STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PARTY A. GE COMMENT: NPM 140818 had the same translation. PP is Truk-No. 4-3 16/0717 July FROM: TO: INTO:

> (C.E. Dat. in Marshalls)(C)

"Reference your SMS 151 blanks."

Bunder fuel oil at Jaluit is short, etceters. Supply requested.

HYPO COMMENT: Sketchy.

Case 17 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC

17/0453 July

TO:

ALL SUBS COPYING

NPM FOX

INFO:

CTF 72

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUBPAC COMMANDER SERIAL 48 LARGE BIRCH X 1215 (COURSE 090) X PLUS 2 (SPEED 12 KNOTS) X -300 (TIME 0900 GCT) X PLUS 4 (DATE 19TH) X HGCT 1000 (5-10M 143-00g) AND 1207.5 (COURSE 045 X PLUS 2 (SPEED 12 KNOTS) X -200 (TIME 1000 GCT) X PLUS 5 (DATE 20TH X HGWZ 1020 (5-10M 149-20E) X

SLANT EYES HEED THIS ONE VERY BADLY X SO DO WE X

STEELHEAD AND TINOSA WORK ON IT X WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER AND FOR OUR SPRUCES FROM DOWN UNDER WHO ARE HEREBY INVITED TO ATTEMPT TO STEAL HER FROM YOU X

C - Submarine Action Raports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII. Case 18, C-5 - C-7.

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were received.

Case 17 (Cont.)

No. C-3

July 17

Patrolling on surface.

2100 (K) Position Lat. 11-10N, Long. 144-09E.
2245 (K) Changed course to 180 T, proceeding to
southern part of area, to route from
Borneo to Truk.

July 18

0454 (K) Changed course to 085 T. 1845 (K) (Report is illegible here.)

July 19

0240 (K) (Illsgible) 1350 (K) Sighted red num buoy, Lat. 08-56N, Long. 147-07E. 2057 (K) (Illsgible.)

July 20

0623 (K) Changed course to 270, surface patrol.
0713 (K) Sighted target through high periscope.
Bearing 270 T. (Contact #2, similar
to MIPPON MARU). Maneuvered on surface
to gain position ahead and at

0726 (K) Submerged. Six foot swalls, no chop.
1846 (K) Fired four torpedoes. No hits heard
or observed. Target had been carefully tracked and with spread used
torpedoes could not have run properly
and missed. We were running too deep
to observe tracks all the way under
sea conditions.

0851 (K) One very loud explosion followed by two weaker ones. Loud one was similar to "block buster" heard after attack on task force. Probably depth charges from tanker.

Case 17, No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 20 (Cont.)

- 0858 (K) Changed course to 270 to open out on target.
- O951 (K) Surfaced and began end run keeping masts and stack of target in sight. Visibility spotty, target sometimes out of sight and suddenly popping out disconcertingly close. Conditions similar to those existing during attack on task force. Target opened to north and then returned towards east. Unable to clear contact report to NPM. Broadcast on 450 KC.
- 1526 (K) Obtained position nearly ahead and changed course to 020 to get directly ahead.
- 1534 (K) Sighted two bombers, Type 98, distant five miles, headed for us and low.

 No radar contact. Submerged to 150 feet.

 At this time we were directly on targets track. Lat. 60-05N, Long. 148-51E.

 Changed course to close target.
- 1602 (K) At earliest possible sight contact came to periscope depth:
- 1634 (K) Sighted one plane in vicinity of spot where we had submerged.
- 1653 (K) Having just completed one sweep with periscope, began second immediately and sighted target, angle on bow 90 port, range 11000 yards, relative bearing 270. Had searched this area one minute before.
- Paralleled target hoping for zig.

 1810 (K) Surfaced. Went ahead on four main
 engines to overtake. Target not visible.
 Cleared new contact report to NPM.
- 1824 (K) Sunset.

July 21

0006 (K) After gaining position ahead without contact turned south to cover other

Case 17. No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

courses and picked up target by radar; range 13000 yards, bearing 150 T. Began approach. Intermittent rain squalls and spotty visibility. Obtained position ahead, target zigzagging, base course about 050. Moved to starboard bow to take

- advantage of light horizon.

 0037 (K) With target range 4900 yards picked up second target on radar, range 2700 yards, in position on targets starboard bow. Heavy rain squall. Continued tracking and moving over to port side of target.
- 0038 (K) Began slowing down for attack position, target range now 5550 yards, estimated angle on bow 10 port. No visual contacts as yet. A possibility existed that the second contact might be the STEMIHEAD. Ran out of rain squall, very dark.
- 0043 (K) Sighted second contact, range 2500
 yards. Identified as destroyer, angle
 on bow about 20 port. Slowed to reduce
 wake and changed course to port of
 target. Range to target 5000 yards.
- 0045 (K) Destroyer opened fire. Submerged to 300 feet. Target never sighted but feel sure it was tanker attacked earlier. Speed check I4 knots. Let. 60-30 N, Long. 1500
- 0049 (K) Pattern of five depth charges.
- 0050 (K) Two depth charges. 0107 (K) Two depth charges.
- Olli (K) One depth charge.
 - Two escorts were taking part in hunt.
- 0225 (K) One depth charge
- 0327 (K) Surfaced. Charging batteries and clearing vicinity.
- 0453 (K) Submerged. Spent day at 150 feet, maintaining listening patrol, resting

Casa 17. No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

crew, and checking torpedoes. All torpedoes were checked during this and next day by Torpedo Officer and his assistant. Exploder mechanisms were not touched.

1846 (K) Surfaced. Returning to area.

No. C-4

Description of Contact

Number:

Time and Date:

O713 (K) - July 20

Lat. and Long:

5-10N 147-15E

Type:

Tanker Similar

NIPPON MARU No. 2

Course:

O90

Spaed:

Remarks:

Loaded Zig-Zagging

Dg 263 ONI 208-J.

Case 18

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

blank FROM: 16/1714 July TO: (Yessel) IMPO: (4th Hil. Stores Sect.) Yokosuka Nav. Sta.) (garbled) (unident) unident) (unident) (unident) (unident) (unident)

5th Special Base Force blank #234.

Case 18, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Convoy #3702 Otsu Maru) and 2 other Marus escorted by #12 Special Subchaser, Maru) convoy commander, depart for PT 17th, 12 hours, expect arrive North Channel 21st at 0600. The Kiyo Maru will return after escorting the above convoy as far as 11 North. Convoy will pass through following points (North and East):

18th, 1200: 12-32, 146-18, 19th, 1200: 10-03, 147-42, 19th, 2400: 08-48, 148-22, 20th, 1200: 08-22, 149-45.

No. A-2

FROM:

TO:

17/1635 July

(4th Fleet)(B)

(Air Group 902, Truk) (C) 00 2

"To 902nd Air Group Commander.

#3702 B Convoy 1200 position the 18th, 12-32N, 146-18E. Course 168 degrees (morning), 151 degrees (afternoon). Speed blank.

Commander Guam Detachment carry out antisubmarine patrol for above convoy.

GI COMMENT: This info phoned to ComSubPacFor at 2335 (-9) July 17th.

ORIGINAL 1946

Case 18 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM:

18/1919 July

INFO:

(Civ. Eng. Section #4. Truk)(B) (Palao)(A)

"DesOPord #277.

1. Convoy FU 406 (escorted by Patrol Boat #31) noon positions, 21st, 30-00 North, 134-00 East. Blanks. Noon position, 22nd, North of Hayasui Seto Blanks.

2. Saeki Defense Force with Blanks escort the above convoy from blank to Hayasui Seto.
3. Commander Saeki Air Group utilizing blank will make daily sweep and provide direct escort for the convoy.

GI COMMENT: Hayasui Seto at 33-19 North, 131-59 East: ComSubPacFor informed at 1400 (-9):

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUMPAC

17/1745 July

CINCPAC ALL SUBS GUARDING

NPM FOX SCHEDULE

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA TO TINOSA I PECAN I 1228 (COURSE 168) I SPRED BLANK (UNKNOWN) I MINUS 900 (TIME 0300) I PLUS 3 (DATE 18) I EXJY 3218 (12-32N 146-18E)

19/0947 July

Case 18 (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC

GINCPAC ALL SUBS COPYING

NPM FOX

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSURPAC SENDS SERIAL 53 X ULTRA X TINOSA STEELHRAD AND POGY NOTE WITH INTEREST X

3 POPLARS (MERCHANTMEN UNKNOWN) 1 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X BLANK X BLANK X -900 (TIME 0300 GCT) X PLUS 4 (DATE 19TH) X WPUT 0342 (10-03N 147-42E) X BLANK X BLANK X

PLUS 300 (1500) X PLUS 4 (19TH)X (08-48 N 148-22E) KIPH 4822 X BLANK X BLANK X -900 (0300) X FLUS 5 (20TH) KLWZ 2245 (08-22N 149-45E) X

ANOTHER PECAN FOR PIECZENTKOWSKI 1244.4 (COURSE 332.4) ABOUT 0 (10) X MINUS 900 (0300) X PLUS 6 (21ST) X KCLQ (30-00N-134-00E)

Case 18 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 17, C-2 - C-4,

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: See VII, Casa 1, C-4.

No. C-3

July 16 - 19

Surface and submerged patrol west of East Fayu Island.

July 20.

Surface and submerged patrol southeast of Ulul Island.

- 1335 (K) Heard distant echo ranging.
- 1438 (K) Sighted convoy of 4 ships and one destroyer escort. Commenced approach.
 - 1614 (K) Fired four torpedoes at closest ship in convoy. Missed. Target apparently sighted torpedo wakes and successfully maneuvered to avoid.
 - 1619 (K) Started evasive tactics at deep submergence to avoid depth charge attack. Eight depth charges. None close.

Case 18, No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 20 (Cont.)

1900 (K) Surfaced. Radar and sight contact on escort at 5600 yards. Maneuvered at full speed on surface to a void.

1942 (K) Sighted flashing light of another escort, apparently signalling. We were between these two ships. Cleared area to northeast.

No. C-4

Description of Contact

Number:
Date and Time:
July 20 - 1438 (K)
Lat. and Long:
S-22N 149-44E
Type:
Convoy of 4 Freighters
1 DD escort
Range:
18,000
Speed:
How Contacted:
P
Ramarks:
Attacked closest ship.
Missed.

U.S.S. Stealhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7.

No. C-6

July 18

Went in to within 9 miles of PIIAANU
PASSAGE and took pictures of TOL ISLAND.
No planes or patrol yessels were sighted
during the day.

Case 18. No. C-6 (Cont.)

July 20

0507(L). CONTACT (2A)

During morning twilight at Latitude 07° 50'N. Longitude 1490 - 55'E., just as the Navigator was taking his sights, the J.O.O.D. sighted a plane gliding in on us barely one-half mile away. It was nip and tuck getting under in time. He dropped two bombs, one of which struck as we passed 60 feet while the second landed as we passed 120 feet. Clocks, manometers, fans and the main motor brushes took a shellacking. mas close.

Proceeded submerged towards the northern edge of our area and during the day sighted the following planes which were evidently keeping a sharp look-out for us. At

CONTACT (JA)

0950-(L) Latitude 070 - 56'N. Longitude 1490 -56 E. one biplene similar to our early morning friend except that this plane had floats only. At

1518 (I) Latitude 80 - 04 R. Longitude 1500 08 E. Two MITSUBISHI type torpedo CONTACT bombers. At (AA)

CONTACT

1617 (L) Latitude 080 - 08'N. Longitude 1500 10 B. Heard the first of 14 depth charges dropped by two PC boats who were evidently operating in conjunction with planes as several bombs were also heard. Went to 250 feet and employed evasive measures until at

L) Heard the last explosion and at 1946 (L) Latitude 080 - 08'N. Longitude 1500 -12'E. Surfaced in a rain squall. Radar immediately picked up three targets on our port quarter and we commenced tracking from abeam. Nothing could be seen and at first we believed these ships to be the antisubmarine patrol which had worked us over during the afternoon,

but at

Case 18, No. C-6 (Cont.) -

July 20 (Cont.)

2026 (L) Made out a convoy consisting of one CONTACT large and two small freighters accompanied by a DD or CHIDORI class torpedo boat. The moon had now risen and in spite of the heavy clouds the visibility in some directions was 5 or 6 miles. Sparred around for a favorable firing position until at

CONTACT (5A)

2317 (L) Latitude 080 - 05'N. Longitude 1500 -39'Z., with a rain squall behind us, went in at standard speed to conduct. attack on the largest AK. When range had dropped to 3800 yards and we were getting ready to fire, CONTROL reported SD radar contact 3/4 mile moving in and down we went. Submerged to 100 feet expecting enother load but nothing happened.

Returned to periscope depth to continue attack but could see nothing. Sound had numerous contacts and from his description it appeared that the convoy had fanned out and were heading away from us. Did not feel that firing into this melee at 4000 yards was warranted. Sound continued to hear light screws apparently searching the area, until at

July 21

0050 (I) Lost contact and at 0105 (L) Surfaced.

No. C-7

Description of Contact

Number

Number:
Date and Time:
Course:
Lat. and Long:

5
July 20 - 1946 (L)
110 T. zig-zagging
8-08 N - 150-12

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 18, No. C-7 (Cont.)

Speed: Remarks:

9-10 Knots
Convoy - 3AK one large
and 1 escort. Probably
a small DD or a CHIDORI
class torpedo boat.

U.S.S. Sturgson

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-8

Ses VII, Case 15, C-4.

Case 19

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

INFO:

16/0704 July

(Part 2 of 2)

*21-08 North, and 132-30 East. 18-20 North, and 134-00 East. 15-15 North, and 134-00 East. 12-50 North, and 132-00 East. 10-00 North, and 133-20 East. PP (Palao).

Case 19, No. A-1 (Cont.)

- (3) Principal passengers and cargo: 2200 men for blank force, blank ammunition, trucks, Tinsei Maru blank 200 personnel 420.
- (4) Replenishment required as follows 200 tons fresh water immediately on arrival blank coal to capacity."

HAKER COMMENT: This is the second part of a Jap two-parter and is our only part.

GI COMMENT: We have both parts, currently being worked on.

No. A-2

FROM:

16/0704 July

IMFO:

(Garbled)
(Saipan Base
Force 5)
(Combined Fleet)
(Chichijima Special
Base Force)

1. O number blank convoy (A ships blank N Maru, Maru), Chinsei Maru, C ships Maru), Maru) depart Saeki on the 15th ?, at blank hours 30 minutes via following points (north and east):

Case 19, No. A-2 (Cont.) -

30N, 134E.

15-15N, 134E.

12-50N, 132E. and arrive PP (Palau on 24th at 1200.

Maru) will proceed to RR (Rabaul) speed 9. Hato

Maru) will break off at blank and arrive Maru) will break off at blank and arrive Manila? at 1600 on the 18th.

2. Noon positions (loth through 24th): (All north and east)

30-20, 133-45 27-15, 134 24-05, 134 21-15, 132-30 18-20, 134 15-15, 134 12-50, 132 10-00, 133-20 PP Eastern Entrance,

- 3. Principal cargo: ____ Maru) blank 2200 blank.

 (Maru) blank ammunition.

 (Chinsel Maru), 2000 tons coal.

 (Maru), 420 men.
- 4- Replemishments: (07695 Maru) 200 tons water blank.

 Maru) 300 tons coal.

GI COMMENT: Sent in NFM 182202 and 182228.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 19 (Cont.)

No. A-3

Mary of the Park

FROM:

(4th Fleet)(B)

16/0704 July

INFO:

(Comm. Unit Chichijima)(B)

"Part 1. "0" blank convoy (A ship blank; B ship Chinsei Maru; C ship blank) departs Saeki 0930, passes through points 30-00N, 134-00E, 15-15N, 134-00E, 12-50N, 132-00E, and arrives Palau 24th 1200. Speed 9 knots. | blank escort as far as Palau. | escorts as far as 29M. Blank leaves convoy 17th for blank arriving 18th 1600.

Part 2. Noon posits: (16th to 24th incl.)

30-20N, 133-45E. 27-02N, 134-00E. 24-04N, 134-10E.

"21-15N, 132-30E (?). 18-20N, 134-00E. 15-15N, 134-00E. 12-50N, 132-00E. 10-00N, 133-20E. Arrive Palau.

18/0742 July

Case 19, No. A-3 (Cont.)

Part 3. 2200 Hationals abcard; blank aboard; 2000 aboard Chinsei Maru, blank personnel 420.

Part 4. Required supplies:
200 tons of water aboard
300 tons of coal aboard
Blank immediately after arrival."

HYPO COMMENT: This is complete version of Baker's 162334 with all parts.

GI COMMENT: Baker's was skimpy with much less detail but no radical differences of 2nd part only.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CONSUBPAC TO: ALL SUBS ON

NPM FOX

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR HALIBUT IF FUEL REMAINING PERMITS AND FOR HADDOCK IF IN POSITION TO USE X COMSUEPAC ULTRA SERIAL 52 X 2 OR MORE LOADED PEARS X

COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME -900 (0300) X DATE PLUS 5 (20TH)X UFLQ 2000 (18-20 N 134-00 E) ALGAROBA THLQ 1500 (15-15 N 134-00 E) X

HADDOCK MIGHT ATTEMPT DOUBLE PLAY WITH THIS AND MY SERIAL 51 WHICH IS CONSIDERED MORE IMPORTANT X

Case 19 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-1.

No. C-2

July 19, 20

Uneventful, Conducted submerged patrol south and east of Guam.

July 21

0459 (K) Submerged. 1800 (K) Departed area enroute MIDWAY. 1900 (K) Surfaced.

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 11, C-2.

No. C-4

July 18

2000 (I) Entered area at Latitude 11° - 11'N

Longitude 137° - 07'E. Set course to
patrol north of Palau at Latitude 18°N,

Longitude 134°E. to cover shipping
lanes from Empire.

July 19

Underway on surface.

July 20

- 1000 (I) Arrived in area, commenced surface patrol. Four days without a fix.

 Sea has been rough and sky overcast most of the time.
- 1300 (I) Established our position in longitude by several sun sights.

July 21

- O600 (I) Weather cleared during night; established position by star fix. Sea moderately rough.
- 0815 (I) Sighted tops and smoke of four ship convoy bearing 040 T, on southerly course. Commenced tracking and determined convoy was on course 180 T, making 8 knots. All ships were coal burners with high stacks. Latitude 160 48 Longitude 1340 00R.
- 1044 (I) Having gained a position shead at approximately 18 miles, submerged to 300 feet to check the trim of the boat in this vicinity. Found that the trim at periscope depth was satisfactory at 300 feet and that density layers existed at 200 feet and 240 feet, with the bathothermograph indicating a 1 change in temperature (lower) at 100 feet and a further drop of 2° beginning at 190 feet and tapering off to 250 feet.
- 1120 (I) Commenced approach. Range 18,000 yards. Ships were in two columns in line and ships in open order. Distance between columns about 600 yards. The ships were given the designation of Nos. 1-2-3-4; 1 and 2 being the west column

July 21 (Cont.)

and 3 and 4 being in the east column. No. 4 was always behind position. The ships were identified as troop transports, and similar to the following:

#1 HUSIMI MARU (10,800 tons), #2 KASIMA MARU (9,875 tons);

#3 JOHORE MARU (6,182 tons), and #4 YOSINO MARU (8,990 tons).

Troops could be seen on the first three

ships.

We found ourselves to be exactly on their track and determined that they were making eight knots, and were making 90° zigs from 135°T to 225°T every eight to ten minutes. At 12,000 yards lost the targets in a heavy tropical rain storm, and picked them up again at about 6,000 yards on course 225°T. We then turned to close the target's track. The ships were so disposed that we could fire at #1, #2, and #3 ships as they were almost overlapping bow and stern, (a position exactly like the SILVERSIDES experienced . on her fourth patrol. This position provided good firing ranges with zero angles and ninety port tracks. When approximately 2,000 yards from #1 target the ships zigged left to 135°T. We started a turn to the right to bring the bow tubes to bear for an identical setup on this side as we had had on the other, but found for the first time an escorting destroyer of the TOMOZURU Class to the starboard of #2 target. He presented a 10° starboard angle on the bow. We were now in a bad spot, and wished that we were still on the other side of the convoy, however, we later discovered another escort of the same type on the port quarter of #4 target.

July 21 (Cont.)

With the targets drawing nearer the firing point, and minutes rushing by like seconds, the escort situation required action. Fortunately the escort took this action and presented a 30° port angle on the bow, and eased around astern of us at about 700 yards. The action of this escort had certainly harrassed the "pitcher", what with keeping track of him and four other targets while trying to gain a favorable firing position, and keep our presence unknown at the same time. Until the escort had gone past us firing was out of the question -- he would have been on us within seconds after we had let a single torpedo go. I don't know how we kept from being sighted with the number of observations we had to take to keep track of these manauvering targets after this last zig-Their lookouts (and there were plenty of them) were looking past their noses, while we were "underneath" them. When the escort was sufficiently clear, the range to #I target was 800 yards and the gyro angle was 50° right. The gyro angle for #3 target was worse. #2 target changed his position from astern of #1 to about 30° on his starboard quarter. We had a chance for a "down the throat" at this target but decided to let him go by - he did at 300 yards. They sure look big at that range (low power). We now swung hard right for a firing setup on #4 target. When his range was about 2,900 yards we noticed that the other targets had zigged back to 225°T so we held our fire until he changed course, swinging further to the right

July 21 (Cont.)

to 1760T. The first three targets now presented tracks of approximately 160° starboard at an average range of 2,500 yards. At that range with their slow speed they were like sitting ducks, so we decided to fire first at #4 target and then bring each of these targets under fire. At 1233-31 fired two torpedoes at target #4, range 3,000 yards, gyro 354 track 125° starboard, firing interval 11 seconds. At 1234-17 fired two torpedces at target #1, range 2,500 yards, gyro angle 027°, track 158° starboard, firing interval 11 seconds. At 1234-50 fired one torpedo at target #2, range 1,600 yards, gyro angle 03520, track 1660 starboard; and , track 166° starboard; and at 1235-10 fired one torpedo at target #3, 2,400 yards, gyro angle 012°, track 1440 starboard. All torpedoes set at 12 feet. At 1235-19 while searching heard one torpedo hit. Before periscope was trained on #4 target a second hit was timed 10 seconds later. #4 target was a mass of smoke, but seemed to be riding all right. Another hit was timed at 1236-02 which would have been on target #2, the nearest of the four. At 1236-17 a hit was observed in the stern of target #1 which caused his stern to immediately drop in the water to where he had about 3 feet free board where before he had had some 25 feet. The second torpedo fired at-this ship either missed or was a dud as no explosion was heard.

July 21 (Cont.)

On this and #4 ship the torpedoes were fired at the fore and mainmasts. is believed the forward torpedo hit. At 1237-00 the last torpedo was heard to explode, a timed hit on #3 target. No. 2 and 3, like #4 were smoking as if they were on fire, but no flame or visible damage was apparent. Many internal explosions followed the torpedo hits. It was now a beautiful sight to witness the state of confusion that was thrown into this otherwise peaceful formation of four Jap transports with their load of "slant eyes". This unfavorable firing position now had its advantages. The enemy seemed to have no idea where the attack had come from, and none of the ships had maneuvered during firing or at the time of the torpedo hits. No. 1 target, his rudder and screws apparently out of commission and his stern getting deeper in the water, drifted off to the right, presenting a 900 starboard angle on the bow at 3,000 yards. During this time we swung to port as fast as we could, in order to bring the stern tubes to bear. escort aft of #4 target came inside him and laid an ineffective smoke screen and proceeded at high speed to a position alongside #1 target, that was now almost dead in the water. The Japs weren't up to form as they still hadn't dropped. any random depth charges. Using a target speed of 2 knots, fired two torpedoes at #1 target at 1245-19. eleven second firing interval, torpedoes set at 10 feet. Point of aim fore and mainmasts. Range 3,000 yards,

July 21 (Cont.)

gyro angle 1880, track angle 900 starboard. The first torpedo was seen to hit in the bow and throw up some flame, and the second was heard to hit at the proper interval. It should have hit in the middle of the target. As the other targets seemed to be under control did not fire anymore at these as they were sure to avoid. After this last attack the destroyar escort saw where we were firing from. He laid a smoke screen beside #1 target, and came down our torpedo track with smoke belching from his stack. We had had the pleasure of shooting and seeing the fun for quite awhile, but it was over now, so at 1249 we went deep to avoid and evade at 75 turns. At 1256 first attack began with a total of 22 depth charges. One group of 5 was close, but not bad. Both escorts seemed to be working us over. Random depth charges were then dropped until 1342. A total of 30 depth charges were heard. At 1345 Commanding Officer and personnel of the conning tower and torpedo rooms heard the familiar sounds of a ship breaking up when sinking. This lasted for a period of ten minutes.

1359 (I) Started to periscope depth.

1415 (I) At periscope depth, both escorts in sight at 8,000 and 9,000 yards. We were surprised to find both escorts still around.

1445 (I) One escort disappeared to south. Made reload forward and aft.

1530 (I) Second escort disappeared to south.

July 21 (Cont.)

1545 (I) Surfaced, closed a rain squall to the east for security and then headed southwest to pass through the firing point. Just at end of twilight passed through four large oil slicks about 500 feet long. Oil was very heavy and seemed to stand well above the surface of the water. It was now too dark to check carefully for debris. Sea was too rough to permit anyone to go on deck to get a sample of oil. Although ship #1 was not seen to sink. it is the Commanding Officer's opinion that it did. The first torpedo which hit in the stern gave indications that his rudder and screws were gone. was almost dead in the water when he was hit by two more torpedces, one in the bow and one probably near the middle. When last seen his stern was awash. One hour later unmistakable sounds of a ship breaking up were heard by the Commanding Officer and personnel in the conning tower and torpedo rooms over a period of ten minutes. When passing through the firing point, large oil slicks were discovered. Shortly after surfacing the weather closed down again, making search difficult and recontact practically impossible. In retrospect, it was: fortunate we had fired when we did. even with the unfavorable firing position, because we would never have been able to get in another attack the way the weather turned out. The weather seemed to have cleared just long enough for us to have sighted this convoy and make an attack. All warheads were torpex except the two fired at #2 and #3 targets - they had torpex extenders. . The explosions were not overly loud.

July 21 (Cont.)

2030 (I) Sent out contact report.

July 22

During the night retired at ensmy's estimated speed to be on his daylight position circle.

0600 (I) Covered a sector 50 miles wide during the day. Visibility not good, never regained contact.

1900 (I) Set course for area at one engine speed, carrying float.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

Torpedo Attack Report Form

U.S.S. HADDOCK- Torpedo Attack No. 1 -Patrol No. 5

Time - 0333-31 GCT Date - 7-21-43 Lat. 16° -18' N. Long. 134° - 09' E.

Target Data - Damage. Inflicted

Description: Sighted on surface with periscope a convoy of four (4) transports escorted by two (2) destroyers of the TOMOZURU Class. Visibility good to fair. Ships similar to:

#1 HUSIMI MARU (10,800 tons)
#2 KASIMA MARU (9,875 tons)
#3 JOHORE MARU (6,182 tons)
#4 YOSIMO MARU (8,990 tons)

Ships were carrying troops,

Ships Sunk: None.

Description of Contact (Cont.)

Ships Damaged or probably sunk - Four (4) #1 HUSINA MARU (10,800 tons) #2 KASIMA MARU (9,875 tons) #3 JOHORE MARU (6,182 tons) #4 YOSINO MARU (8,990 tons)

Damage determined by:

Ship #1 - Saw one torpedo hit in stern.
Ship #2 - Heard and timed one torpedo hit.
Ship #3 - Heard and timed one torpedo hit.
Ship #4 - Heard and timed two torpedo hits.

Saw one torpedo hit in the stern of #1 target, stern dropped from 25 feet to 3 feet free board. Rudder and screws apparently damaged as ship drifted out of formation and stopped. Other targets had smoke rolling out of them as if they were on fire, but no other visible damage. Heard many internal explosions. All ships unquestionably damaged.

Target Draft: 28' Course: 225 T. Speed: 8.0 Knots. Range at firing:

(1) 2500

(2) 1600

(3) 2400 (4) 3000

U.S.S. HADDOCK- Torpedo Attack No. 2 -Patrol No. 5

Time - 0345-19 GCT Date-7-21-43 Lat. 16° - 18° N. Long. 134° - 09° E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Sighted on surface with periscope a convoy of four (4) transports escorted by two (2) destroyers of the TOMOZURU Class. Ships were similar to:

Description of Contact (Cont.)

#1 HUSIMI MARU (10,800 tons)
#2 KASIMA MARU (9,875 tons)
#3 JOHORE MARU (6,182 tons)
#4 YOSINO MARU (8,990 tons)

Ships were carrying troops.

Ships Sunk - One (1) HUSIMI MARU (10,800 tons) (Same as damage in Attack No. 1)

Ships Damaged or probably sunk - None.

Damage determined by: On first attack saw onetorpedo hit in stern, stern dropped from 25 feet to 3 feet free board, ship fell out of formation. On this second attack saw one torpedo hit in bow throwing up flame from forecastle, and heard one hit which should have been in the middle of target. When last seen the stern was awash. An hour later Commanding Officer and personnel in conning tower and torpado rooms heard unmistakable sounds of a ship breaking up over a period of ten minutes. Passing through firing point at dusk found four large oil slicks 500 feet long. it is the Commanding Officer's opinion that this target sank.

Target Draft: 29' Course 303 T. Speed: 2 knots Renge at Firing: 3000 yards.

Case 20

A - Source of Intelligence

No. 4-1

FROM:

17/1941 July

INFO:

(Singapore Area,

Air)

(Miri Guard Force)

(Garble) (Singapore Comm Unit)

Kenyo Maru | departing from Singapore 18th and expected to arrive Truk at noon 29th. Speed 13 knots.

Route through Balabac and Basilan Channels.

Morth of Nenoesa Island, and eastward along the paralle.

of 3° North to 146° East. Thence on course 054, heading for South Channels.

Hoon positions.

19th - 03-00 North, 108-13 East. 20th - 04-30 North, 112-45 East. 21st - 07-10 North, 116-10 East. 22nd - 07-10 North, 120-30 East. 23rd - 05-05 North, 124-40 East. 24th - 04-25 North, 129-25 East. 25th - 03-00 North, 130-50 East. 26th - 03-00 North, 138-40 East. 27th - 03-00 North, 143-30 East. 28th - 04-35 North, 148-10 East.

NEGAT COMMENT: Longitude on 25th is patently in error, but we are unable to budge it.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0130 (-9). Balabak Channel is at 07-30 North, 117-00 East. Basilan Channel is at approximately 06-35 Horth, 122-00 East.

Casa 20 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

18/0714 July

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING

HPM POX

INFO: CINCPAC

FREC: OPERATIONAL FRICRITY

SANTA CLAUS ANSWERS YOUR LETTERS X SERIAL 51 FROM COMSUBPAC X ULTRA X MINGO AND HADDOCK GET THESE WITH TINOSA PLAYING SAFETY MAN IN CASE THEY GET BY YOU X LET US KNOW X 262 AND 259 POPCORN POSSIBLY WITHOUT LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X 1215 (COURSE CSO) X BLANK (SPEED) X -900 (TIME CSOO) X PLUS 10 (DATE 25TH) X ROBU COSO (CS-00 NORTH 153-50 EAST) X ALGAROBA

ROHV 0C40 (03-00 NORTH 138-40 EAST) ROOT 0C30 (03-00 NORTH 143-30 EAST) X AND THEN 1209 (COURSE 054) X BIANK (SPEED) X BIANK (TIME) X BIANK (DATE) X AT ROJY (C3 NORTH 146 EAST) X AND 1209 (COURSE 054) X BIANK (SPEED) X -900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 13 (DATE 28TH) CIPH 3510 (04-35 NORTH 148-10 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC

26/1056 July

TO: HADDOCK

ALL SUBS COPYING

HPH FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

CONSUBPAC SERIAL 88 ULTRA X DISREGARD MY SERIAL 71

I REMAIN APPROXIMATELY WITHIN 100 MILES OF ROMY

(3 NORTH 138 EAST) X BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO KESP

YOU BUSY THAT VICINITY X MINGO REPORTS 1 TANKER 1

PRRIGHTER I ESCORT AT 2 HOURS GOT 26TH ROLQ 4028

(3-40 NORTH 134-28 EAST) COURSE 090 SPEED 13

Casa 20 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

. U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 24, C-3 - C-4.

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete

No. C-3

July 19

Closing Palau on easterly course. Stormy overcast, strong southwest winds, rough seas.

July.22

1924 (I) Surfaced and set course 215 degrees true at alow speed to head for new position east of Helen Reef.

July 23.

Proceeding on surface, at 6 kmots, using auxiliary engine to save fuel, to latitude 3 degrees-oo N. Seas now extremely calm and glassy again.

July 26

Proceeding at slow speed on northwesterly course to head back for our area.

- O534 (I) Sighted smoke bearing 211 degrees true and apparently moving eastward. Went ahead on a normal approach course at 19 knots until we could see his masts and stack.

 It appeared to be a single tanker.

 Kept masts and stack in sight with periscope as we made "end rum." Determined his base course to be 090 degrees true, and plotted his zig-zag plan through two complete cycles. Speed of enemy was 13.5 knots. At
- 1000 (I) Tanker now bearing 270 degrees true, submerged and commenced another glassy sea approach. He continued to zig-zag according to plan.

Approached to a position 1800 yards 20 degrees on the starboard bow of the target on a 30 degree starboard track, at which time he was about due to zig left to 060 degrees true. Target speed 14 knots.

Attacked.

July 27

Lying to at latitude 3-20 H. longitude 133-40

July 28-30

Enroute Sorol Island on northeasterly course at 6.5 knots using auxiliary engine.

July 31

1001 (I) Sighted land in periscope, which was being used to increase surface range of visibility. Headed for the island on course 103 degrees true until it was in sight from the bridge them submerged and approached western end of Bigelimol.

Casa 20, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See VII, Case II, C-2.

No. C-5

July 28

Conducting surface patrol.

- O729 (I) Sighted two modern tankers bearing 164 T, distance 12 miles on an easterly course. Intitude 2-52 N, Longitude 157-40 E. Went to four engine speed to gain position ahead. Sea calm, visibility excellent-making 19.5 knots. Targets were making radical zigs on base course 090 T at estimated speed of 14 knots. At one point lost targets for over an hour when they decided to rum south for 10
- miles.

 Having gained a position ahead at approximateIy 21 miles submerged to 300 feet to check
 the trim of the boat in this vicinity.

 Found the trim at periscope depth to be
 satisfactory at 300 feet and that a density
 layer existed at 200 feet. The temperature
 dropped one degree, between 30 and 150 feet,
 two degrees between 150 and 230 feet, and
 then dropped rapidly lower as it went off
 the card at 250 feet.
- 1245 (I) At periscope depth, commenced approach, range about 18,000 yards. The ships were in column. They were identified as the GENYO HARU (10,020 tons), and the NISSYO HARU (10,526 tons), in position in the order named Both ships were loaded.
- 1315 (I) When the range was 5,800 yards; the angle on the bow was 10° starboard. We were only 970 yards off the tracks. As the targets had

been making about 20° zigs at irregular intervals, and we had not figured out their plan, we thought if they zigged at all before firing, it would be to starboard. We therefore turned left to open the track. No escorts were in sight, but we figured they were still hidden by the targets. One would never expect to find two valuable target like these unescorted.

1318 (I)

Targets unfortunately zigged left. There was not enough time to bring the bow tubes to bear so came to a course for straight stern shots at a range of 3,900 yards, 90° starboard track. We had gotten a good check on their speed at 14 knots and were sure the range was correct or nearly so. The sea was in our favor for numerous white caps had appeared on what had been a calm sea. Under the circumstances it appeared advisable to divide our fire and fire two torpedoes at each target. At 1321-35 fired two torpedoes at the leading target, with a 9 second firing interval. Range 4,280 yards, gyro angle 171, track 95° starboard. At 1321-53 fired two torpedoes at the second target, with a 7 second firing interval. Range 4,250 yards, gyro angle 170°, track 92° starboard. Point of aim on each target was the bridge and the mainmast. Torpedoes were set at 15 feet. Neither surface or air escort could be seen. The torpedces were heard to run hot and straight, and a light smoke stream from the first torpedces could be seen leading the first targets. The targets had not seen our torpedces and were still steaming on unconcerned.

Heard a torpedo hit at 1324-29 and within a few seconds saw a torpedo hit the second target just forward of his after deck house. No damage could be seen on #1 target, so both hits must have been on the second target

Both targets now started to turn to the left and presented a 165° starboard angle on the box. At 1327-18 and 1327-25 two torpedo explosions were heard at the end of their run.

The second target seemed to be in trouble and dropped well behind the first target. His main deck was now awash. The sea was calm but the wind was blowing up white caps.

We immediately changed course and headed for this target at full speed, but the range opened to 11,000 yards and then remained constant. The first target came back and stoo by the damaged ship.

- 1334 (I) Heard two internal explosions and it looked as if the ship would surely sink, he was
- barely afloat.

 1345 (I) With the range still 11,000 yards targets
 turned to the right and started off to the
 east in formation making ten knots. It was
 hard to see what was keeping this ship afloatand here he was steaming off at ten knots.
 These modern tankers can really take it.

Thy the torpedoes missed that were fired at #1 target is unknown. The targets hadn't maneuvered and the target data was undoubtedly correct since both torpedoes fired at the second target hit. The only conjecture that can be made is that the torpedoes ran deep. Exploders were inactivated. These targets were drawing better than 25 feet — their loaded draft is listed at 30 feet. This is the first experience we have had with torpedoes exploding at the end of their run. As we couldn't close for another attack let the targets clear and then at

targets clear and then at

1443 (I) Surfaced, set course to get ahead of the
targets while keeping the range opened to abo

32,000 yards so that they wouldn't know of
our movements, We expected planes to show
up at any time to force us down.

- 1500 (I) Picked up both targets. The target we hit
 was very low in the water. It was too late
 to get ahead of them for another daylight
 attack so the decision was made to trail them
 for a night attack. One of the disappointing
 things of the patrol was that our SJ radar was
 not functioning properly and our radar personnel
 were doing everything in their power to repair
 it. A report on the SJ radar follows under
 marginal heading (M) RADAR.
- 1620 (I) Targets commenced their regular zig zag plan to the east with base course apparently 090°T.
- 1719 (I) Hade quick dive to avoid being sighted when targets got too close.
- 1740 (I) Surfaced, targets were on base course 022°T.

 1820 (I) As it began to get dark put four engines on the line and increased speed to full (19.5 kmots). The sea was now perfectly calm. It was a dark night, and it was extremely difficult to see the targets the radar would have been a great help. We couldn't tell just how close
 - a great help. We couldn't tell just how close we were to the targets, and it didn't seem as though we were closing any. We were afraid that if he should stop we'd charge past him before we could ever stop our headway. It was so dark we couldn't judge the range well, especially looking into the stern of the
- 1950 (I) Rang up stop and made the forward tubes ready for firing when the target bearing started to fall off to the left and it looked a though they were changing course. Number 5 tub cuter door could not be opened. The range was closing, but the targets were still very in distinct, estimated range 3,000 yards. Targets
- rere just off the port bow.

 1951 (I) Our previous concern for the rate of change of range under these conditions of poor visibility without a radar was now justified. The targets now turned to the right and presented a 90° starboard angle on the bow, and the bearing rapidly drew to the right. We started to swing to the right for a quick shot,

but then saw the leading target swing left and

- He fired two emergency identification signals at us. There had not even been enough time for us to shoot from the "hip" when we were sighted. Firing was now out of the question with the targets maneuvering, so went to emergency speed to clear the area, turning away from the formation. The range was determined to be approximately 1,900 yards; the target covered two-thirds of the field of the 7-50 binoculars when broadside to us. The stern of the damaged target was seen to be awash.
 - 1953 (I) We made a quick dive when the second target turned a searchlight on us. He opened fire as we dove and dropped a depth charge. We sustain ed no damage; but blem a gasket on an outboard engine exhaust valve when it was closed before the engine had stopped running. The inboard valve held and the engine was not flooded.
 - 2030 (I) Surfaced and closed the targets to the north.

 It was too dark for a submerged periscope approach without a radar, so we decided to try a surface approach, firing from about 3,000 yards. We began tracking by estimating the range and angle on the bow and using the T.B.T. for bearings.
 - 2138 (I) With the targets on course 075 T, and making
 14.0 knots we took a firing position on the
 second ship. At 2138-33 fired four torpedoes
 from the bow tubes at the second target; range
 3,000 yards, gyro angle CO8, track 95° starboard. Torpedoes were set at 15 feet. A six
 second firing interval was used. A divergent
 spread of one degree was applied to the first
 and fourth torpedoes, while the second and
 third were fired at the M.O.T.
 - 2144-05 Heard three torpedoes explode at the end of their run (about five minutes thirty seconds).

 The fourth torpedo was not heard to explode.

 All torpedoes ran straight and normal, and

their tracks could be seen passing beneath the target. The targets did not maneuver until the torpedoes exploded at the end of the run. This is decidedly a bad feature because it gives the submarine's presence away.

The targets now again opened fire, but not in our direction. We felt that these torpedoes should have hit, because the data had checked well and the targets didn't maneuver.

- 2219 (I) Radar picked up target at 7,400 yards, began
- tracking. Target now making 15.5 knots.

 2244 (I) When the range was 4,000 yards and we were presenting a zero angle on the bow, the targets opened fire on us. After a half dozen shells had passed close above our heard we dove. They did not use a searchlight, it seemed uncanny that they should have opened up so close to us I'm sure they couldn't see us because even they were hard to see.

 2300 (I) Surfaced, range 8,600 yards. Commenced tracking again.

July 27

- Tracking two targets that are as determined to get away as we are to get them.

 OCSO (I) Targets opened fire and turned on searchlight in the direction of 045°T while we bore 352°T from them at a distance of 9,000 yards. They fired about thirty rounds, turned their searchlight off, and fired ten more. This gave us good proof that they didn't have a radar, and that they had just happened to fir in our direction at 2244 (I). If it was just "trial and error", or "random shooting" it was, nevertheless, uncomfortable to have around. Following the shooting we lost targe by sight and radar:
- Oll4 (I) Radar contact on target at 8,250 yards.

 Commenced tracking with the idea of getting ahead for a submerged radar approach. Hoon was to come up at 0130, but the sky was overc-

0217 (I)

After midnight the targets started heading in the direction of Palau with their base course 310°T and making 12.5 knots.

310°T and making 12.5 knots. Having gained a position directly ahead of the target at 9,020 yards dove and began submerged approach. Target was on course 510°T making 12.5 knots. We placed ourselves on course. 050°T with the expectation that the target would sig to the right for he had been on 510° for a long time and was due to change to 3500T Radar didn't pick up the target after submerging until 6,000 yards. Target still hadn' changed course so we increased speed to full to get off his track. At 4,000 yards picked up targets through #1 periscope. At this time we went to periscope depth to avoid beingseen. Out setup was checking beautifully sound, periscope, and T.D.C. all agreed. We only had two torpedoes aft, so we planned to fire these at the first target (not yet damaged), then swing to bring the bow tubes to bear on both targets.

At 0240-55 fired two torpedoes on periscope bearings from aft set at 20 feet. Range 1,950 yards, gyro angle 171, track 82 starboard, 10 second firing interval. Points of aim were bridge and mainmast. Torpedoes were heard to rum by sound. Both torpedoes missed and exploded at the end of rum (5 minutes - 20 seconds). At this time both targets maneuvered. Up until this time bearing stayed exactly on. If there ever was an ideal set-up, and a correct one this was it. We're sure the torpedoes didn't go around or over so they must have gome under. However, having had such perfect luck with our torpedoes on the convoy, we still wouldn't give up.

After firing the stern tubes, swung hard right to bring the bow tubes to bear. We were on the point of firing with 1100 right gyros and

a 90 starboard track on the second target when our "friends" the first two torpedces exploded at the end of their run. This is a decidedly unsatisfactory feature. We continued our swing to reduce the gyro angles to zero and by the time we got around the second target presented a 1600 port track at 3,300 yards. No. 1 target was also in line with this, so we still had a good chance of finishing off these targets. At 0248-20 fired four torpedoes from forward, set at 20 feet with a 10 second firing interval. Range 3,370 yards, gyro angle 354, and track angle 160 port. Two of these were spread 1/2. dagree right and left while the other two had no spread. At 0250-49 fired one torpedo from forward, set on 20 feet, range 4,000 yards; gyro angle 534° and track 180°. The second target changed course 200 during the run of the four torpedoes, but did not maneuver during the run of the fifth. The leading target did not maneuver at all. These torpedces had an excellent chance of hitting one, or both of the targets, however no hits were obtained. All torpedoes exploded at the end of their run The targets should have come close to being damaged even by these explosions. Surfaced, targets at 8,000 yards, still very much afficat. With one torpedo remaining, and having gotten only two hits out of fifteen torpedces, decided to call it a day, thus ending a twenty hour running battle which had resulted in serious damage to one ship. We had chased these ships from Latitude 20-52'H Longitude 1370-40'E to Latitude 40-59'N Longitude 1390-040 E over a track which amounted to 269 miles. The absence of air and surface screens had made this chase possible -- it is unfortunate that it couldn't have ended more favorably

0312 (1)

O515 (I) Submerged to give the crew a much needed rest efter last night's battle. Ran at 100 feet between looks. All attempts to send out contact report before diving were unsuccessful.

1840 (I) Surfaced. Nothing sighted during day. Having only one torpedo remaining, and only enough fuel for another week of restricted activity in the area decided to return to base. This would let another boat, that had more fighting power, enter a very productive area. Set course for departure point.

Ho. C-5

Description of Contact

No: 2 Time: 0729 I Date: 7-26-43 Istitude: 2-52N Longitude: 137-40E Type(s) 770 -

Initial: 12 miles
Est. Course
and Speed: 090°T
How Cont: SD

Two (2) modern tankers identified as #1 GEHYO Maru (10,020 toms) and #2 Nissyo Maru (10,526 toms). No surface or air escort. Attacks 3-4-5-6. Damaged one 40 on first attack.

Case 21

A - Source of Intelligence

Ho. A-I

FROM: (Nauru Comm 19/0733 July To: (Ath Fleet) (B) (2nd Fleet) (B)

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 21, Ho. A-1 (Cont.)

(Comdr Base Force #4) (B)

Arrived at Nauru 0630 with (DD) upon completion of taking on cargo, will depart at 1000; scheduled to arrive North Channel 0500, 22nd passing through following positions:

At 0500, 21st: 04-45 N, 157-17 E. At 1700 same date: 06-47 N, 154-41 E.

GI COMMENT: Phoned Subs CO15/20th (-9).

Ho. A-2

TO: (Nauru Comm 19/0733 July
TO: (4th Fleet)
(Eastern Force)
(Tarawa Comm Unit)

From Captain of Wrakaze

Arrived Nauru at 0630 with - unident ship). Will complete unloading and depart at 1000. Will pass through following points and arrive North Channel at 0500 on 22nd:

At 0500 on 21st in 04-45 N, 157-17 E. At 1700 on same date in 06-47 N, 154-51 E.

NEGAT COMMENT: Wrakaze is from garbled group and should be treated with caution.

Case 21 (Cont.)

B - Operational Discatch

No. B-I

COMSUBPAC FROM

19/1632 July

TOP

ALL SUBS COPYLING

HEN FOL

IIIFO:

CIMOPAC

PREC:

OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

WAIRS OF POGI GETS ANOTHER TIP IN CONSUBPAC ULTRA SERIAL 55 X I HAPLE I TRONWOOD X EMROUTE NAURU-TRUK X BLANK X PLUS 800 PLUS 5 X CXGM 4517 (IAT 04-45 NORTH LONG 157-17 HAST) X MINUS 400 X PLUS 6 X VTRU 4741 [06-47 HORTH 154-41 EAST] X ENTERING HORTH CHANGEL PLUS 800 PLUS 6

G - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

Ho. C-I

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-4.

No- C-3

July 20

Surfaced and submerged patrol southeast of Ulul Island

Heard distant echo ranging.

Sighted convoy of 4 ships and one destroyer 1438 (K)

escort. Commenced approach.

Fired four torpedoes at closest ship in convoy 1614 (K) Missed. Target apparently sighted torpedo wakes and successfully maneuvered to avoid.

Started evasive tactics at deep submergence to avoid depth charge attack. Eight depth charges ... Home close

- 1900 (K) Surfaced. Radar and sight contact on escort at 5600 yards. Maneuvered at full speed on surface to avoid.
- 1942 (K) Sighted flashing light of another escort, apparently signalling. We were between these two ships. Cleared area to northeast.

July 21.

Surface and submerged patrol north of Hagur Island.

1800 (X) Set course for area 14 south.

July 22-23

Patrolling Guam-Saipan-Truk route enroute to area 14 south.

Ho. C-3

Description of Contact

See VII, Case 18, C-4

Gase 22

A - Source of Intelligence

Ho. A-1

FROM:

11/0846 July

Casa 22, No. A-I (Cont.)

"Combined Fleet Desopord #625.

2. The Advance Force Commander will have the Umikaze and - umident DD) (in DesDiv 17?) escort the above force under the command of the Captain of the Hayataka between FT and Japan after which they will engage in upkeep.

No. 4-2

FROM:

11/0846 July

TUIL 5

*Combined Fleet Desopord 625.

I. Ryuho and Hayataka /coth without their aircraft/ Unyoo, Chunyoo, DesDiv 7 /Ushio and Akebono/ under command of Commanding Officer Hayataka blanks Truk and Empire.

2. Commander Advance Force will have the Umakaze and carry out protection of the above force between Truk and the Empire, after which they will carrout maintenance.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

Case 22, (Cont.)

Ho. A-3

FROM: He originator

17/2100 July

Hayataka will guard Tokyo #1 and #2 broadcast (Guard

Truk broadcast (until 1200 July 21) Combined
Fleet short wave (until same time?) Combined Fleet
lang wave (until 1800 July 19)."

Baker Comment: Above suggests Hayataka and Ryuho enroute Kure. Unyo and Chuyo plus DesDiv 7 destroyers enroute Yokosuka, and Umikaze enroute Sasebo.

Ho. A-4

FROM:

18/1805 July

#2 Yokosuka) (B)

Reference HYPO 190142. NEGAT's copy none too good herebut here is translation of first portion.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

20/0943 July

Case 22, No. A-4 (Cont.)

Says: "In company with Unyo, Chuyo and DesDiv 7
(Akedone, Ushio) will break off from the group going to Kure at 1430 in position 31-00 North, 136-44 East, and proceed at 18 knots. At 0500 on 24th, bearing 032, distance 10 miles from parbled but could be Irozaki) etc, blanks."

MEGAT COMMENT: Remainder is the same.

GI CONMENT: Heading supplied from HYPO's 190142 which also had other details regarding the passengers and cargo on board the Unyoo and Chuyco. The destination of the group breaking off in the above position is Yokosuka.

B - Operational Dispatches

Ho. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAG

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING

HPI POX

III70:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 56 ULTRA X BAG OF FEANUTS CONTAINING 2 OR 3
ASHES* DIVIDING INTO 2 BUNDLES X BLANK (COURSE UNKNOWN)
PLUS 8 (SPEED 18 KHOTS) X NIHUS 630 (TIME 0530) X
PLUS 8 (DATE 23) X NJJX 0144 (31-01 H 136-44 E) X
PIECZENTKONSKI CONDUCT PEANUT ROAST AND DONT SAVE THE
ASHES X POMPANO NOTE AND BOTH OF YOU SEE MY NEXT
SERIAL

MOTE: ASH IS A CARRIER

CRIGINAL 1946

Case 22 (Cont.)

No. B-8

FROM: COMSUBPAC

20/1018 July

CO: ALL SUBS COPYING

er for

IHFO: CIMCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

ULTRA FROM SUBPAC COMMANDER SERIAL 570 SOUTHWESTERLY WIND BLOWING SCHE ASHES TOWARD RED STONER X MAYBE I MAYBE 2 X ABOUT 1205 X PLUS 8 X PLUS 800 X PLUS 8 X SKIPJACK TAKE POSITION JZIH> 3007 IN TIME TO REMDER HONORS X

PCMPANO IF SUFFICIENT FUEL AND TORPEDOES REMAINING TAKE STATION 6 HILES BEARING 270 FROM SKIPJACK X IF NO CONTACT AFTER WAITING 14 HOURS BEYOND TIME SET STONER CONTINUE PATROL AND THOMAS HEAD FOR THE BARN X PIECZENTKCHSKI IF YOU SLOW ANY OF THESE BABIES DOWN USK 450 KILOCYCLES TO INFORM RED AND TOM

*(34-30N: 139-07 E)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception:

Radio reception was on the average good. No serials were missed.

No. C-2

July 19

We cannot be very far from the center of a typhocn. The seas are mountainous....

dase 22, No. G-2 (Cont.)

July 20-22

Patrolling to southward of our area. Nothing

July 23

Heavy seas and strong winds from the southeast
1650 (I) Sound picked up screws dead ahead.
1653 (I) Saw one destroyer bearing 258 degrees
relative.....The seas were so high could only

relative..... The seas were so high could only see top of his stack and masts at this close range. Lat. 30-57N, Long. 137E.

1655 (I) Could just see the flight decks of two carriers down the troughs of the waves.....

At no time could sound pick up the screws of the carriers. Range of periscope visibility very low because of high seas.

July 24-25

Heading back to, and in southern part of area. Departed area for Midway July 25, 1943.

July 27

Patrolled vicinity 33%, 141 E. Nothing sighte

July 28

Surface cruising to Midway.

U.S.S. Pompano

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: HPM reception was good though SubPac serials 15 and 55 were missed. Case 22 (Cont.)

Ho. C-4

July 23

33-27 M. 142-45 E. submerged on radar contact 5 miles to 3 miles.

0945 (I) Plane sighted through periscope 15 minutes

1145 (I) Surfaced.

July 23

1440 (K) 34-10 M, 148-34 E, submerged for 40 minutes on radar contact at 3 miles.

1727 (K) 34-06 N, 149-56 E, sank floating moss covered and barnacled mine with 20 m.m. Result, a fine explosion 100 to 150 yards from the ship with bits of mine case dropping around.

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-5

See VII. Case 15, C-12 - C-14.

U.S.S. Iapen

First War Patrol

Ho. C-6

Hadio Reception: The equipment on board is highly satisfactory.

Ho. C-7

July 23

CCCC (K) Standing to southward to cover lanes approaching Tokyo from the southeast and east,

Casa 22, No. C-7 (Cont.)

- Oloo (K) Sighted a bright light bearing 214 T. on horizon could not make out any other details probably a fishing boat or a patrol Visibility good bright moon, clear skies.
- C442 (K) Star fix shows a 2.3 knot current setting C50°F. This is in general agreement with Pilo Charts but we didn't expect as much set as far off the beach as we are. Position Lat. 34° 40 N., Long. 141° 16K.
- 0454 (K) Submerged. Changed course to 225°T. to hold our own against current and patrol across
- lanes to Tokyo.

 1439 (K) Sighted destroyer, bearing 240 T. Range approximately 6000 yards. Battle Stations.
- 1440 (K) Sighted second destroyer and one large aircraft carrier. Range 5000 yards, speed 20, course southeast. Destroyers patrolling.
- 1440-30 (K) One aircraft bomb landed closs by.
 1442 (K) At periscope depth. Second aircraft bomb
 landed fairly close. Rigged for depth charge.
- 1443 (K) First depth charge landed not very close.
- 1445 (K) Went deep, 250 to 280 feet.
- 1447 (R) Groups of depth charges being dropped some
 we guess at 1000 to 1500 yards others may be
 a little closer none closer than the usual
 400 yard indoctrination charges.
 Started evasive maneuvers. About 20 charges
 dropped pinging is heard intermittently.
 High speed screws of at least 300 RPM heard.
- 1600 (K) Deep still hear searching vessels close by. 1700 (K) Deep still hear searching vessels close by.
- 1807 (K) Screws fairly close pinging on slow scale.
 1857 (K) About 6 depth charges dropped appear to be
 distant -3 000 to 4000 yards.
- 2005 (K) Came to periscope depth. Nothing sighted. Visibility hazy.
- 2045 (K) Surfaced. Sighted destroyer distant about 4000 yards, bearing 165°T. Another destroyer or patrol bearing 180°T. at about same distance. Changed course to 330°T. Cut in all engines and cleared area to northward. Heard heavy explosion from astern, source unknown.

2143 (A) Sighted two yellow flares on port beam -

2150 (K) Changed course to 0900 - Believe we have shaken patrol craft. Made decision to stand to eastward in view of being unable to reach assigned position and to cover alternate track assigned by Comsubpac dispatch.

July 24

Oli5 (K) Sent contact report regarding aircraft carrier to Comsubpac.

Ho- C-8

Description of Contact

Ho:
Date: July 23
Time: 1440 (K)
Latitude: 34-28H
Longitude: 140-58K
Type: 1 CV
Initial Range: 5000 yards
Est. Course

and Speed: S.R. 20 kts. How Cont.: Periscope

Case 23

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM; TO:

21/1235 July

(Yokosuka Haval Munitions Section) (Garble) (Kiska Comm Unit)

Case 23, No. A-1 (Cont.)

*Prom Captain - Derin Maru?).

(1) This ship escorted by the Mamikaze departs
Paramushiro Island at 1600, 21st July, and is scheduled
to pass through following points at times indicated:
22nd, 1100, 47-Horth, 157 East.
24th, 0100, 40 Horth, 152 East.
25th, 1800, 35 Horth, 144 East.
25th, 1700, arrive Yokosuka Speed 12.5 knots.

(2) Upon arrival Yokosuka, desire to load 10,000
tons light oil, 1,000 tons of #1 heavy oil for use of
this ship, and blank heavy oil for boiler use. Also
500 toms of fresh water. For use of - unident
DD) and - unident DD) request 300 toms heavy
oil for boiler use and 15 tons of fresh water.

HEGAT COMMENT;

is Haru whose call is JWIQ.

GI COMMENT: Phoned Subpac at 0230 (-9) July 22.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-I

FROM: CINCPAC TO: COMMORPAC 21/1827 July

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

I HARU WITH I DESTROYER ESCORT DEPARTED PARAMUSHIRU 210700 ENROUTE YOKOSUKA K ULTRA X AT 220200 in 157 EAST 47 NORTH X PASS 40 NORTH 152 EAST AT 231600 K AT 250900 POSIT 144 EAST 35 NORTH X TIMES AND DATES ARE GCT X

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC

.22/0847_July

TO: HARMHAL (SS167)-SALMON (SS182)

IMPO: CIMCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICEITY

Case 23, No. B-2 (Cont.)

ULTRA I COMSUBPAC SERIAL 61 Q X 1 LARGE BIRCH X BLANK PLUS 2.5 X MINUS 1000 X PLUS 7 DGGT (PLUS 7 47 DEG HORTH 157 DEG WEST) X BLANK X BLANK X PLUS 400 X PLUS 8 0SVQ (PLUS 8 40 DEG HORTH 152 DEG EAST) X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 300 X PLUS 10 PRRP (PLUS 10 35 DEG NORTH 144 DEG EAST) X WATCHOUT FOR EACH OTHER AND FOR S BOATS TO NORTHWARD 0P YOU WHO MAY THY TO STEAL THIS ONE FROM YOU X PIRST POSITION WAY POSSIBLY BE DGZK (47 DEG NORTH 153 DEG EAST) X RED SEA DRAGON

0 - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Harrial

Fifth War Patrol

No- C-I

Radio Reception: All serials received were complete; reception was only fair.

Ho. C-2

July 21

CO13 (K) Completed transmission of MARWHAL "CAST".

1330 (K) Departed from Area 1 Able, heading southeast through special area of patrol boat contacts. Steering sixty percent zigzag to cover wide area.

July 23

Olds (X) Running in and out search along possible enemy tracks.

July 24

0900 (K) No. 4 main engine out of commission with two broken cylinder head belts.

1600 (K) No. 4 main engine in commission.

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 25

- C300 (K) Having enhausted all possible enemy tracks with no contacts, again set course through area of patrol boat contacts.
- 2130 (K) Received ComSubPac's Serial 76. 2217 (K) Altered course to search patrol boat contacts.

July 26

- C800 (K) Lat. 36-35 N; Long. 152-34 E. barometer falling, heavy swells, wind building up to force 6.
- 1122 (K) Lat. 36-15; Long. 152-45, plane contact on SD radar, 9 miles, closing. Dived. Unable to maintain periscope depth at 70 feet in heavy swells. Plane not sighted, at this point we were 540 miles from HONSHU and 600 miles from MARCUS. Stayed down for lunch.
- 1323 (K) Surfaced.

 Continued on surface, cruising over a 92%

 zigzag plan superimposed on four hour legs

 200 to right and left of base course between

 possible contact points to cover maximum area.

U.S.S. Salmon

Seventh War Patrol

No- C-3

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete.

No. C-4

July 17

1300 M Departed Submarine Base Midway for area with surface escort until dark.
Hade trim dive.

Case 23, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 17-24

Enroute patrol area. Made daily training dives held daily fire control drills, and conducted general indoctrination and instruction of the crew.

During the training dive on July 21, the operating gear for negative flood valve became inoperative (see section under major defects for full description of casualty). During the night, with the ship lying to with all floods closed, Lieutenant L. P. Davis, Jr., U.S.N. and Ensign J. P. Woodling, U.S.N. entered negative tank through number two main ballast tank, removed a broken section of negative flood valve linkage, and brought it into the boat where it was straightened and reenforced, and then reinstalled it. This was a job well done under difficult conditions and gave us the use of negative tank during the patrol.

July 25-31

Entered the area on July 25. We had expected to find fog in this area from reading available meteorological data but nothing like the actuality. The fog was dense and persistent, visibility ranging from zero to 1000 yards. We cruised around waiting for it to clear until we were hopelessly lost. In view of the prevailing southeasterly winds decided our only hope was to go thru one of the passes into the sea of Okhotsk to the lee of the Kuriles chain. On 29 July commenced return along our track to break thru the fog.

Casa 24

A - Source of Intelligence

No: A-1

FROM: (Vessel tanker in Balikpapan Zone) 22/1135 July

TOS

(4th Fleet) (C)

From Comir #5 Tonan Haru

In 21 July 1900 posit (03-26 N, 138-00 E) will change

At 0330 on July 23 pass 25 miles south of Satawal Island proceed via blank of Enderby Island on blank July at 0500 arrive South Channel.

GI CONSERT: Given to SubPac by phone at 1830 (I)

Ho. A-2

FROM: (#3 Toman Haru) 22/1136 July

*Prom Commander of #3 Toman Maru

At 1900 on (82944 - 22nd July?) in position 0-26 H, 138 E, will change course and proceed to Truk passing through a point 25 miles South of blank ON Island at 0330 on (33312 - 24th July?).

HEGAT COMMENT: In Hegat's 221622 we guessed as 23rd July, but in view of distance involved in above message, believe that 25th July is better, although this is based on value of 22nd July for which previously has been guessed as 21st July. However, since this message was originated at 1136 on 22nd, believe 22nd July is more probable for this group.

Case 24, No. A-2 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Hypo 221706 version is quoted:

From Comdr #3 Toman Haru
In 21 July 1900 posit (C3-26 N, 138 E) will change
course. At 0330 on July 23 pass 25 miles south of
Satawal Island proceed via blank of Enderby Island on
blank July at 0600 arrive South Channel."

Hypo version given to SubPac by phone at 1830 (I) 22 July.

Ho. A-3

FRCK: (2nd Fleet Tanker)

23/1105 July

TO:

INFO:

From: Captain #3 Tonan Maru.

In accordance with #2 Sea Escort Force # blank paragraph 3 change the rendezvous point for and #3 Tonan Maru to 07-04 H, 148-24 E at 0930 24 July.

GI COMMENT: MSS 230929 has posit at 140-24 E. Hypo's 148 plots much better and is good value.

Phoned to SubPac at 1850 (I) 23rd.

No. A-A

FROM: (#3 Tonan

23/1105 July

TO:

INFO

(Garbled)

*From Commander #5 Toman Maru.

In accordance with para 5 of #2 Surface Escort Unit

Case 24, Ho. A-4 (Cont.)

SMS #50 the time and place of rendezvous for and #3 Tonan Maru is changed to 0930 the blank (*) at 07-04 N. 140-24 R.

Hagat Note: (a) Date blank may be 24 July.

NEGAT COMMENT: is unrecovered group, but judging from its position in message, assume it is a ship. See Negat's 1802 of 22nd.

NEGAT COMMENT: In Negat's 221642 we guessed as 23rd July, but in view of distance involved in above message, believe that 25th July is better, a lthough this based on value of 22rd July for which previously has been guessed as 21st July. However since this message was originated at 1156 on 22rd, believe 22rd July is more probable for this group.

GI COMMENT: Hypo 221706 version is quoted:

In 21 July 1900 posit (03-26 N, 138 E) will change course.

At 0330 on July 23 pass 25 miles south of Sataval Island proceed via blank of Enderby Island on blank July at 0600 arrive South Channel.

Hypo version given to SubPac by phone at 1830 (I) 22 July.

11 January 1945.

Case 24 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC

22/1207 July

TIMOSA STREIMEAD

ALL SUBS COPYING NEW FOX

IMFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICEITY

ULTRA FOR POSSIBLE USE TINCSA AND STEELHEAD X 280 POPCORN X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 200 X PLUS 6 ROHY 2600 (03-26 NORTH 138-00 EAST) X BLANK X BLANK X PLUS 630 X PLUS 7 X CDUT 0005 (07-00 NORTH 147-05 HAST) I THEN VIA PULLWAT ENTERING SOUTH CHANNEL TRUK PLUS 900 PLUS 8 I SERIAL 63

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC

23/09II July

TO: CINCPAC

ALL SUBS GUARDING

NPM FOX

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

ULITRA X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 68 X BLUE SEA DRAGON X DATES GIVEN IN MY SERIAL 63 SHOULD BE ONE DAY LATER AND CHANGE QUOTE VIA PULLWAT UNQUOTE TO READ ECRTE OF PULUHAT X FOR TINOSA AND STEELHEAD

No. B-3

PROM: COMSUBPAC

23/1755 July

TO: TINOSA STEELHEAD

ALL SUBS ON NPH FOX

INFO:

OPERATIONAL PRICRITY PREC:

ULTRA FOR TIMOSA AND STEELHEAD X 280 POPCORN X COURSE

Case 24, No. B-3 (Cont.)

BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME -1130 (-0030) X DATE -/
9 (24TH) CDPH 0424 (7-04 N 148-24 E) X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

10. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7.

No. C-3

July 22

0428 (L) Latitude 07-30H Long. 150-30 E. Made morning dive and at

0432 (L) Fire was reported in the Maneuvering Room.

Lost propulsion until at

C445 (I) When fire was extinguished and propulsion was resumed on the port shaft only. While investigating the cause of the fire sound made contact on bearing 020°, light fast screws. Made periscope observation, but could see nothing in the rain squall prevailing.

O500 (L) Lost contact. Fire was caused by a burnt-out starting resistance in the starboard motor.

Replaced damaged resister and at

O857 (L) Both shafts were in normal operation, until at 1108 (L) A loud click developed in the starboard shaft while running at dead slow, 42 RPH. Went ahead on port shaft for the remainder of the day investigating the cause of the knock. During the morning heard three or four depth charges, all distant. By

1800 (L) Had determined source of noise to be in the coupling of #1 motor. Decided to get well

Case 24, No. C-2 (Cont.)

clear of TRUK and try to effect regains. Broke coupling and ran all night on three motors towards northern boundary of area.

July 23

O428 (L) Lat C9-50N, Long. 151-30K. Dove and continued investigating possible remedies for starboard shaft. As we had no spare coupling to install in place of the damaged one, decided to continue patrol as long as possible with damaged parts. We could rum at 80 RPM on the port shaft only for silent running and if we had to have more speed, we could still use the starboard shaft, noise and all, in a pinch. Reconnected the coupling to rum on all 4 motors. With those operating limitations it was decided to keep well clear of the patrol boat areas where a prolonged depth charging might prove embarrassing.

July 23 to July 30

Continued patrolling area using a high periscope wherever conditions permitted. No contacts were made, but on surfacing on 29 July, found antenna trunk flooded. Could not locate source of leak, but antenna operated satisfactorily after trunk was drained. This condition continued for the remainder of the patrol.

U.S.S. Tinesa

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were received.

Ho. C-4

July 22

2326 (K) Changed course to 180°T to patrol Borneo-Truk route.

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 23

Surface patrol, nothing sighted. Position in vicinity Lat. 7-00N, Long 140-00E.

July 24

- .0442 (K) Changed course to 070°T to investigate possible contact.
- 0555 (K) Sighted target through high periscope bearing 162°T, angle on bow 90 port, range about 55000 yards. Began end run. Target similar to TOMAN MARU No. 2.
- 0809 (K) Obtained position ahead, angle on bow zero. Submerged.
- '0823 (K) Sighted target. Angle on how 35 port. Took normal approach course, high speed.
- 0928 (K) Fired four torpedoes. At least two hits. 0932 (K) Four depth charges dropped by target, one
- 0934 (K) Target had turned away, angle on bow 150 port, range 1700 yards. Tracked and at
- OS38 (K) Fired two torpedoes; two hits. Two explosions heard by personnel in submarine. Second hit in port quarter made much smoke and target stopped, took port list and settled by stern almost immediately.
- 0940 (K) Four depth charges.
- 1009 (K) Having observed target carefully and found no evidence of sinking, approached and fired one torpedo at starboard side. Hit, heard by sound to stop at same time I observed large splash. No apparent effect. Target had corrected list and was firing at periscope and at torpedo wakes with machine guns and four inch.
- 1011 (K) Fired eighth torpedo. Hit. No apparent effect.
- 1014 (K) Fired minth torpedo. Hit. No apparent effect. Target firing at periscope, when exposed, and at wakes when torpedoes were running. Crossed track to observe for nets; none rigged.

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 1039 (K) Fired tenth torpedo. Hit. No apparent
- IC48 (K) Fired eleventh torpedo. Hit. No effect.
 This torpedo hit well aft on the port side,
 made a splash at the side of the ship, and
 was then observed to have taken a right turn
 and to jump clear of the water about one
 hundred feet from the stern of the tanker.
 find it hard to convince myself that I saw
 this.
- 1050 (K) Fired twelfth torpedo. Hit. Ho effect.
 1100 (K) Fired thirtsenth torpedo. Hit. No effect.
 Circled again to fire at other side.
- 1122 (K) Picked up high speed screws.
- 1125 (K) Sighted DD approaching from east. Angle on box zero.
- 1131 (K) Fired fourteenth torpedo. Hit. No effect.
- 1132 (K) Fired fifteenth torpedo. Started deep.

 DD range 1000 yards. Torpedo heard to hit tanker and stop running by sound. Periscope had gone under by this time. No explosion.

 Had already decided to retain one torpedo for examination by base.
- examination by base.

 1142 (K) After search, first pattern of three depth
 charges. Close but to port. Regative
 temperature gradient began at 190 feet.
- 1147 (K) Destroyer passed directly overhead from starboard bos to port quarter. Screws could be heard clearly through hull at 310 feet.
- 1148 (K) He didn't know it.
- 1156 (K) Pattern of four depth charges. Close. All sounded as if set deep. Lockers arred open but no other damage. Search continued but gradually getting more distant.
- 1357 (K) Periscope depth. Tanker still afloat, down by stern and with port list. DD about 6000 yards away. Maintained periscope watch, DD gradually searching to other side of tanker. We were to east, watching for any additional escorts.
- 1800 (K) Lost sight of tanker in haze and twilight, range about six miles.

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

1937 (K) Surfaced. Sent report to ComSubPac via
Australia. Repeated one group for station
in vicinity. Believe STEELHEAD. To insure
reception broadcast twice on 450 KC's.
Started charge, began run to west of target
to be ready to pick up target again if
necessary to guide STEELHEAD. Moon rise was
due about midnight.

2220 (K) Received orders to return to Pearl.

No. C-5

Description of Contacts

NG: 0555 (K) Tima: July 24 Date: 6-558 Latitude: 147-10E Longitude: Tanker Type: TONAN MARU Description: 073 Course: 13 Speed: Loaded Hemarks:

5 1120 (K) No: Time: July 24 Date: Destroyer Type: -265 Course: Speed: High speed Remarks: 6-571 Latitude: 148-00E Longitude:

D - Verification

No. D-1

FROM: (Concealed 24/1620 July identity)
TO: (#3 Tonan Maru)

CRIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 24. No. D-1 (Cont.)

Prom Captain of _____ - Isuzu?).

- Isuzu?) and Asanagi) are scheduled to arrive on scene at 0530 on 25th blanks."

OI COMMENT: Previously sent in HYPO's 241702. #3 Toman Maru was torpedoed in 06-56 North, 147-52 East, on 24th July and unable to make way.

Ho. D-3

PROM:

24/1620 July

TO: :-

(#3 Tonan Maru)

IHFO:

"From Commanding Officer Isuzu / with and Asanagi expect arrive at scene 0530, tomorrow 25th July."

HYPO COMMENT: DI under TI label.

GI COMMENT; (Refers #3 Toman disaster).

Fhomed to SubPac Duty Officer 250015 (-9).

Case 25

A - Source of Intelligence

TO THE PROPERTY.

Ho. A-1

FROM: (Yokosuka Haval Station) 19/1001 July

TOT

Case 25, No. A-1 (Cont.)

IMPO:

(Base Force #4)

(Marcus Island Force) (Chichijima Base Force)

(lith Air Fleet)

Convoy 3719 /Asakaze Haru (and about 5 other Marus) 7 departed NAA (Yokosuka) for PT (Truk) at 1000, 19th. Noon positions 20th - 29th: 20th, 52-27 H, 139-40 E. 21st, 29-26 N, 140-20 E. 22nd, 26-25 N, 140-44-467 E. 23rd, 23-30 N, 141-30 E. 24th, 20-47 H, 142-52 E. 25th, 18-05 N, 144-18 E. 26th, 15-30 N, 145-53 E. 27th, 15-blank N, 1477-40 E. 28th, 10-40 N, 149-35 E. 29th, 08-00 N, 151-blank E.

At 0800 29th scheduled to pass 20 miles northeast of Point and #

HEGAT COMMENT: Latitude for 27th obviously in error but unable to change.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPac notified at 1525 (I).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

23/0823 July

PROM: COMSUBPAC TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING

NPM POX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Case 25, No. B-1 (Cont.)

COMSUBPAC SENDS ULTRA SERIAL 64 X 075 POPCORN AND 5-POPLARS (MERCHANTMEN TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK X BLANK X ULTRU -900 PLUS 11 TBMQ 3053 (15-30 NORTH 145-53 EAST) ALGAROBA QSUT 0540 (13-05 NORTH 147-40 EAST) PPNZ 4035 (10-40 NORTH 149-35 EAST) X TINOSA HANDLE THIS X HAVE ANOTHER JOB FOR POGY AND STREIHEAD X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-I

July 24

2220 (K) Received orders to return to Pearl.

July 25

- Ol28 (K) Sighted Pikelot Island. Running on surface.

 1737 (K) Sighted merchantman, angle on box 70 port,

 bearing CSO relative.

 Cwn course Olo T. Lat. 11-44N, Long. 148-12E.

 Put on four main engines. Stationed gum
- 1755 (K) Secured. Identified as hospital ship,
 very similar to BAIKAL MARU. Changed course
 to 200°T to mislead Japs. Sure enough, after
 we opened out, he changed course to pass
 astern of us and get our course. No radio
 transmissions heard.
- 1831 (K) Out-of sight through high periscope. Took easterly course to great circle track.

July 26 -

Enroute Pearl. Daily Dives and drills.

CRICINAL IL January 1946

Case 25

A - Source of Intelligence

Ho. A-1

FR OM:

22/1703 July

TO2 .

(Garble) (Garble)

(Garble)

From Captain of Ayata Maru LECTED AND ARTHURS AND ADDRESS.

Departed Paramushiru Strait for Yokosuka at 1700. Will arrive at a point 5 miles south of blank at 0600 on 27th after passing through following points: 46-00 North, 156-25 East. 34-00 North, 146-00 East. Scheduled to arrive at 1000? on 27th. Can carry about 2200 tons: of cargo and about blank passengers."

MEGAT COMMENT: Arrival time is garbled and may be "1430." The last sentence refers to the load he can take back with him.

GI COMMENT: Hypo's translation (NFM 221706) varies in its positions which were impossible to recover accurately. The essential material was phoned to SubPac at 0445

(-9) July 23.

No. A-2

FROM: TO: 22/1703 July

Defense Porce Unit Yokosuka) (C)

Case 26, Ho. A-2 (Cont.)

INFO:

(WX Station Marcus) (B)

From Captain Awata Maru.

Departed Paramushiro Strait for Yokosuka at 1700.
Passing through posits 46-15(?) N, 156-25 E and
34-40 N, 14 blank-00 E will be 15 miles south of
Nojima Saki at 0600 July 27th. At 1000
same day am scheduled to arrive. Leaded with about
2200 (tons?) of supplies and about 400 persons.

GI COMMENT:

Not phomed to subs. No sub available to meet first posit. Blank longitude in second posit makes it too indefinite. Arrival dope can wait for Comdr Voge.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

23/0833 July

TOR

ALL SUES ON HPM FOX

NARWHAL SALMON

SKIPJACK

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 65 S X ANOTHER ULTRA FOR NARWHAL SALMON AND SKIPJACK X 069 POPCORN AND 1 POPLAR X BLANK X BLA

PLUS 11 X JZJY 4000 (34-40 NORTH 146-00 EAST) BLANK BLANK X PLUS 900 X PLUS 11 JZIH-3953 (34-59 NORTH 139-53 EAST) X LAPON CAN WORK ON THIS ONE ALSO IP STILL IN VICINITY X FIXES GIVEN ARE ONLY APPROXIMATE Case 25 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Narmhal

Pifth War Patrol

No. C-I

See VII, Case 23, C-2.

U.S.S. Salmon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-2

See VII. Case 23, C-4.

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 15, C-12.

No. C-4

July 26

OCAO (I) Sighted convoy of three vessels bearing
1957. Convoy consisted of two escorts and
one large ship headed on course about 350 T
bound for Tokyo Bay. While maneuvering to
track the convoy range decreased to about
6000 yards on nearest vessel.

cois (I) Being up moon from convoy, dived to avoid detection and upon returning to 35 feet was unable to find targets either by periscope or radar coservations. We probably had been sighted and convoy turned away.

Olis (I) Surfaced and conducted search to northeastward at four engine speed for about one hour until proximity of HOJIMA SAKI made further attempt

Case 26, No. C-4 (Cont.)

to close useless. Contact was never regained.

July 27

Patrolling eastern approaches to Tokyo Bay.
SJ Radar out of commission. This is quite a
blow as all traffic seems to move at night
in this area.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

HOE Times 0040 (I) July 26. Datas 34-17 H Tatitude: 140-29 B Longitude: Type(s): -1 large ship 2 escorts Initial Range: 6 mi. 195(T) Course & Speed: 340 Unicom How Contacted! Lookout Remarks:

U.S.S. Lapon

First War Patrol

Ho. 0-8

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 22, C-6.

No. C-7

July 24

- Oll5 (K) Sent contact report regarding aircraft carrier to ComSubPac.
- Ol49 (K) Sighted patrol craft, possibly small destroyer bearing C82 T. distant 6000 yards. Changed course and evaded.
- OS15 (K) Hadar reports contact small "pip" on starboard bow. Range 6000 yards. Changed course and evaded.

Case 26. No. C-7 (Cont.)

0230 (K) Back on 090T., having evaded both patrols.
We believe the Jap's DF'd our transmissions.
They seemed to be headed for us when sighted.

0450 (K) Submerged. 0608 (K) Sighted type 97 heavy bomber, on parallel course on starboard beam, 2000-3000 feet high. Patrolled all day on course east.....print

illegible...Weather clear. 2000 (X) Surfaced - weather clear - took star

2119 (K) Changed course to 070T. to close estimated track of convoy.

July 23

CARO (K) Morning twilight - partially overcast, - star sights.

0535 (K) Submerged. Altered course to patrol on track of convoy.

C900 (K) Sighted type 97 heavy bomber, bearing 045 T., about 4000 feet, on estimated course 210 T. This is same type as sighted yesterday.

1924 (A) Surfaced - horizon clear, sky partially clear.
1947 (K) Sighted type 97 heavy bomber, 530 T., about
10 miles, on slightly converging course.
Submerged. Consider plane may not have seen
us. Surprised to firm a patrol this far out
at this late hour.

2017 (K) Surfaced.
2030 (K) Patrolling a line 8 miles long, on courses 305 and 125 T. Patrolling at 12 knots.

July 28

0457 (K) Submerged. Disappointed on fruitlessness of

1922 (K) Surfaced. Took up great circle course for Midway.

Case 27

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

(The heading of this dispatch is not available-Ed. not:

From Commanding Officer Otaka.

Case 27, No. A-1 (Cont.)

1. Otaka will depart Yokosuka with Maikaze at 0800 on the 23rd. Expect arrive PT 1430 on the 28th.

2. Will pass through following points:

23rd, 1030(?) - 34-52 North, 139-46 East. 23rd, 2115 - 33-15 North, 143-32 East. 24th, 0905 - 31-10 North, 145-40 East. 27th, 0510 - 14-33 North, 154-00 East. 27th, 1200 - 12-40 North, 154-00 East. 28th, 0800 - 07-blank North, 154-00 East.

GI COMMENT: FT - Truk (CD).
Gave to ComSubPac (Commander Voge) July 231400 (-9).

28th, 1500 - 07-06 North, 152-00 East. Transit PT South Charmel 1550, speed 18 to 20 kmots.

3. Since this ship has only I screening vessel please make special arrangements for additional screen and anti-submarine patrol planes from 1200 on the 27th in position 12-40 North, 154-00 East.

NEGAT CORMENT: This is part 1 of 2 part message. Part 2 concerns cargo and passengers and will be sent as soon as finished (so the lads will know what went down when they sink her).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CONSUBPAC TO: ALL SUBS COPYING HPM FOX 23/0942 July

INFO:

PHEC: ROUTINE

UMRA X 026 PEARUT WITH ONLY 1 DD X BLANK X PLUS 8-18 X -1155 X PLUS 9 X 31-10 NORTH 145-40 EAST X BLANK X PLUS 815 X PLUS 11 X 150-33 NORTH 154-00 EAST X BLANK X BLANK X -900 X PLUS 12 X 12-40 NORTH 154-00 EAST X BLANK X BLANK X PLUS 900 X -12 7-00 NORTH

265

Case 27, No. B-I (Cont.)

154-CO EAST X MINUTES OF LATITUDE FOR LAST POSITION
UNKNOWN X SPEARFISH AND POGY WORK THIS ONE HORTH AND
SOUTH RESPECTIVELY OF 14-50 NORTH 154-00 EAST X
STEELHRAD ANYWHERE BETWEEN 8 DECREES NORTH AND 12
DECREES NORTH X TRANSPORTS WILL BE PRESENT AFTER BLANK
BLANK -900 PLUS 12 X IF ANYONE SLOSS HIM DOWN LET US
KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THOSE FARTHER SOUTH
CAN FINISH HIM OFF

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Spearfish

Seventh War Patrol

Ho. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was good at all times.

No. C-2

July 16 to

Patrolling on surface, made trim dives at dawn. Ho contacts.

July 28

Patrolling on surface on course 350 T.
0120 (K) Set course for eastern edge of area at three engine speed.

0452 (K) Submerged.

0532 (K) Surfaced. 1730 (K) Departed area, set course for Midway.

July 29 to

Enroute to Midway, made trim dives at dawn.

Case 27. (Cont.)

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See VII; Case 1, C-4.

No. C-4

July 22-23

Patrolling Guam-Saipan-Truk route enroute to area 14 south.

July 24

Submerged patrol, reconnoitering east coast of Guam. To signs of building or other activity.

July 25-26

En route assigned area, patrolling across Empire-Truk routes.

July 27-30

Surface and submerged patrol, in assigned areas, on Empire-Truk routes.

July 28

1400 (K) Sighted a floating mine, -Lat. 14-35N Long. 152-38E. Unsuccessfully attempted to sink with 20mm. and rifle fire.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7,

Case 27, (Cont.)

July 23

Call (L) Latitude C9 - 50 M. Longitude 151 - 31 K.

Dove and continued investigating possible remedies for starboard shaft. As we had no spare coupling to install in place of the damaged one, decided to continue patrol as long as possible with damaged parts. We could rum at 80 RPM on the port shaft only for silent running and if we had to have more speed, we could still use the starboard shaft, noise and all, in a pinch. Reconnected the coupling to run on all 4 motors. With these operating limitations it was decided to keep well clear of the patrol boat areas where a prolonged depth charging might prove embarrassing.

to July 30

Continued patrolling area using a high periscope wherever conditions permitted. Ho contacts were made, but on surfacing on 29 July, found antenna trunk flooded. Could net locate source of leak, but antenna operated satisfactorily after trunk was drained. This condition continued for the remainder of the patrol.

Case 28

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM

(#1 Escort

21/1400 July

Case 28, Ho. A-1 (Cont.)

TIPOT

(Palao Comm. Unit)

(3rd SoEx Fleet) (Takao Comm. Unit)

A Palso bound convoy of 6 vessels (including 2 ships for Ambon and 1 for Davao) escorted by Fuyo will depart Tarakan at 0700 on the 22nd. Speed 9 knots. Scheduled to arrive at 1800 on 27th. Ships bound for Palso are "A" vessels blanks and Shinyu Maru (JNOD) and "B" vessel Ten Blank Maru (JYFR).

Noon positions:
For Palae group - 22, 3-38 H, 118-08 E.
23, 3-19 N, 120-35 E.
24, 2-32 H, 125-08 E.
25, 3-50 N, 128-18 E.
26, 6-04 H, 151-01 E.
27, 7-40 N, 134-05 E.

For Ambon group - 25th, CON, 128-06 E. 26th, 3-265, 127-53 E.

For Davao-bound vessel - 23rd, 3-44N, 120-45 E. 24th, 5-02N, 125-16 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING

NPH FOX

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

24/0711 July

Case 23, No. B-1 (Cont.)

SERIAL 71 FROM SUBPAC COMMANDER X ULTRA X PECAN X BLANK X BLANK X HINUS 900 (TIME 0300 GCT) X PLUS 10 (DATE 25TH X RQAS 5018 (LAT 03-50 NORTH LONG 128-18 EAST) ALGARCHA VTCD 0401 (LAT 06-04 NORTH LONG 151-01 EAST) CDIQ 4005 (LAT 07-40 NORTH LONG 154-05 EAST) X MINGO AND HADDOCK GIVE THIS THE PROPER ATTENTION PROVIDED IT DOESN'T INTERFERE WITH PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS X RED SEADRAGON

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-I

See VII, Case 20, B-2 and C-4 - C-6.

U.S.S. Hingo

First War Patrol

No. C-2

See VII, Case 20, C-2 - C-3.

Case 29

A - Source of Intelligence

No. 4-1,

FROM:

19/0820 July

TOI

(Naval Trans.

Section Tokyo) (B)

THEO

(Military Stores Section

Tokyo (B)

(Maval District Comdrs

Yokosuka (B) ..

(Defense Force Empire) (C)

(Local Trans. Section

Yokosuka) (C)

Case 29, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Base Force 6) (C)

(Civ. Eng. Det. in Marshalls) (C) (Trans. Section Kwajalein) (C)

There is a shortage of aviation gasoline at the Wake airbase (short enough for about 200 land-based attack plane patrols). Since there is no ship available now for supplying wake with gasoline, the #20 Hikage Haru which was assigned that task at direction of the lith Air Fleet having run into disaster, in accordance with your SMS # blank request you arrange to have the Jootoo Haru proceed from Kwajalein to Wake and unload gasoline there.

Furthermore, in accordance with your SMS #08-812, request the blank ______) also proceed from Kwajalein to Tarca and blank.

Ho. A-2

FROM: (Kwajalein 23/1909 July
Transportation
Office)
TO: (2nd Section NGS)

(Wake Detachment)

"Kwajalein July 25 departures:

Blank An Maru for Wake. Scheduled to arrive at 0500, July 27.

II January 1946

Casa 29, (Cont.)

Ho. A-3

(TPN Section 23/1909 July Kwajalein) (C)

TOS

INFO:

(2nd Section

Esval General Staff) (B)

Enciphered Wake Detachment Blank An Haru depart Kwajalein 23 July. Scheduled arrive Wake 0500 July 27.

GI COMMENT: Message from KUWIRI (Krajalein Base Force 8) on July 211655 said: "The blank AN Maru (carrying 2, 20 centimeter guns; 4, 15 centimeter guns; and 184 Army troops for #5 Garrison at Wake) will operate in accordance with this Unit's Opord #54 (not available in our files). Request special provisions for antisub patrols subsequent to date).

GemSubPacFor informed at 0540 (-9), 24th.

Ho. 1-4

(Base Porce 6) (B)

(Hauru) (B) (Seaplans Base at Firek) (B) (Air Flot 22) (B)

Case 29, Ho. A-4 (Cont.)

Schedule of operations of blank revised as follows:

Depart Kwajalein 23rd.

Depart Huotto 25th.

Depart Wake 29th.

Depart Wotje August 1st.

Depart Tarca August 4th.

Depart Hille August 7th.

Depart Tarawa August ?

Depart Nauru August 14th.

Return to Kwajalein.

GI COMMENT: NES 221712 has departure from Mille on 6th? and Tarava on 10th. Also originator date is 221100

No. 4-5

FROM:
TO: (Base Force
#6, Kwajalein)(C)
IMPO:

25/1130 July

Five B24's at 0844 and 3 B24 at 0930 raided us, flying over at an altitude of about 6000 meters, dropping bombs in the vicinity of the landing field. Some blank (possibly dropped 58 bombs). Fired 230 rounds of blank with no effect. Investigating damages (54417) (or possibly no damage).

HYPO COMMENT: Broadcast from Guard Div. #65, Wake Island.

OI COMMENT: Wake raid.

No. A-8

FROM: (Guard 27/1325 July
by Truk)
CSurface Escort

Unit 2) (B)
(Civil Eng. Section
4 Brown Island) (B)
(Base Force 6) (B)

CRICINAL 11 January 1946.

Case 29, No. A-6 (Cont.)

IHPO:

(Make Guard Porce) (B)

Blank an Maru arrived Wake 1300.

Ho. A-7

FROM:

27/2210 July

TOS

INFO:

(Kwajalein Base

Force #6)

"Inform me immediately the extent of damage to the Kanan Maru and if you expect to complete cargo handling Request you do all possible in carrying out screening.

GI COMMENT: Hypo 280156 version gives D/T group at

272220 July.

Believe this Haru bringing gas supply to

Wake arriving 1500, July 27th.

No. 1-8

FRCH:

(Unidentified

28/0600 July

TOB

ship) Unident en-

ciphered address)

INFO:

"(H.B.I. Address, carried

Cofs]

Enciphered address Military Stores)

(Tarakan BR 102

0200 28th.

Went aground on "Aru Bank". All efforts to refloat ship with own power have proved to no avail. Request tug de sent at once. Draft forward 6 feet, Draft amidships 7 feet. Draft aft 24 feet.

Case 29. Ho. A-8 (Cont.)

GI COUMENT: SCRE 7 at 281730 reported a possible runnin aground. Although calls give no clustiming of messages makes this a probable preime to reference above.

No. A-9

FROM;

(Base Force

29/1352 July

46)

(Kawakaza (DD)

(Commander?))

INFO:

"(Part 1). The blank AN Maru (escorted by SubChaser #33. #3 Shonan Maru and #11 Kyo Maru) will depart AA at 0800 on July 30 and arrive FT at 0930 (?) on August 5th. Speed 10 knots. Course and points at which course changes are made: (all North and East). Bearing blank degrees from AA (20?-20, 165-blank) course 240. From 19-44H, 164-38 East, course 180. From 19-00 North, 164-38 East, course 210. From 18-18 North, 164-15 East, course 180. From 18-18 North, 164-15 East, course blank. From 14-28 North, 162-51 East, course 227. From 9-48 North, 157-37 East, course 235. From 7-50 North, 154-46 East, course 256. After that pass through Points "K" and "S". Hoom posits: (north and East).

30th, 19-42 North, 165-44 East. 31st, 17-38 North, 164-15 East. 1st, 14-28 North, 162-51 East. 2nd, 12-08 North, 160-14 East. 3rd, 09-48 North, 157-37 East. 4th, 07-50 North, 154-46 East.

(Part 2). #3 Kyo Harn will leave the convoy at blank hours on the 31st and proceed to PQ.

Case 29, No. A-9 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Phoned ComSubPacFor at 0920 (-9) July 30.

Correction from "Escorting" to "escorted by" supplied by MSS 292102.

AA is Wake (CD)

PQ is Kwajalein (CD).

Ho. A-10

FROM: (Base Force

29/1923 July

(Air Flot #22)

(garbled)

*Hoon posits (all North and East)
30th, 19-42 North, 165-44 Hast.
31st, 17-38 North, 164-15 Hast.
1st, 14-10 North, 164-15 Hast.
2nd, 10-blank North, 164-15 Hast.
3rd, 09-00 North, 167-20 Hast.

NEGAT COMMENT: This is part 2 of a 2-part message.

We have not received part one therefore unable to determine whose posits
the above will be.

GI COMMENT: HYPO has both parts and is currently working on the first. Phoned this info to SubPacFor at 0630 (-9) July 30.

No. A-II

FROM: (Guard by

29/1923 July

TO:

INFOI

Case 29. No. A-11 (Cont.)

*(Kan?) an Maru /escorted by - Subchaser #33); #3 Kyoo Haru and #11 Kyoo Haru /will depart Wake at 0600, July 50 and arrive Kwajalain at 1500, August 5. Speed IO knots. Route /points for changing course / 1

POSITION

COURSE THEREAFTER

From Wake
From 20-00N, 165-14 R. 240 degrees
From 19-14N, 161-38 E. 180 degrees
From 19-00N, 164-38 E. 210 degrees
From 18-18N, 164-15 E. 180 degrees
From 10-13N, 164-15 E. 120 degrees
From 09-17N, 166-48 E. Proceed into shore
toward blank channel.

HYPO COMMENT: This is Part I of Jap 2-parter.

Hegat's 291921 gave Part 2, with which

Hypo agrees entirely. Suggest

comparison with despatch reported in

Negat's 291931 and 291947.

GI COMMENT: Above information phoned to ComSubPacFor

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

24/0817 July

TO: ALL SUBS. GUARDING

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICEITY

ADDITIONAL CHDERS FOR SEADRAGON X ULTRA SERIAL 72
BLUE SEADRAGON X 1 POPIAR (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN)
X BLANK (COURSE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X
BLANK (TIME UNKNOWN) X PLUS 8 (DATE 23 JULY) X KLVG
5540 (C8-55 N 167-40 E) AND AT BLANK (COURSE UNKNOWN)
X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X PLUS 800 (TIME 2000) X PLUS
11 (TIME 26 JULY) REACHES CENTER AREA 27 X EXACT ROUTE
UNKNOWN POSSIBLY SMALL BUT HAS VERY IMPORTANT CARGO X

CRIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 29, No. B-1 (Cont.)

YOUR PRIMARY MISSION IS TO GET THIS BABY EVEN IF IT PREVENTS YOU FROM BEING IN POSITION FOR ANY PHASE SCHEDULED THAT DATE X IF UNABLE TO GET HIM GOING IN ATTEMPT ATTACK AT ANCHORAGE X GOOD POSSIBILITY DURING RAID WHEN LIBERATORS WILL BE AFTER HIM ALSO ANY DISTRACTING ANTISUB PATROLS

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPACTOR

27/1932 July

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOI

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

FOR SEA DRAGON X ULTRA X ARRIVAL POPLAR MENTIONED MY SERIAL 72 PROBABLY DELAYED BY BOMBING RAIDS X HE WAS HOT SIGHTED BY PLANES X IF YOU HAVE NOT AIREADY GOT HIM REMAIN UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS PATROLLING SOUTHERN APPROACHES X VERY IMPORTANT THAT THIS POPLAR BE POPPED X CONSUBPAC SERIAL 94 X INFORM US WHEN YOU GET HILL

particular transfer * INTERCEPT *

No. B-3

FROM: COMSUBPAC SKADRAGON 28/1904 July

ALL SUBS COPYING

HPH POL

CIMCPAC: INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY 对"你是我们的是我的

BELIEVE POPLAR (MERCHANTHAN TYPE UNKNOWN) MENTIONED BY SERIAL 72 EITHER HAS ANCHORED. OR STRANDED IN CENTER ARRA 27 X MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO FINISH HER OFF BEFORE SHE CAN BE UNLOADED X THIS IS ULTRA

Ma. B-4

COMSUBPAC FRCMI

30/0307 July

"ALL SUBS COPYING"

NPM FOI SEADRAGON

IHFO: CINCPAC

FREC: OPERATIONAL PRICEITY

Casa 29. No. B-4 (Cont.)

COMSUBRAC SEMDS ULTRA SERIAL 4 TO SEADRAGON ONLY X
BRITEVE THIS IS MERCHANTMAN (TYPE UNKNOWN) YOU HAVE
BEEN LOOKING FOR X COURSE 180 X BLANK X 1100 GCT X 50
JULY 19-44 NORTH 164-38 EAST AND 6 HOURS LATER 19-00
MORTH 164-38 EAST AND 5 HOURS AFTER THAT 18-18 NORTH
164-15 EAST X BLANK X BLANK X C300 GCT X 31 JULY 17-38
MORTH 164-15 EAST X 5 HOURS LATER 16-54 NORTH 164-15
EAST

X BIANK X BIANK X 0300 X I AUGUST 14-28 NORTH 162-51 EAST ALGAROBA 12-08 NORTH 160-14 EAST X IF YOU GET HIM ON IF NO CONTACT BY IAST TIME GIVEN PROCEED TO MARSHALLS AND CARRY OUT CRIGINAL CHDERS X AS SOON AS CONVENIENCE ACCHOMISEDGE THIS AND REPORT WHETHER SHIP WAS ABLE TO UNLOAD AT WAKE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Seadragon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-I

Radio Reception: Good and complete in all areas.

No. C-2

July 27

OICO (L) Commenced patrolling South of WAKE.

0510 (L) Dived, closing WAKE.

0829 (L) Sighted patrol boat dead ahead, maneuvered to clear.

0910 (L) Sighted ship with boy on beach East of Attack #1 channel to lagoon, no other ship in sight. Contact #1

1110 (L) Decided to fire two torpedoes at grounded freighter. It was a MFN coal burner of about 5,000 tons. Had a fresh coat of paint, one barge alongside port quarter, considerable activity on board. Bow was about 14 feet out of water, otherwise appeared to be in good shape.

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

ILI6 (L) Pired two torpedoes from bow tubes, 0° gyro angle, 110° track, range 2200 yards.

Torpedoes observed running straight, leaving quite a trail of smoke. See glassy smooth.

1137-30 (L) Heard a thump, first torpedo must have been a dud.

1137-38 (L) One explosion at port quarter of ship.

After smoke had cleared away barge had disappeared, ship was down by the stern with water clear up to the after deckhouse. Dom't know whether torpedo hit the barge or the ship. Decided not to waste any more torpedoes and what further influenced my decision was the fact that the Jap shore batteries were firing at the periscope every time it was put up and there were two PC boats and one trawler standing out from the channel to the lagoon, headed in our direction.

1145 (L) Went to deep submergence to get under density layer we had previously found at 140 feet.

All three patrol boats were pinging.

1158 (L) Three depth charges.

1220 (L) Two depth charges.

- 1555 (L) As pinging seemed to be not too close, came to periscope depth for observation. Sighted six Mitsubishi 96 bombers circling around in our vicinity.
- 1538 (L) Three bombs, too close. Thru the periscope looked as if the whole ocean had exploded. Went deep. Between 1538 and 1626 came to periscope depth seven times, and within three minutes after each time the periscope was runup, we would be greeted with a salvo of bombs.
- 1912 (L) Surfaced Last periscope observation at 1810 showed no other ships at WAKE. Decided to patrol to South and Southwest of WAKE, until

July 28

CCCO (I) Headed for station for days operations.

0533 (L) Arrived on station

- 1930 (L) Headed for area South of WAKE.
- 2003 (L) Searchlight beam on WAKE trained in our

Case 29. No. C-2 (Cont.)

direction, changed course to open out from island.

2208 (L). Searchlight trained again in our direction.

July 29

0446 (L) Dived to close WAKE.

Sighted four planes in the direction of WAKE, 0647 (L) too far away to identify.

Heard several distant explosions. Lust have been way out of position when we dived as we should have picked up the island by 0600.

Sighted water towers. 1550 (L

Sighted masts of ship moored at WIIKES ISLAND. 1720 (L)

Contact #2

Made out ship to be a small freighter of about 1759 (L) 5,000 tons, a HFH coal burner. There were four patrol boats patrolling about eight thousand yards out from ship with three smalle: craft close in, two appeared to stay in one position. There were three Mitsubishi 96 bombers patrolling over and to the South of the ships was a second to the

Decided to head out and come in next morning for an attack as it was getting too dark for an attack unless we fired long range shots.

1930 (L) Surfaced

July 30

0439 (L)

Sighted masts of our targets 0517

Heard numerous explosions, sounded like bombs. 0520 Target underway. Changed course to left and went to full speed. 0620 (L)

Target stood off to Northwest of WAKE with 1703 (L) two surface and two air escorts. Headed away from island'so we could surface and chase the freighter

Surfaced Commenced searching to the South and Southwest as we believed that the freighte

would head for KWAJAIEIN.

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 31

Searching to the Southwest of Wake.

- 1133 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 010° T. Made out the tops of one ship on course 195° T. Dived. Attack #2
- Contact #3
- 1203 (L) Ship was small freighter sighted at WAKE, 29 July, accompanied by two escorts and one Mitambishi 96 bomber.
- Fired three torpedoes from after tubes, range 2,000 yards, track 105° S.
- 1250-30 (L) Ome hit aft, low order emplosion.
- 1252 (L) Target completely obscured by heavy black smoke
- 1255 (L) Trailing escort dropped one depth charge. Target still obscured by smoke appeared to
- have pulled out to Southeast and stopped. Second depth charge
- Went deep as the PC escort was close, heading right at us. Between 1259 and 1319 six more depth charges were dropped. None very close.
- Electrical fire in after torpedo room. 1320 (L)
- 1325: (L)
- Fire put out Came to periscope depth for observation. 1335 (L) Target appeared to have got undersay but still smoking very heavily. Had to go deep again, escorts apparently had picked us up as they were heading for us again.
- Came to periscope depth for another look Target much further away, evidently underway but still obscured by heavy black smoke . Had . to go deep again. Plane is evidently spotting us for the escorts as the sea is glassy.
- amooth 1405 (L) Came to periscope depth. Target evidently stopped about 9,000 yards amay still smoking heavily. Again had to go deep on account of escorts. This time they stayed over the top of us for about two hours, but evidently couldn't make contact

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

16C8 (L) Came to periscope depth, nothing in sight except plane and escorts, still searching for

1746 (L) Surfaced. Nothing in sight. Put all four main engines on propulsion and commenced searching to the South and Southwest for our target.

August'I

Still searching for freighter.

Ho. C-3

Description of Contacts

No:

Time:

1250

Date:

July 31

Iatitude:

Longitude:

Description:

Sighted smoke from bridge.

Coal burning freighter of about

coal burning freighter of about 3,000 tons. Two escorts; one travler, one PC boat. Visibility excellent.

Ship(s) sunk: (Hothing reported, Ed. note) Ship(s) damaged: One MFN 3,000 ton Freighter. Damage Determined

Heard hit. Large column of black smoke came up from after part of

Target Draft: 15 Course: 188 Speed: 11.5 Range: 2000 (at firing)

DAS:

(The data above is given in the Seadragon's Patrol Report under the title Torpedo Attack No. Two - Editor's Note).

Cess 30

A - Source of Intelligence

the second of the tree for (The Japanese source message for ComSubPac's dispatch of 24-0931 is unavailable. Ed. Note.)

B - Operational Dispeton

No. B-I

FROM: COMBUBBAC

24/0931 July

TO: ALL SUES COPYING MPM FOX INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

64、产品。在37、产品34、A CONSUEPAC SENDS ULTRA SERIAL NUMBER 73 TO TULLIBEE X 1 POPLAR (MERCHANTMAN -TYPE UNKNOWN) ARRIVING WRFZ 2556 (01-25 MORTH 172-56 EAST) AT UNKNOWN TIME JULY 28 EAST LONGITUDE DATE I POSSIBLY ABOUT DAWN AND PROBABLY COMING FROM NORTHWEST X POSSIBLY SMALL BUT LAPORTANT X AFTER YOU GET HIM OR IF HE GETS IN SAFELY OR AT SUIDET 29 JULY IF NO CONTACT PROCKED TO YOUR AREA PASSING THROUGH NBKH (11-00 NORTH 155-00 EAST) AND WEQO (11-00 NORTH 150-00 EAST) MARSHALL AREAS VACANT OF OUR SUBS AT PRESENT X RED STADRAGON

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tullibee

First War Patrol

No. C-I:

Radio Recotion: Satisfactory. All serials were received with the exception of 73 1

Case 30, (Cont.)

No. C-2

July 27

2240 (H) Passed Maraki (Matthew) Island about 7 miles abeam to port. Noted numerous lights plus flashes from arc welding on this island.

July 28

- 0535 (M) Submerged an estimated 10 miles NW of entrance to Tarawa Island lacoon.
- 0629 (M) Sighted Tarawa bearing 0720T, distant
- 0630 (M) Sighted a 5,000 ton AK with a PC type escort and a plane flying overhead, commenced approach. Abandoned approach at
- O756 (M) When angle on the bow was 1800 and range 10,000 yards with target heading for lagoon entrance. With one exception, when for a short period at a range of 12,000 yds, the target rigged 1050 towards and presented a 50 starboard angle on the bow. The least angle on the bow was 750 port. Mearest range was 3,750 yds, with an unfavorable track and a 4,100 yd. torpedo run. The escort ran a rigazas patrol about 1,000 to 1,500 yds. in the wake of the AK and was pinging on 19 KC's.
- 1903 (M) Surfaced and headed for assigned area.

Case 30 . No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 29

1315 (1) Periscope sighted by 00D.,
lookout and periscope watch
1,500 yds. on port beam. Put
it on tail and went ahead flank.
1345 (1) Resumed course and speed.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No: 1315 (图) 0630 (H) Time: 23 July Date: 29 July 3-08H, 169-15E 2-31N,172-38E Lat, Long: Types: SS AK and PC 14,000 135°, 9 K. 1,500 Init Range: Est. Cr. Spd: SD and P How Contacted: Periscope sighted by AK similar to Remarks: 00D. Lookout & Periscope Watch. ONI 208J page 50 . .

Case 31

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

- 001107

23/1245 July 43

(CinC China Fleet)(B) (CinC South China Fleet)(B) (In Southwest Area)(7/10) (Carble)

Case 31. No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Special Convoy L 2 composed of 2 ships, Kiyokawa Maru and blank escorted by (destroyer) at 1200 July 23 depart blank (Takao?).

Noon posits:

26-35 North, 121-45 East.
29-37 North, 125-44 East.
At 0630 July 26 separate in Posit 31-53
North, 128-50 East. Kiyokawa (?) arrive
Sasebo at 1500 and blank hugging the
coast arrive blank at 1300 July 26."

GI COMMENT: Phoned to Comdr. Voge at 1200 (I) July 24.

B - Overational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC

24/1007 July

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX

SAMPISH

TALO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR SAWFISH X SERIAL 75 V BLUE TULLIBEE FROM SUBPACOM X 063 PEANUT PLUS 1 UNKNOWN AND 1 DESTROYER X BLANK X BLANK X 0300 GCT X 24TH X 26-35 NORTH 121-45 EAST ALGAROBA 29-37 NORTH 125-44 EAST X BLANK X BLANK X 2330 GCT X 28TH 31-53 NORTH 128-50 EAST X THEY SEPARATE AT LAST POINT WITH 063 PEANUT GOING TO 33-07 NORTH 129-44 EAST

Cese 31. [Cont.]

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sawfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Last serial received: 41 Able.

No. C-2

23 July

0436 (I) Submerged in Lat. 31-13N Long. 126-17E and ran eastward all day. On surfacing set course to eastward.

24 July

0440 (I) Submerged 40 miles west of KOSHIAL RETTO and patrolled north and south.
2017 (I) Surfaced and set course to south and west.

25 July

- 0430 (I) Submerged in lat. 31-02N long. 128-16E and patrolled to westward. 2021 (I) Surfaced and started surface patrol at 5 knots.
- 2225 (I) Made radar contact in Lat. 31-00N
 Long. 127-30E at 19,000 yds. on two
 targets. Commenced tracking. As
 range closed, radar indicated an
 escort.

Case 31, No. C-2 (Cont.)

26 July

0058 (I)

(Attack #5) Fired four torpedoes from stern tubes at larger of two targets. A 11 missed. Destroyer commenced closing range and prevented my bringing cow tubes to bear. Retired towards sterm of formation. Do not believe we were seen by either ship or destroyer and the closing range was incidental to his patrolling. After torpedoes crossed track, whole formation speeded up and were tracked out at 18 knots. Did not attempt chase since there was only three hours of darkness left and I saw no chance of overhauling before dawn and planes arrived. Therefore set course to western portion of area.

Ho. C-3

Attack #5

On making radar contact tracking was started immediately. Night was dark but clear. Surface of water was flat and slick. Base course was determined to be 050, speed 14 knots, targets zig zagging at 8-12 minutes. Commenced approach from western (left flank) side of formation, the side opposite from the escort. The large ship was leading the formation, the smaller one astern of him at about 1000 yards abeam of the larger ship. When range was reduced to 7000 yards the ships shifted positions in the formation. The large ship dropped astern, and the escort shifted to

Case 31, No. C-3 (Cont.)

the other flank, putting him. between me and the target. I speeded up and crossed ahead of the formation and took up position for a stern shot, range 3000 yards. The destroyer then moved over to my flank again. The formation zigged away when range was 5500 yards so I shifted to low power and fired four torpedoes from stern tubes in low power at range of 6400 yards, 105 starboard track, firing interval 12 seconds, depth setting 14 feet, longitudinal spread with first torpedo fired à length ahead of target. All missed, though I don't believe target group knew they were on the way until they pessed near the target track. I started swinging to bring bow tubes to bear when radar reported the destroyer closing the range. I don't believe he saw us but he kept me from firing the bow tubes by this maneuver, which may have been fortunate for us since the others missed. I retired toward the target stern after firing. Two explosions were felt 10 minutes 55 seconds after firing and were probably depth charges. Target group was tracked out on original base course at 18 kmots, I'm convinced that either the large ship or the destroyer had radar equipment, for the escort persisted in keeping him self between me end his formation. Summing up - I'm not proud of this one.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 32

A - Source of Intelligence

Mo. A-I

24/0915 July 43

FROM:

TO:

(All Ships Truk Area)

IMFO:

"At 0800, July 24, torpedo attack in position 06-56 N, 147-52 E. Reliability excellent."

CI COMMENT;

GZ comment on Hypo translation of above message is "position of #3 Tonan Meru".

Timosa reports 12 positive hits on this vessel with 1 explosion at 0133 on 24th July in same position.

No. A-2

FROM:

24/0915 July 45

"Torpedo attack at 0800, July 24, in position 06-56 North, 147-52 East. Grading excellent."

GI COLEMNI: This is in regard to torpedoing of #3 Tonan Maru.

ORIGINAL Il January 1946

Case 52, (Cont.)

No. A-3

24/1536 July 43

FROM:

(Combined Fleet) (3rd Fleet) (#3 Tonan Maru)

INFO:

"Combined Fleet Desopord

Commander Striking Force detail suitable ships to tow #3 Tonan Maru | to PT.*

GI COMMENT: PT - Truk (CD).

No.A-4

FROM:

24/1536 July 43

TO:

(2nd Fleet tanker)

INFO:

"Combined Fleet Desopord # blank, officer concerned. Striking Force, utilizing suitable ships, have #5 Tonan Maru towed to Truk."

CI COLERET: ComSubPacFor informed at 0400 (-9)
25th. Timosa reports 12 positive
hits on this vessel with one
explosion at 1035 (-9) 24th position
06-56 North, 147-52 East.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

24/1600 July 43

Case 32, (Cont.)

No. A-5

FROM: TO:

(Maru)

INFO:

(Vessel)

The #3 Tonan Maru escorted by blank received torpedo attack in 06-56 North, 147-52 East and Isuzu?], is unable to make way. The Asanagi -unident ship), Hoko Maru?) and #2 Chonan Maru are proceeding to the scene. Special Subchasers #5 and #12 get underway immediately and proceed to the scene to assist in escort blanks -

CE COMMENT: Previously reported in HYPO's 24/1516.

No. A-6

FROM: TOP

24/1600 July 43

(Maru) (C)

INFO:

(Guard By Truk) (C)

(Yessel) (B)

Case 32, No. A-6 (Cont.)

The #3 Toman Maru escorted by dank
DD (was attacked with torpedoes
in position 6-56N, 147-52E and is
unable to proceed. Blank
Asanagi, blank (, Hookoo Maru
) and #2 Chooan Maru (

are enroute to the scene.

2. #5 and #12 Special Subchaser under tactical command of Commanding Officer sortie at once, proceed directly to the scene and assist in escorting the above. Blank under direction Commanding Officer Isuzu?

GI COMMENT: ISU Ø of 24/0915 July is quoted for info:

"At 0800, July 24, torpedo attack in position 06-56N, 147-52E. Reliability excellent."

Tinosa reports 12 positive hits on this vessel with 1 explosion at 0133 on 24th July in same position.

Phones to SubPac D/O 25/0010 (-9)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC

24/1530 July

TO: STEELHEAD (SS-280)

ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MAD AS FORMETS X ULTRA FOR STEELHEAD X TOTAL OF ABOUT 7 LEMONS (ESCORT VESSELS) AND IRONWOODS (DESTROYEPS) GOING TO ASSISTANCE TIMOSA TARGET X WATCH YOURSELF X DAISY CHAINS X

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

24/1753 July

Case 32. (Cont.)

TO:

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC

STEELHRAD

ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X POSITION OF TANKER AT 20 HOURS CCT 24TH VIUT 5154 (6-51 NORTH 147-54 EAST) X WR NEED HIM BADLY

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

July 22 Was proceeding to north of area when at

0428 (L) Latitude 070-30' N. Longitude 1500- 50' E. Mede morning dive and at

0432 (L) Fire was reported in the Maneuvering

Room. Lost propulsion until at 0445 (L) When fire was extinguished and propulsion was resumed on the port shaft only. While investigating the cause of the fire sound made contact on bearing 0200, light fast screws. Made periscope observation, but could see nothing in the rain squall

ost starting resistance in the starboard motor. Replaced damaged resistor and at

Case 32, No. C-1 (Cont.)

- 0857 (L) Both shafts were in normal operation, until at
- 1108 (L) A loud click developed in the starboard sheft while running at dead slow, 42, HPM. Went shead on port shaft for the remainder of day investigating the cause of the knock. During the morning heard three or four depth charges, all distant. By
- 1800 (L) Had determined source of noise to be in the coupling of #1 motor. Decided to get well clear of TRUK and try to effect repairs. Broke coupling and ran all night on three motors towards northern boundary of area.

July 23 . At

Latitude 09-50 N. Tongitude 151-30 E. 1428 (L) Dove and continued investigating possible remedies for starboard shaft. As we had no spare coupling to install in place of the damaged one, decided to continue. patrol as long as possible with damaged parts. We could run at 80 RPM on the port shaft only for silent running and if we had to have more speed, we could still use the starboard shaft, noise and all, in a pinch. Reconnected the coupling to run on all 4 motors. With these operating limitations it was decided to keep well clear of the patrol boat areas where a prolonged depth charging might prove emberessing.

July 23 to

Continued patrolling area using a high periscope wherever conditions permitted. No contacts were made, but on surfacing on 29 July, found antenna trunk flooded. Could not locate source of leak, but antenna operated satisfactorily after trunk was drained. This condition continued for the remainder of the patrol.

Cesa 33

A - Source of Intelligence

(The Japanese source message for ComSubPac's dispatch of 25-0733 is unavailable.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No- B-I

FROM: COLBUBPAC

25/0733 July

TO: ALL SUES COPTING HPM FOX

INJO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR NARHAL X COMSUEPAC SERIAL 76 X TO POLISH OFF THE MANOGONY (PATROL BOAT) LOOK AROUND AT THE FOLLOWING OBEX 5143 (30-51 NORTH 153-43 EAST) X QETS 0150 (35-01 NORTH 87-30 EAST) TEXP 4008 (32-40 NORTH 156-08 EAST) X KCQU 2030 (30-20 NORTH 154-30 EAST) X KCQU 4000 (50-40 NORTH 150-00 EAST) X GZZX 3214 (27-32 NORTH 153-14 EAST) X PBXM 3050 (25-30 NORTH 155-50 EAST)

C - Submerine Action Reports

U.S.S. Marmhal

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

25 July

0800 (K) Having exhausted all possible enemy tracks with no contacts, again set course through area of patrol boat contacts.

Case 33. No. C-1 (Cont.)

2130 (K) Received Comsubpacts Serial 76. 2217 (K) Altered course to search patrol boat contacts.

26 July

- 0800 (K) Lat. 36-35N, Long. 152-34E.

 Barometer falling, heavy swells,
 - wind building up to force 6.

 1122 (K) Lat. 36-15, Long. 152-45, plane contact on SD radar, 9 miles closing. Dived. Unable to maintain periscope depth at 70 feet in heavy swells. Plane not sighted, at this point we were 540 miles from HONSHU and 600 miles from MARCUS. Stayed down for lunch.
 - 1323 (K) Surfaced. Continued on surface, cruising over a 92% zigzag plan superimposed on four hour legs 20° to right and left of bare course between possible contact points to cover maximum area.

27-29 July

Uneventful, conducted daily dives and drills.

Casa 34

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM: TO: DIRO: 23/1445 July

(Garbled)

(lst Section Naval General Staff)

(CofS Sesebo) (CofS Kure) (Jap Weather Station) (Takao Guard District)

(R.N.O. Keelung)

(Trok Army Address)

*I. Convoy #179 (?) consisting of 6 ships blanks.

Blank Maru blanks.
Blank Maru carrying 6000 cubic meters?
munitions.

Dover Maru Carrying 2700 tons of petroleum products.

Rakuto Maru carrying 106 passengers and 1800 tons of munitions, bombs.

Matsura Maru carrying 1800 tons of blank

and 2000 tons of blank. Nichtro Marn blanks.

3. (Badly garbled, gives route points).

4: (Noon positions:

Case 34. No. A-1 (Cont.)

24th - 32-53 North, 127-50 East. 25th - 31-06 North, 124-37 East. 26th - 28-37 Horth, 122-28 East. 27th - 25-50 North, 120-45 East. 28th - 22-55 North, 120-04 East. 5. 28th 1430 arrive blank.

GI COMMENT: ComBubPacFor informed about 0700 (-9) 25th. (NSS 24/2152 changes "Nichiro Maru" to Hora Maru in the 2nd para.; DTB 25 July Page 175-176 makes this correction).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

FROM: COLSUMPAC 25/0912 July TO: ALL SUBS COPYING IPM FOX INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR SANFISH X ULTRA X 6 POPLARS (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X - 900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 10 DATE 25TH) X MJAD 0637 (31-06 NORTH 124-37 EAST) ALGAROSA DRUQ 3428 (28-34 NORTH 122-28 EAST) PBYA 5045 (25-50 NORTH 120-45 EAST) X YOU ARE ONLY SUB IN CHINA SEA AT PRESENT TIME X COMSUSPAC NUMBER 80 Z

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sawfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 31, C-1-C-3.

Cese 35

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Resident Naval Officer 25/1145 July Keelung)(B)

TO:

(Oshima Defense Force)(B)
(Surface Unit)(C)
(Has a Detachment at Okinawa)(A)
(Coff Kure Naval District)(C)
(Surface Escort Force 1)(B)

"Unknown composition.

Part 3: Noon positions: 26th, 28-42N, 122-24 E. 27th, 31-02N, 125-28 E. 28th, 53-15N, 126-08 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC

26/0945 July

TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING NPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM GENE SANDS IE ANY FISH REMAINING X ULTRA X SERIAL 85 B FROM COESUEPAC X 1 OR MORE POPLARS (NERCHANTMAN) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X MINUS 900 (0500GCT) X PLUS 11 (26th) X DRUQ 4224 (28-42 N 122-24 E) ALGAROBA MJCA 0228 (31-02N 125-28 E) QBAS 1508 (33-15 N 128-08 E)

Case 35, (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sawfish

Phird War Patrol

No. C-I

Radio Reception: Last serial received: 41 Able.

No. 0-2

July 25

- 1905 (I) Signted convoy of 4 small AK's and 1 DD escort in Lat. 32-32N Long. 127-20 E on base course 050 speed 12 knots. Was unable to close to firing range though we got in to 2500 yds. on the escort.
- 2044 (I) Surfaced and commenced chase on course 050 T.
- 2237 (I) Abandoned chase when we reached point where we should have over-hauled them. Evidently they made a radical course change to about 120°T and passed south of Fukae Shima to Magasaki. Set course for Korean coast in northwest part of area.

July 27

O105 (I) Made radar contect at 2100 yds. on starboard bow in Lat. 53-09N, Long. 127-50K. Turned and put contact astern and increased speed to flank. Drew away slowly at 20 knots. When range chened to about 5500 yds. patrol boat opened fire with a small caliber deck gun but ceased fire after five shots. Not even close.

Case 35. No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0435 (I) Submerged 45 miles bearing about 080° T
- from Fukae Shima. 1135 (I) Sighted smoke of convoy in Lat. 32-32H Long. 127-41E. Commenced approach. Convoy consisted of 1 AK of about 7000 tons and 4 AK of from 2000 to 4000 tons and one DD escort, who was pinging. Picked out large AK as target but as we approached the firing point the target zigged away. The destroyer, however, held his course, presenting a small port angle. As I had been presenting a small angle to him, decided to shoot at him instead of at the AX which was at range of 2500 yds. Shifted set up and fired four torpedoes down throat of the destroys at range of 750 yds. and immediately start deep in case we missed. We didn't! torpedo hit 25 seconds after first one was fired with tremendous explosion. Thinking it may have been a premature I continued on to 300 feet and rigged for depth charge. Seven charges were dropped during next hour from the AK's, I came to periscope depth after one hour and the convoy had passed out of sight except for mast tops. Destroyer had not completely sunk. His stern was still out of water. Took pictures. At 1454 I stern of destroyer sunk.
- 1619 (I) Sighted Kawanishi 94 plane to northward.

Case 55, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1940 (I) Heard echo ranging to eastward. While searching for source, heard one aircraft bomb, close enough to shake us up but to do no material demage. Went to 100 feet end changed course.

Four more bombs - pinging stopped. 1953 (I)

2092 (I Sixth and last bomb.

2015 (I) Came to periscope depth - nothing in sight.
2050 (I) Surfaced and set course to southward.

With only two torpedoes aft remaining July 28 and the performance of one of them doubtful decided to depart area. Sent message.

Departed area.

ORIGINAL -IL January 1946

Case 36

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM: Unknown originator

23/1145 July 43

TNFO: "From Cinc 2nd Fleet.

The schedule of the 2nd Fleet (Atago
Takao (____), Ragara and Suzukaze
_____ bound for Yokosuka) being as here-inafter stated we will (meet up with ?) your force
the night of the 24th. At 1930 in 15-15 North,
151-40 East, course about 340, speed 20. At
1400, on 25th, in 32-55 North, 140-30 East."

GI COMMENT: Phoned to ComSubPacTor at 25/0225
(-9). Plot indicates position on
25th to be 21-25 North, 149-20 East,
following course 340 at 20 knots,
provided position for 24th is
correct.

Following for NEGAT.

Your 24/1606. Even if 1930 is taken for 23rd July, it would require a sustained speed approximately 30 knots for this unit to cover the distance between these positions. Request verification of dates and positions.

Case 36, No. A-1

OI COMMENT: Reference is quoted.

From Cinc 2nd Fleet. The schedule of the 2nd Fleet (Atago Takao Nagara and Suzukaze shound for Yokosuka) being as here-in-after a stated we will (meet up with?) your force the night of the 24th. At 1930 in 15-15 N, 151-40 E, course about 340, speed 20. At 1400, on 25th, in 52-55 N, 140-30 E."

Correction concerning NEGAT's 24/1606 and enswering BAKER's 25/0225. Last part of message should read " at 1930 on 22nd in 15-15 North, etc."

GI COMMENT: Text of NEGAT'S 23/1806 is quoted:
"From Cinc 2nd Fleet. The schedule of the 2nd
Fleet (Atago Ragara

| and Suzukaze Bound for
Tokosuka) being as here-in-after stated we
will (meet up with?) your force the night of the
24th. At 1930 in 15-15 North, 151-40 East,
course about 540, speed 20. At 1400, on 25th,
in 32-55 North, 140-30 East."

BAKER'S 25/0225 is quoted in part:
"Your 24/1606. Even if 1930 is taken for 23rd
July, it would require a sustained speed of
30 knots for this unit to cover the distance
between these posits. Request verification
of dates and positions."

ORIGINAL 11 January 1936

Case 36, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. E-1

FROM: COMBUBPAC

25/1011 July

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPH FOX

IMPO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS ULTRA FOR SKIPJACK AND STURGEON IP PASSING THROUGH VICINITY X 1 IRONWOOD (DESTROYER) X 047 PEANUT AND 2 EDITIONS 037 PEANUT X BLANK X PLUS 10 X MINUS 130 X PLUS 9 X THED 1540 (15-15 NORTH 151-40 RAST) AND BLANK X PLUS 10 S MINUS 700 X PLUS 12 X THAN 5530 (32-55 MORTH 140-30 RAST) X SERIAL 81 FROM COMBUBDAC

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Skinjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 15, C-12.

No. C-2

27 July

Patrolling eastern approaches to Tokyo Bay. SJ Radar out of commission. This is quite a blow as all traffic seems to move at night in this area.

Cese 36. No. C-2 (Cont.)

0109 (I) Sighted ship smoking heavily on westerly course bearing 085T -approximately 8 miles (Par F-12). Commenced tracking and maneuvered to keep up moon.
Target turned out to be moderate

sized patrol vessel, course 260, speed 9 knots. Hauled clear to

the south after getting too close. Sighted a second patrol vessel bearing 0258 [I] 110T, 23 miles. (Par. F-13) Attempted to clear to southwest but he kept forcing us west. His speed approximately 18 knots. Making full power, 17 knots

Beginning of morning twilight. 0303 [I]

0338 (I) Getting light. Submerged to periscope: depth and turned south.

Went deep, rigged for silent running. 0355 (I) Lost contact. Retired to eastward. 0423 (I)

0718 (I) Periscope observation. Sighted mast. of small ship (Patrol boat) on a northwesterly course bearing 228T distance about 10 miles. (Par. F-14). Cama to bearing of ship.

Only smoke in sight. This was first 0745 (I) of the pair encountered during night.

Lost contact. Commenced submerged (FI) 0080 patrol off southeastern approaches to Tokyo Bay.

Description of Contact

No. 13 Date 27 July

Time 0258 (I) Let. 34-329 Lat.

Long 140-49E Type 1 patrol ship

Initial Rengae 5080 yds. 110T Speed 16 knots

Contact Lookout

Remarks Pursued us at 18 knots.

Case 38. (Cont.)

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-4

On the average, good. No seriels Radio Reception:

were missed.

No. C-5

Heading back to, and in southern July 24-25. part of area. Departed area for Midway 25 July, 1943.

Patrolled vicinity 33 N, 141 E. July 27

Nothing sighted.

Surface cruising to Midway. July 23

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Cesa 37

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM: (Yokosuka Chief of 24/1320 July Staff)
TO: (Commander Chichijima Activity)

"Convoy #3724 (consisting of Mogemignwa Maru - Yamagiri Maru?) Seiko Maru escorted by the Fukue) departed NAA for PT at 1300 on 24th. Noon positions: 25th, 23-15 North, 143-30 East. 25th, 29-30 North, 145-35 East. 27th, 25-25 North, 147-20 East. 27th, 25-25 North, 147-20 East. 29th, 17-20 North, 150-40 East. 29th, 17-20 North, 152-15 East. 20th, 15-15 North, 152-15 East. 31st. 09-10 North, 153-20 East. Will pass through point "A" at 0300 on 1 August.

NEGAT COMMENT: Ship translated as "Tukue" is made of characters Fuku Saiwai and E Koo River. May be that "Tukkoo" is correct reading.

OT COMMENT: NAA is Yokosuka (CD).
PT is Truk (CD).
Phoned to Subs 1620 (I) July 25th.

No. A-2

FROM: (Yokosuka Chief of 724/1320 July Staff)

11 January 1948

Case 37. No. A-2 (Cont.)

TO:

(Commander Chichijima Activity)

*Convoy #3724 (Consisting of Mogamigawa - Yamagiri Maru?) Seiko Mara escorted by the Fukua) departed NAA for PT at 1500 on 24th, Noon positions: 25th, 33-15 North, 145-30 East, 25th, 29-30 North, 145-35 East. 27th, 25-25 North, 147-20 East. 28th, 21-20 North, 149-00 East. 29th, 17-20 North, 150-40 East. 30th, 13-15 North, 152-15 East. 31st, 09-10 North, 153-20 East. Will pass through point "A" at 0300 on I Angust.

MEGAT COMMET: Ship translated as "Fukue" is made of characters Fuku Salwai and E Koo River. May be that "Fukkco" is correct reading.

GI COMMENT: MAA Is Yokosuka (CD) PT is Truk (CD) Phones to Subs 1620 (I) July 25th.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COLBUBRAC

25/1817 July

-ALL SUES GUARDING NPM FOX

INE OF CINCPAC

PHEC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 37, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA X C89 AND O76 POPCORN I POPLAR

1 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X BLANK (COURSE
UNKNOWN) X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X MINUS
900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS-11 (DATE 26) X LSMQ5035 (29-30 N 145-35 E) ALGAROBA PBUT 2520
(25-25 N 147-20 EAST) FLWZ 2000 (21-20 N
149-00 E)

No. B-2

FROM: COLSUSPAC

27/0817 July

TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING HPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

POGY AND STEELHEAD GET THIS ULTRA X 063 PEANUT X 076 POPCORN X 1 POPLAR (MERCHANTSHIP TYPE UNKNOWN) X 1 LEMON (ESCORT) X BLANK (COURSE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X FLHZ 2000 (21-20 H 149-00E) ALGAROBA JTQQ 2040 (17-20 N 150-40 E) X GBYQ 1515 (15-15 M 152-15 E) TRIK 1020 (09-10 N 153-20 E) TONY DROPP MAY HE HORKING ON THIS CRACKERJACK PARTHER NORTH X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 91

C - Submerine Action Reports

U.S.S. PORT

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete.

Case 37. (Cont.)

No. C-5

- July 31 Surface patrol, to north of assigned area, on Empire-Truk routes.
- 0418 (K) Radar and sight contact on four ships to northeast, distance 10,000 yards. Started tracking on surface.
 - 0530 (K) With enemy masts just visible on eastern horizon from top of our periscope sheers, enemy apparently sighted us at range of about 25,000 yards, and challenged with searchlight. Opened out on surface and started end around chase.
 - 1235 (K) Reached position 30,000 yards ahead of convoy.
 - 1321 (K) Submerged on estimated track of convoy.

 1348 (K) Sighted smoke of convoy. Commenced approach. Convoy apparently changed base course. Unable to close to firing range. Observed three ships with one destroyer escort. Ships were:
 - (1) KANSAI MARU (XAV) OR KINUGASA MARU (XAV)
 - (2) KAMOGAMA MARU (XAV)
 - (3) Unidentified 5000 ton coal burning freighter-
 - 1805 (K) Surfaced in pursuit of convoy.
 1900 (K) Sent contact report
 - 1900 (K) Sent contact report 2120 (K) Radar and sight contact on convoy at 14,000 yards.
 - 2335 (K) In position 4000 yards off the track range 10,000 yards. Submerged to 40 feet and commenced approach.
 - 2350 (K) Went to 55 feet and used generated ranges, sound and periscope bearings. Visibility good, clear, starlight night, no moon.

Case 57; No. C-2 (Cont.)

August 1

- 0002 (K) Fired four torpedoes. Two hits (Torpex) in largest ship. Target screws stopped. Went deep to avoid escort. Cunfire until -
- OOI2 (X) When escort dropped two depth charges near firing point, then started supersonic search. Series of sharp explosions followed by very loud rumblings heard throughout the ship and lasted over 10 minutes. Noise sounded like an earthquake. This was terminated
 - 0058 (K) by a loud but dull, heavy explosion, as target presumably blew up and sank. It is believed that this target sank although sight evidence is lacking. Target was KAV KAUSAI MARU or KANUCASA MARU.
 - 0048 (K) Escort's screws stopped but echo ranging continued. Heard very light fast screws as of a motorboat in vicinity of escort.
 - Olso (K) Stuck comming tower out of water and went to bridge for a look. Escort was lying to, 4,000 yards astern, echo ranging, and apparently picking up survivors, Thought he sighted us, so went deep again.
- 0208 (K) Escort's screws started up. He dropped one depth charge, not close, and then opened out to southward.
- 0300 (K) Surfaced and cleared immediate area as escort was in sight on horizon about 10,000 yards.
- 0509 (K) Submerged. During forencon, area was searched by echo ranging and several distant depth charges were heard.

 Remained submerged during day. Patrolled Empire-Truk routes.

Case 57. No. G-2 (Cont.)

August 2 Surface patrol on Empire-Truck routes.

1200 (K) Set course for ULUL Island.

1305 (K) Sighted floating mine Lat. 12-25N

Long. 151-46 E.
2025 (K) Due to fuel situation set course for
Johnston Island. Sent dispatch
to ComSubPac.

No. C-3 Description of Contact

U.S.S. PORT

Second War Patrol

No. 6 Time 0418 (K) Data July 31 Lat. 13-56 N Long. 152-00 E

Types Convey of 3 ships

1 DD escort

Initial

Range 10,000 yds. Est.Course 155 Speed 9 kts.

Contacted SN R

Remarks Attacked largest ship IAV.
Two hits. Probably sunk.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War-Patrol

No. C-4

Redio Reception: See VII; Case 6, C-7.

(L time in this report is an error for K time, - 10 hours., Editors note)

Cese 37. (Cont.)

No. C-5

JULY 31

2000 (L) Lat. 10-14 N. Long. 152-50 H received.
Pogy's contact report, and altered
course to intercept convoy. As
dawn was breaking at

August I

OSOO (I.) Lat. 11-20N Long. 153-50E. Signted one AH with PC boat bearing 3300

I distance about 7 miles. Dove and conducted attack. As we went in it was evident freighter was stopped and PC boat was patrolling around it alternately pinging and listening. The target was smoking heavily and may have been demaged at

0704 (L) Sound heard the target sorews turning over and the next periscope observation confirmed the fact that the target was underway, angle on the bow 800 port. The escort was now dead ahead

of her. Swung to port and at 0706 (L) Heard one depth charge. At 0707 (L) Fired four torpedoes at a range of 1500 yds. 1250 port track. At

0708 (L) Heard two explosions corresponding to the second and third shots.

Could not observe target as we were below periscope depth and going down.

The screws stopped, however, and were not heard again. Started down, rigged for depth charge and at depth charges, none of which were too

rigged for depth charge and at

Heceived the first of a series of 10

depth charges, none of which were too
close. We were heavy and had to run
at 65 to 70 RPM to maintain our depth
and it was evident that the PC boat had
no trouble maintaining contact with us
at this speed. To help matters the
starboard sheft, which had been running
fairly quiet for the last few days,
started clicking again. At

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Casa 37, No. C-5 (Cont.)

J. 200 100

0750 (L) Sound reported loud crackling and crunching noises from the direction of the target and at

0802 (I The noises ceased. At-

Received the last salvo of depth 0805 (L) charges. We are convinced that the target sank at 0802, for although we were not contacted again during the remainder of the day, the escort remained in the vicinity and desultory depth charging was heard to the west of us as late as five o'clock in the efternoon. Desired to come up at this time, but as we were very. heavy and could not make it at 85 RPM, stayed deep as we were not sure that the escort had departed.

No. C-6 Description of Contact.

No., 6 Date I August

Time 0500 (L) Lat. 11-20H

long. 153-30E

Course 240°T

Speed - 0 to 10 Kts.

Type Taisyo Meru and PC boat freshly painted gray, goal posts buff, masta white.

- Confirmation

No. D-1

01/1037 Aug. (Mogent gawa Meru) -FROME

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 37, D-1 (Cont.)

FRCM: (unident ship)

INFO: (unident ship)

Mogamigawa Maru while proceeding in convoy was torpedoed by enemy submarine in position 153-18E, 11-08N at 2310 on the 51st and sank in 10 minutes. Saiko Maru blanks crew of above vessel and at 0600 while heading for Truk blanks. At 0610 she was struck in #4 hold by a torpedo and although flooding is (able to make EM) 11 knots.

NEGAT COMMENT: Above message is badly drafted.

Message start was a parently left
out and last portion is somewhat
vague. However the important
points involved are plain enough.

GI COMMENT: Mogamigawa Maru is a 7996 ton Saiko Maru is 4365 tons.

No. D-2

FROM: (Yokosuka Guard For. 02/0850 Aug.

TO: (Truk Base For 4)
(Truk Harbor Affairs
Sec. 4)
(Mortlock Comm. Unit)
(Truk 4th Mil. stores Sect.)
(Guard Div. 42)

INFO: (4th Fleet)

Case 37. No. D-2 (Cont.)

From Captain of Hogamigava Haru.

Please make arrangements (blanks) clothing, hospitalization (blank) survivors now being taken aboard the Fukue.

Unit	Officers	Hen	Requiring Hospitaliza- tion				
Mogamig Maru 552nd A	11	137 165		11 9			
802nd A Others		45 212 51971		0			

Remainder of the message badly garbled but appears to explain need for clothing by reason of sudden sinking.

GI COMMENT: Total of men should read 559 if figures for individual units are correct.

No. D-3

FROM: (Guard Force or 02/0840 Aug. 43
Yokosuka CofS)(C)

To: (Base Force 4, Truk) (C)
(Harbor Affairs Section

(Harbor Affairs Section 4, Truk)(B) (Combatant Ship)(B) (Guard Division 41)(C)

(In Rabaul z one July 7) (?)

Ratings Persons requirin

zation

Case 37, No. D-3 (Cont.)

INFO:

(Hilitary Stores Section 4) (A) (Ath Fleet)(b) (Combined Fleet) (B)

"Originator Captain Hogamigawa Haru Report of survivors that have been rescued and on board the Fukue: request that arrangements be made take care of patients requiring hospitalization.

(a) Unit. (Orderst b) Above rank warrant officer.

Ratings.

(d) Persons requiring hospitalization.)

	Above rank Warrant Officers			Persons rehospitali	
Mogamigawa Maru 552 Air Group 802 Air Group Other units	11. 4		137 165 45 212		11 928

Totali Officers, 27. Men.

GI COMMENT: Mogamigasa Maru torpedoed in position 11-08W, 153-18E at 2310 on 31st July and sank in 10 minutes.

No. D-A

FROM: TOS

01/1615 Aug. 43

"Submarine warning. At 2300, July 31 torpedo attack position 11-08%, 153-18E. Certain. At 1800, July 31, the Pogy sighted 3 freighters with 1 escort vessel GI COMMENT: on course 150 degrees in position 12-141, 152-553.

Casa 38

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM:

INTO:

23/1530 July 43-

(Makassar Local Transportation Section)

(In Balikpapan Area)

(Combined Fleet)

(Chief of Staff Kure)
(Balikmapan Fuel Depot #102)

"Moon positions 25th to 29th:

06-20 North, 142-20 Hast.

04-15 North, 137-30 East.

03-20 Morth, 132-15 East.

03-20 North, 126-45 East.

03-20 North, 121-30 East.

Arrive Tarakan at 1000 on 30th.

NECAT COMMENT: First part of this is unreadable but deals

with movements of fairly large convoy which arrives Saipan on 28th. Noon positions given above are for the Nichiei Maru and perhaps one other vessel which was to break off from convoy at 1000 on 24th, in position 7 degrees North, 148-15 East and proceed to Tarakan.

CI COLLENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1130 (-9)

ORIGINAL 11 January 1948

Case 38, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

-26/0825 July

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX

IMPO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL DISPATCH

BETRA X FOR HADDOCK OR MINGO IF STILL IN VICINITY X PAIR OF HIRCHES (TANKERS) TRAVELLING LICHT X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X MINUS 900 (0300 GCT) X PEUS 11 (26th) X CXEU 1530 (4 D2G NORTH 15 MIN 137 DEG 30 MIN EAST) ALGAROBA RQJH 2015 (3 DEG 20 MIN NORTH 132 DEG 15 MIN EAST) RGWE 2045 (3 DEG 20 MIN NORTH NORTH 126 DEG 45 MIN BAST) X COLSUBPAC SERIAL 84 X BLUE TULLIBRE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock Fifth War Patrol

No. C-I

See VII, Case 20, C-1-C-8.

8.3.3. M 120

First War Patrol

No. C-2

See VII, Case 20, E-2 and C-2-C-3.

Il Janury 1946

Case 39

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

DI under II heading.

FROM: Blank originator

. 25/0734 July 43

INFO; (Kure Cofs)

From Captain of Irako Chief of Staff.

(via #2 Channel) .*

Schedule of Irako Amatsukaze (Jand Urakaze) as follows:

1615, 25th, depart Truk for Kure. 1745, 25th, sortie via North Channel, course

2300, 25th, 08-35 North, 151-00 East. 0300, 25th, 09-35 North, 151-00 East. 0300, 27th, 12-15 Eorth, 146-10 East. 2000, 27th, 12-15 Horth, 142-30 East. 1300, 28th, 15-00 North, 140-05 East. 1930, 29th, 21-26 Horth, 138-25 East. 0530, lat, arrive ...

CH COMMENT: Phoned subs 1840 (-9) 25th.

Casa 39, (Cont.)

No. A-2

"From Commanding Officer of Irako (?)

Movements of Irako (?)
Amatsukaze, and Urakaze are as follows:
1615 July 25 depart Truk for Kure.
1745 July 25 sortie by North Channel, course 320°.
2300 July 25 08-35 North, 151-00 East.
0300 July 26, 09-blank North, 151-00 East.
0300 July 27, 12-15 North, 146-10 East.
2000 July 27, 12-15 North, 142(?)-30 East.
1300 July 28, 15-00 North, 140-05 East.
1930 July 29, 21-26 North, 138-25 East.
0530 1st (?) arrive blank
#2 Channel).

Info Chief of Staff (?)."

GT COMMENT: Heading is completely lacking and makes no mention of another part.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

26/1017 July 43

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TONY ROPP GETS ANOTHER ULTRA X NUMBER 86 C X 2 IRONWOOD (DESTROYERS) 1 BIRCH (TANKER) AND 033 PEANUT BADLY CRIPPLED X BLANK X MINUS 800 X PLUS 13 TEMA (15 DEG NORTH 140

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Cese 39; No. B-1 (Cont.)

DEC EAST) X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 150 X
PLUS 14 FLHV 2625 (21-26 DEG NORTH 138-25
DEC EAST) THEN THROUGH AFEA 7 AND AT PLUS
830 X PLUS 18 X JZJH (1433 (34-14 DEC
NORTH 152-35 DEC EAST) X LOOKS JUICY BUT
NOW SO89 POPCORN IN MY LAST MESSAGE TO YOU
MORE IMPORTANT X IT IS A BIG APPLE (SEAPLANE
TENDER) X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Saury

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-I

Radio Reception: Complete insofar as is known.
All schedules were copied.

No. C-2

July 30

2225 (I) Mede redar contact of three pips at 19000 yds. Sighted 2 large ships at 11000 yds. and DD escort at 10000 yds. Tracked on surface and determined base course to be 338 T, speed 13.2 knots, with 15 to 20 zigs on either side. Formation consisted of what appeared to be an AO with a CA about 1000 yds. astern. The DD was about 100, 2500 yds. on the starboard bow of the tanker. With the visibility conditions existing, a redar-periscope attack appeared feesible and at

Case 39, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 31

- 0303 (I) Submerged to conduct attack with
- target at 11600 yds. At

 0325 (I) with target about 4000 yds. distant,
 started to come to course 250°T
 for 90° starboard track with distance
 to track about 1700 yds. Lost depth
 control once during turn and put rudder
 amidships to regain it, resumed turn
- and lost control again. At
 0331 (I) Changed course to 250°T. Before
 periscope was out, sound reports
 showed targets passed firing bearing.
 Periscope out at
- 0334 (I) and at
 0338 (I) Sound reported bearing 180° relative.
 Through the periscope on the port
 quarter appeared a DD with a 0° angle
 on the box. We were rammed a very few
 seconds after the sound report. Two
 distinct jars were felt after the
 order to go deep and rig for depth
 charge attack. Retired to the east.
 No depth charges were heard. The
 known damages sustained at this time
 were: 1. Both periscopes out of
 - out of commission. Remained at 175
 feet to 200 feet all day and at
 2020 (I) Surfaced. Noted periscope shears bent
 30° from vertical to starboard with all
 equipment mounted thereon damaged.
 Decided to maintain patrol for the night
 and then return to base.

commission. 2. Leaks around packing gland to #2 periscope. #. Both radars

Case 30, No. C-2 (Cont.)

August 1

0403 (I) Set course for return track.

August 2

0902 (H) Sighted patrol boat on southerly course. Avoided by altering course to north.

No: C-3 - Description of Contact

Contact Date 7-30-43 Time 0225 (I) Lat 26-00M Long. I35-56B Course 338 ZZigzagging 15° rt and left of base crs. 13 to 25 ... 13.2 kts. Speed Description

I AO, 1 CA and 1 DD. AO & CA in column about 1000 yds. apart, CA astern, DD screening 2200 on stbd. bow of AO. Rammed by DD, Lat 27-03M Long. 135-27E.

CRIGINAL Il January 1946

25/2341 July

Case 40

A - Source of Intelligence

Ho. A-I

FROM: (Cinc Combined Fleet)

INFO:

"Combined Flast Dasopord # blank.

1. As of 30th July the -Yamato?) is assigned to main force and Unyo ...) and DesDiv 7 (Sazanami) are assigned to main body.

2. The main body will depart Western Inland Sea at 31st July and proceed to PT / the Unyo ... and Sazanami ... under command of Captain of Unyo. will join up at Point B (30-00 N, 136-00 E) at 0600 on August 1 / Scheduled to arrive PT on 5th August. Operations schedule and employment enroute are as given in separate message addressed only to units concerned.

GI COMMENT: PT - Truk (CD).
ComSubPacFor informed at 0212 (-9) 29th.
Another message from ComDesRom 2 said
Unyco would depart Yokosuka early
morning of 51st.

No. 4-3

FROM:

25/2342 July

Casa 40, No. A-2 (Cont.)

IMPO:

"Reference Combined Fleet SMS 252341.

To Operation schedule for main body.

(a) Route #1: /In absence of special orders to contrary route #1 (* will be used) / sortie from (19644 Naikai?) at 1500 July 31 Course 165. (* Pass through following points taking courses from each point as indicated)
(Positions are north and east).

DATE TIME POINT	HOITICON	COURSE	Prom :	Point/
2 August 0800 C 3 August 2100 D 4 August 1500 E 5 August 0000 F	30-00, 136-00 22-40, 138-56 12-15, 142-52 10-15, 147-57 20 miles south	160 Not 110 140 of Ulu	degrees degrees given degrees	3
5 August 0700 blank	Arrive North C	hannel.		
(b) Route 24 Fr	om Point C, co	urse 120	degree	33.
3 August 0600 G	19-20, 145-00	110	degrees	3
3 August 1700 H	18-12-148-14	165	degrees	3
5 August 0130 L	30 miles west blank, arrive l	of Lutke	e(?) Is:	Lands

CRIGINAL 1946

Case 40; No. A-2 (Cont.)

(c) Route 3. From Point H, course 155 degrees.

DATE TIME POINT POSITION COURSE /From Point/

5 August 0500 J Bearing 52 degrees Not given 80 miles from Shiko Island

5 August 1000 Arrive North Channel

2. Each blank force will conduct air combat exercises as follows using main body as target /in order, exercise number, time of execution, participating units/

EXERCISE NO. EXECUTE TIME PARTICIPATING UNIT

- (a) 1 0130 to 1500 1 Aug Air Flots 50 and 51.
- b) 5 1200 2 Aug to 1200

3 August Air Flot 21.

- (c) 7 0130 to 1500 4 Aug Not given.
 (d) Aircraft operating (> in these exercises) during daylight hours will cease their antisubmarine
- (e) Each tactical commander will promulgate a summarized plan (including frequencies to be used).

HEGAT COMMENT: Note that date for departure is now 31 July. Negat 261404 and paragraph 2 of Negat 202059 should be amended accordingly.

Baikai so frequently referred to in traffic may be the place of that name on western end of Shikoku at innerend Bungo Straits as well as Inland Sea. In this case if Maikai is correct for the group in question it must be the place and not the sea.

Other messages related this operation are being worked particularly Combined Fleet SMS 252341. **Asterisk in parens indicates translators insertion for clarity.

GI COMMENT: Essentially same as Hypo's version in 211612, 261624, 261638 and 262226.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 40, (Cont.)

Ho. A-3

FROM;

25/2342 July

(Air Basa Saipan Area)

(Associated Northern Force)

INTO:

"Ref: Combined Fleet SMS #252341.

(Radio

Intelligence) (C)

(Part 1). Hain body movements.

(Para a) Houte #I. (To be used if no blank).

Sortie from (unident place) (Haikai-Ed.) at 1500 July 31 om course 165 to Point "A" at 2000. (31-32 North, 132-56 East). Course 120 until 0600 August 1 in Point "B" (30-00 North, 136-00 East) thence om course 160 until 0800 August 2 in Point "C" (22-40 North, 138-56 East). At 2100 August 3 Point ("D?") (blank blank North blank - 52 East).) Comment: Estimated by plot 12-10 North, 142-52 East). Then course 110 until 1500 August 4 Point "E" (10-25 North, 147-57 East). Then course 140 until 0000 August 5 (?) in Point "F" 20 miles south of (Ulul Island?). Arrive North entrance 0700."

Cass 40, No. A-5 (Cont.)

Prom Point "G" course 120 until 0600 August 3
in Point "G" (19-20 North, 145-00 East)
then course blank until 1700 August 5 in Point "Ha"
(18-59 North, 148-14 East). Then course 165 until
0130 August 5 in Point "In - 30 miles
west of Rukutei Island.
Blank Forth Channel."

HYPO COMMENT: NECAT has value 2 August for group
In this message date for Point "H" is
written August 3 Nichi and group necessarily
becomes 1 August. Request check. Other dates
recovered in this message based on this 3 August
date. This lat part of 2.
HYPO working on 2nd part.

"HA Routs 3.

From Point H course 155 degrees August 5?)
0500 Point I (52 degrees 80 miles from Kajima (7))
1000 North Channel.

Part 2. Each force carry out air battle exercises using main body as target group (in order of operation number, date, units participating).

I. Operation #1.

2 August (0150?) until I500 Air Flot 50 and Air Flot 21.

RO Operation #5.
From noon August 2 until noon August 3.
Blank (unit) and 21st Air Flot.

HA Operation 7.

4 August | from 0130 to 1500 blank unit.

EI Planes participating in daylight operations (will carry?) out anti-sub patrols enroute.

HO Blank make advance report of details of plan

CRIGINAL Il January 1948

27/0042 July

Case 40. No. A-3 (Cont.)

HYPO COMMENT: This is second part first part of which reported in Hypo's 261612, 261624, 261638.

GI CONMENT: Para 2 of HEGAT's 202059 is quoted:
"Hain Body less Yamato?) will depart
Western Inland Sea for PT (Truk) on - date)."

CORRECTION: HSS 261941, HSS 261952; HSS 262005, and HSS 262019, gave a message from KAE & July 252342, which said:
"Hain Body would sortle from (19644 - Naikai?) at 1500 July 31
HEGAT requested COMB addressees to change HSS 261404 and HSS 202059."

B - Operational Dispatches

Ho. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC-

TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING

HPH FOX

SAURY: PADDLE, CINCPAC

INFO:

PAEC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

UITRA X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 89D X SACA OF PEANUTS CONTAIN-ING SEVERAL BATTLESHIPS X 1100 GCT X 31 JULY x 31-32

CRICINAL II January 1946

Case 40, Ho. B-1 (Cont.)

HCRTH 132-56 EAST X 2100 GOT X 31 JULY X 30-00 HORTH 136-CO EAST X 2300 GCT X 1 AUGUST X 22-40 HORTH 138-56 EAST X SAURY AND PADDLE PICK YOUR CAN SPOTS NORTH AND SOUTH RESPECTIVELY OF DR

Ho. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC

27/0848 July

TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING

HPH FOX

CINCPAC

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY and the contract of the contra

HORE ORDERS FOR PULLIBEE X ULTRA X SERIAL 90 X IT IS NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REACH AREA 15 A NOT LATER THAN DAWN AUGUST 4TH X IF YOU HISS CONTACT ON YOUR FRESENT HISSION YOU ARE AUTHORIZED DEPART THAT VICIBITY SUNSET 28 JULY X TAKE A LOOK AT MY SERIAL 89 D X NORE DOPE ON THIS OUTFIT LATER FOR YOU

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Saury

Seventh War Patrol

Ho. C-I

See VII. Case 39, C-2.

U.S.S. Paddle

First War Fatrol

Ho. C-2

Radio Reception: Generally good and complete.

No. C-3

July 31

1030 (K) Position 24-02-00H 144-37-00E. Sighted

Case 40, No. C-3 (Cont.)

dack house of small craft bearing 260°T.
Contact made by #1 periscope watch. It was a small trayler. Avoided detection by a detour to the south.

1321 (K) Submerged to routine all torpedces. 1931 (K) Surfaced. Obtained good navigational fix. Position 23-278 144-55-309.

August 1

C300 (K) Changed course to west. No morning stars.
Sky heavily overcast.

0950 (K) Cotained sun-sight.

1000 (K) Submerged.

1900 (I) Surfaced. No star sights possible.

August 2

COC5 (I) At D.R. position 22-40N 138-56 E. Commerced one engine patrol of triangular area about desired 0800 position. Sky overcast.

Occasional showers, clearing just before dawn and in time to obtain star sights.

OSOO (I) Obtained a good fix showing us to be 18 miles due south of desired OSOO position. Had experienced unusual set to south.

0502 (I) Changed course to 010°T at 15 knots to close 0800 position.

0522 (I) Changed course to 090 T at 15 knots.

0613 (I) Submerged for periscope patrol, assuming that further search was impracticable in view of expected air patrol and low clouds.

C830 (I) Heavy rain to southwest. Sky generally overcast. Light choppy smell. Numerous white caps. Occasional showers throughout the morning. Visibility variable from poor to good.

0840 (I) : Changed course to 330 T.

1155 (I) Sighted land or carrier based plane bearing

1156 (I) Plane lost in clouds. 1157 (I) Changed course to C90° T.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

Case 40. No. C+3 (Cont.)

- 1202 (I) Sighted bember bearing C44° T distant 6 miles. Both planes on a southerly course.
- 1300 (I) Occasional showers throughout afternoon.
- 1858 (I) Surfaced on course 090° T and commenced one engine (IO knots) patrol to eastward.

August 3

1205 (I) Position 22-20-30H 142-07-00E. Changed course to 0210T.

U.S.S. Tullibes

First War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 30, C-1.

No. C-5

August 4

Made daily training dives in period July 29 and August 4. Submerged half a day August 2 and all day August 3. Noted S.J. radar interference at OI50 (L) on August 3. S.J. contacts were reported several times during night periods. These looked like real contacts but faded and usually the O.O.D. could see a rain squall in the direction of the contact.

Case 41

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM:

26/2205 July

(Saipan Seaplane, Base) (C)

Case 41, No. A-I (Cont.)

Blanks.

(72813-July 27(?) at 1800 Bungo Channel blank. Thereafter course change point and noon positions as follows:

1200 - 28th - 29-10 North, 135-15 East. 1200 - 29th - 24-15 North, 138-30 East. 0230 - 30th - 22-40 North, 140-00 East. 0130 - 31st - 22- North, 147-00 East, 1930 - 31st - 19-40 North, -00 East, 1200 - 1st - 16-10 North, T51-00 East, 2230 - 2nd - 09-25 North, 152-40 East.

0600 - 3rd - at entrance to North Channel.

Turns for 16 knots making good 13. blank knots (?).

will require 450 tons fuel blanks.

ComSubPacFor at 1710 (-9) 27th. Hypo copy garbled. Ushio (DD) in accordance with Combined Fleet DesOpord # (was assigned as an escort ship on July 25th. Arrived Empire 7/24 in company with Unyo and Chuyo.

No- A-2

PROM: TOR

(Surface Escort Unit #2)

26/1406 July

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 41, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"Scheduls is changed as follows: Hoom positions: 27th, 05-52 Forth, 138-44 East. 28th, 09-03 North, 142-32 East. 29th, 09-33 North, 147-18 East. At 1730 on 29th in 09-33 North, 148-20 change course to 134.

At 0130 on 30th, southwest of - Olol Island?). At 13 blank blank pass through point "T".

At 1500, enter North Channel. Speed 12 knots."

HEGAT COMMENT: Something must be wrong with the noon position on 27th since it is impossible for him to reach the 28th noon position from 27th, position at 12 knots. Believe we have read text correctly however.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1300 (-9) 27th. HYPO 262152 reported same message.

Io. A-3

PROME

26/1406 July

(Surface Escort Unit #1)

"(Movement schedule amended as follows) . Hoom positions

27th, 05-52 North, 138-44 East, 28th, 09-03 North, 142-52 East, 29th, 09-33 North, 147-19-2 At 1730 July 29 blanks (5). At 0130 July 30, 13 miles southwest of blank, 1500 North Channel, Speed 12 knots.

* BAKER working on this.

Activities and Sylvery

GI COMMENT: HYPO 262125 and MEGAT 261605

Case 41, (Cont.)

No. A-4:

PROM:

26/1408 July

Surface Escort (C) (C)

"Schedule changed as follows: Noon posits:

27 July 05-52 H, 138(?)-44 E. 28 July 09-03 H, 142-52 E. 29 July 09-33 N, 147-18 E.

At 1730 29 July from posit blank -33 N, blank-20 blanks. At 0130 July 30 posit 13 miles southwest of blank pass through point "T" and arrive North Entrance-1500. Speed 12 knots."

B - Operational Discatches

No. B-1

FROM: CCHSUBPAC

28/0402 July

28/0743 July

TO: ALL SUBS COPYIED

NPM POX

INFO: - CINCRAC:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

ULTRA FOR SAURY BUT BOT TO INTERFERE WITH MORE IMPORTANT: JOBS X 045 POPCORN X BLANK X PLUS 6 PIT X MINUS 900 X PLUS 13 X ISNE 1015 (29-10 NORTH 135-15 EAST) ALGAROBA MCHY 1530 (24-15 NORTH 138-50 EAST) X SERIAL 95 G

No. B-3:

COMSTEPAC FROM:

ALL SUBS COPYING

HPM POL

STEELHEAD

POGY

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

Case 41, No. B-2 (Cont.)

STEELHEAD AND POGY GET THIS HONEY X ULTRA X 045
POPCORN X SPEED THROUGH WATER 16 X 0300 GCT X 1ST
X 16-10 N 151-00 E X SPEED THROUGH WATER 16 X 1530
GCT Z 2MD X 9-25 N 152-40 E X THEN HEADS FOR NORTH
GATE X FOLLOWING FOR STEELHEAD ONLY X 1 OR MORE
HERCHANTMAN (TYPE UNKNOWN) X COURSE 153.8 DECREES
X SPEED 12 X 0800 X 29TH X AND 8 HOURS IATER PASSES
SOUTHWEST OF ULUL ISLAND X SERIAL 96 FROM COMSUBPAC

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Saury

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 39, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

See VII, Case 37, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Sae VII, Case 24, C-1 - C-2.

Ho. C-4

See VII, Case 37, C-4 - C-6.

CRIGINAL II January 1946

28/0751 July

Case 42

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM: (Chown Maru) 28/1305 July TO: INFO:

(Davao Comm Unit)

ome shall depart Palao West Channel at 1500, 28th cm course 256, speed 9.5. 1200, 29th arrive position 06-15 N, 131-37 E.*

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CONSUBPAC

ALL SUBS GUARDING

HPM FOR

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

COMSUBPAC SENDS ULTRA TO MINGO I SERIAL 97 FROM COMSUBPAC X I MERCHANTMAN (TYPE UNKNOWN) WHICH IS POSSIBLY 162 POPCORN X COURSE 75 X SPEED 9 I COCO GCT X 29TH X 6-45 NORTH 151-57 E I REACHES THE GATE YOU GUARD 21 HOURS LATER X ALSO NOTE HADDOCK REPORTS 2 LARGE TANKERS ONE OF WHICH HE DAMAGED HEADING YOUR WAY FROM HOLH (05-00H 159-00 E) AT 1600 GCT 26TH COURSE 310 SPEED 12

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Hingo

Pirst War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 20, C-2.

ORIGINAL II January 1946

Case 43

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM

25/1650 July

(4th Fleet) (B) (Haval District CofS Kure) (B)

"Convoy FU #blank. Hibi Maru, unident Group BAS. Matsue Maru

as far as the 10 degree North latitude line. Course for entering Hayasul Seto, "A-2". Depart the Western entrance at 1530 the 25th.

Point A. 14-00 135-00 Point A, 14-00, 136-00. Point B, 21-30, 138-00.

Point C, 25-00, 138-00.

Point D, 28-00, 137-00.

Point E, 31-30, 134-00.

(No latitude or longitude given, but assums to be North

and East). By way of above points, arrive Pukushima at 1030, -27 July).

Moon positions 26th to blank (2 August).

10-10, 134-35, 13-10, 135-40, 16-15, 136-00,

19-77, 136-45.

22-10, 138-00.

25-20, 137-55. 28-20, 136-40.

30-50, 134-35. A group for Ujima - B Group for Yokosuka, both without (possibly escort)."

Case 43, Ho. A-1 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Received in MSS 262250, which had latitude on 29th as 19-15. ComSubPacFor informed at 0735 (-9) 27th.

No. A-2

FROM: TO:

(4th Pleet) (CofS Kure) (Patrol Boat: #46)

"FU Comyoy "A" ships: Mataue Haru. I, Hibi Maru (HI, NICHI AND BI, UTSUKUSHI) Koyu Maru -unident ship) Hofuku Hamu?).

as 10°. Will depart West Channel at 1530, 25th, course AZ entering Hayasui Seto.

Point A-14-00, 136-00. Point B 21-30, 138-00. Point C 25-00, 138-00. D 28-00, 137-00. E 31-30, 134-00. Arrive blank Island blank date.

Noon positions 26th - 2nd August:

10-10, 134-35.

13-10, 135-40. 16-15, 136-00.

19-15, 136-45.

22-10, 138-00.

25-20, 137-55.

28-20, 136-40.

30-50, 134-35.

Heither "A" ships going to Ujina nor ship) going to blanks."

-unident

GI COMMENT: HYPO had a similar translation of this, which had previously been reported to ComSubPacFor at 0735 (-9), 27th. Latitude on 29th was 19- in HYPO's copy. ComSubPacFor informed at 1150 (-9) of MEGAT's posit of 19-15 for the 29th.

II January 1946

28/0758 July

Case 43 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

Ho. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC TO: ALL SUBS COPYING

NPH FOX

IMPO: CIMCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

HORE WORK FOR TONY DROPP X ULTRA FROM COMSUBPAC HUMBER 98 H X ABOUT 6 MERCHANTMEN (TYPE UNKNOWN) INCLUDING 229 POPCORN X UNKNOWN SPRED X UNKNOWN COURSE X TIME 0300 X DATE 31 JULY 25-20 N, 137-55 E POSITIONS AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY ARE AS FOLLOWING: 28-20 N 136-40 E, 30-50 N, 134-35 X POSSIBLY NO ESCORT

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Saury

Seventh War Patrol

No- C-I

See VII, Case 39, C-1 - C-3.

Case 44

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

[(Air Activity near Saipan) (C).

27/1702 July

TO: IMPO:

(4th Fleet) (B) (Base Force #4) (C)

*Genvoy #37 blank (Koogyo Haru Too blank

Case 44, No. A-I (Cont.)

Maru), and depart Yokosuka at 1700
July 27, for Truk. Noon position July 28 through
August 3 (37008).
32-00 North, 139-22 East.
27-30 North, 139-00 East.
23-05 North, 139-46 East.
18-54 North, 141-46 East.
15-12 North, 144-12 East.
11-34 North, 146-38 East.
C8-06 North, 149-00 East.
At blank time 5 August pass 8 miles North of Point R."

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1912 (-9) 28th.

No. A-2

FROM: MEKESO (Yokosuka 27/1702 July Cofs)
TO: CSA 7
INFO: HIA 3 (4th Fleet)
CO 7
WIHO I
MEHA IL
NOTA 12

#37 blank Convoy /Kogyo Maru?). To blank Maru, and blank Maru (__) escorted by /depart Yokosuka at blank CO, July 27 for Truk. Moon positions (July 28 to August 3): 32-00 H, 139-22? E. 27-blank N, 139-00 E. 23-05 H, 139-46 E. 18-54 H, blank-46 E.

15-12? N, 144-12 E. 11-34 N, 146-blank E. 08-06 N, 149?-00 E. Blanks.

BAKER COMMENT: Baker has only I copy of despatch. Cannot get minutes of Latitude for July 29. Will continue work on message.

(GI COMMENT: HYPO 281136 July version more complete and information given to ComSubPac 1912 (-9) 28th.

ORIGINAL 11 January 1946

Case 44 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC

29/0928 July

PO:

POGY

STEELERAD

INFO:

CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ANOTHER ULTRA FOR POGY AND STREIHEAD X SERIAL 2
FROM COMSUBPAC X CONVOY X 0300 GCT X 1 AUGUST X
TERP 1212 (15-12 NORTH 144-12 EAST) X POSITIONS AT
SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY ARE AS FOLLOWS: WEJY
3438 (11-34 NORTH 14638 EAST) KINZ 0600 (08-06 NORTH
149-00 EAST) X WISH EACH OF YOU WERE THINS

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

Ho. C-I

SEX VII, Case 37, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

Bo. C-2

August 3

During morning twilight at

0403 (L) Latitude 9-25 N, Longitude 152-39 E sighted

what at first appeared to be a bright star

on horizon. It appeared to come closer,

however, and just as we made it out to be a

plane showing running lights and a search-

Case 44, No. C-2 (Cont.)

light, it fired a green rocket, and we dove. We bembe were dropped and as it was still dark we were not sure that we were seen.

Decided to make another sweep in the vicinity of Ulul Island before leaving area and headed in that direction. At

August 4

1252 (L) Latitude 08-42 N, Longitude 151-26 E
Sighted EAST FAYU ISLAND bearing 222 T.
distance eight miles and passed it abeam to
starboard.

Case 45

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-I

FROM:

28/1000 July

INFO: (Palao Guard Division 43) (4th Fleet)

From Captain of - unident Nan of War). For information to Palao Embarkation Commander.

The assault force convey, - Nansei Maru?) and Nissho Maru (). Speed 13 knots/ will operate as follows:
Depart Ambon at 1700 on 28th. Moon positions:
29th, 01-36 S, 129-32 E.
30th, 01-46 M, 132-30 E.
31st, 06-24 M, 133-43 E.

Arrive Palao at 1000 on 1st."

Case 45, No. A-1 (Cont.)

HEGAT COMMENT: This is an army outfit.

GI COMMENT: Information given to ComSubPac at 290750 (-9)

B - Operational Dispatch

Ho. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC

29/0937 July

TO: HINGO INFO: CINCPAC

PRES: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

ULTRA FOR HINGO FROM COMSUBPAC SERIAL 3 X 2 TRANSPORTS X 0500 GCT X JULY 30 X WR JH 4630 (01-46 NORTH 132-32 EAST) X ALGAROBA X VTBU 2443 (06-24 NORTH 133-43 EAST)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Mingo

First Har Patrol

Ho. C-1

See VII, Case 20, C-2 - C-3.

Case 48

A - Source of Intelligence

Ho. 4-1

FROM: (Truk Base Force #4)

24/1735 July

Case 45, No. A-1 (Cont.) (Saipan Air Base) (Chichijima Comm Unit) (Yokosuka Haval District Commander) (Yokosuka Defense Force Commander) (Chief Transportation Section (4th Fleet) (1st Section Naval General Staff) (Chief of Staff Kure Mayal District) (Yokosuka Local Transportation Section) (Vessel) Chihaya Maru (] and blank TSU Harri escorted by Yugiri Blanks. Noon positions 25th to 1st:

Blanks. Noom positions 25th to 1st 25th, 10-07 North, 149-55 East. 26th, 13-18 North, 147-43 East. 27th, 16-16 North, 145-56 East. 28th, 20-15 North, 145-blank East. 29th, 23-34 North, 142-blank East. 30th, 27-24 North, 141-20 East. 31st, 30-55 North, 140-22 East. 1st, 34-49 North, 139-32 East.

NEGAT COMMENT: Something peculiar about the position for the 29th, but the noon positions which are yet to be reached look very good.

GI COMMENT: COMSUBPAC informed by phone at 0505

Case 46, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSTBPAC

30/1901 July.

TOE

SKIPJACK CINCPAC ALL SUBS COPYING HPM FOX

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

ULTRA FOR SKIPJACK X 2 HERCHANTHEN (TYPE UNKNOWN) 1 DESTROYER X 0300 GCT X 31ST 30-55 N 140-22 E ALGAROBA 54-49 N 139-52 E X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

Ho. C-I

Radio Reception: See VII Case 15, C-12.

No. C-2

July 31

Patrolling southeastern approaches to

1252 (I) Sighted large patrol vessel or trawler (Par. F-13), bearing 237 T 6 miles. As it was at first believed he might have been a small freighter, commenced a submerged approach.

I325 (I) Ship definitely identified as trawler or large patrol boat. Broke off approach. He passed out of sight around the northern end of Miyake Shima.

Case 46, No. C-2 (Cont.)

August 1

Continued patrolling southeastern approaches to Tokyo Bay east of Ilu Shoto. The SJ Radar is permanently out of commission.

August 2

Shifted patrol to northward to cover eastern approaches to Tokyo Bay.

0822 (I) Sighted patrol vessel bearing 070 T. 4 miles, on westerly course. (Par. F-16). Avoided.

Sighted four engine bomber bearing 210 true 2 miles (par G-2).

August 3

Patrolling off shore in vicinity of Katsuura Wan.

0759 (I) Sighted large plane, type unidentified bearing C40 7 5 miles on southeasterly course (Par G-6).

Sighted four engine patrol plane bearing 1545 (I)

115 T 3 miles, on westerly course (Par G-7). Sighted distant plane bearing 348 T. 1633 (I) miles on westerly course.

Ho. C-3

Description of Contact

TOR Timet 1252 (I) July 31. 34-01 Latitude: Longitude: 139-44 large PG or Travler Type(s) 6 mi. 237(T) Initial Range: 330 Course: 10 mots Speed: How Contacted: Periscope

Casa 47

A - Source of Intelligence

INFO;

No. A-I

FROM: (Chief of Staff, Yokosuka)

30/2048 July

(4th Fleet)

"Convoy #3731 consisting of - Lyons Maru?,
Shinyubari Maru | and - Taian Maru?,
escorted (to NAA) by - unident ship, will depart NAA at 1200 on 31st for PS. Noon positions:

(lst to 6th)
Aug. 1, 32-52 North, 139-40 East.

Aug. 2, 29-50 Horth, 140-35 East. Aug. 3, 26-55 Horth, 142-00 East. Aug. 4, 23-50 North, 142-45 East. Aug. 5, 20-40 North, 143-50 East.

Aug. 6, 17-40 North, 144-50 East."

HEGAT COMMENT: Parenthetical "to NAA" preceding the escorting vessel does not make any sense but there it is

GI COMMENT: HYPO'S translation of this phoned at 0815 (-9) July 31 to ComSubPacFor.

GI COMMENT: MAA is Yokosuka (CD) PS is Saipan (CD)

B - Operational Discatch

PIKE

No. B-I

FROM: COMSUBPAC TO: ALL SUBS COPYING HPM FOX PADDIR . POLLACK

30/2206 July

Case 47. No. B-1 (Cont.)

IMFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRICRITY

POLIACX GETS A JCB POSSIBLY ASSISTED BY PADDIR AND PIKE X ULTRA X SERIAL 6 FROM COMSUBPAC X PECAN(CONVOY) X BLANK X BLANK X HINUS 900 X HINUS 14
(C300, 1 AUGUST) X TMIH 5240 ALGARCBA (32-52 NORTH, 139-40 EAST) ISHA 5035 (29-50 NORTH, 140-35 EAST)
RDSD 5500 (26-55 NORTH, 142-00 EAST) TTSD 5045 (23-50 NORTH, 142-45 EAST) WOOT 4050 (20-40 NORTH, 143-50 EAST) JTSP 4050 (17-40 H, 144-50 EAST) X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pollack

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Throughout the patrol was entirely satisfactory and complete.

Ho. C-2

July 31

1606 (K) Made battle surface and fired all gums.

August 2

0412 (I) Dived.

August 3

0432 (I) Dived. 1859 (I) Surfaced.

August 4

0430 (I) Dived.

Case 47, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1014 (I) Surfaced and headed for Sofu Gan to fix position.

1432 (I) Sighted Sofu Gan.

1452 (I) Dived and proceeded to close rock submerged.
1919 (I) Surfaced and closed Sofu Gan to 10,000 yards
to tune SJ radar.

August 5

0420 (I) Dived. 1325 (I) Surfaced.

Made rader contact dead shead at 4100 yards; mothing in sight. Turned away to commence tracking. Rader showed definite interference from an outside source indicating the presence of another rader on the same frequency. The range opened rapidly indicating that the contact had also turned away. Turned toward; but contact was lost at 6100 yards and could not be regained. Considered it possible that this might have been another one of our own subs.

8 feugust

0450 (I) Dived.
0850 (I) Sighted two freighters on course 000 T.,
bearing 0840 T., range 12,000 yards. Waited
until freighters were out of sight and at

1020 (I) Surfaced to give chase.

1036 (I) Signted three ship convoy on course 200 T., bearing 340° T., range 20,000 yards. As we were in a much better position to get in on this group, gave up the chase on the two freighters and commenced maneuvering to obtain position shead of the three ship convoy.

1336 (I) Dived and commenced submerged approach.

Preighters appeared to be about 1200 yards apart, with the second in column about 1200 yards apart, with the second in column slight on the starboard quarter of the leader, and the third on the port quarter still further

Case 47, No. C-2 (Cont.)

astern. The formation was sig-zagging from 15 to 40 degrees at intervals of five and six minutes. No escorts in sight. Leading freighter was tentatively identified as being similar to the AMAGISAN MARU listed on page 123 of ONI 208-J. It appeared to be the most important target. The other two freighters were not identified but appeared to be of about 5,000 tons.

- 1440 (I) Coming in for a 60° track on the leading freighter when it zigged toward, leaving us about 300 yards from the track. Turned away and at
- 1446 (I) Fired two stern tubes at leading freighter on 126 track at a range of 800 yards. Missed. Commenced swinging left to get the second freighter with the bow tubes.
- 1451 (I) Depth charge exploded, not too close, while we were still turning at 80 feet. Came to periscope depth and found that we were about 600 yards abeam of the second freighter. This ship was clearly seen to be towing a heavy cable similar to those used by our magnetic mina sweepers except that it seemed to be towing much deeper. Shortly after the periscope was raised she commenced blowing her shistle. Took a quick look around and discovered a DR escort on our starboard quarter coming in. The escort must have been trailing the convoy and masked by the freighters, as I had been unable to see it previously. We did not have time to turn for a straight bow shot at the second freighter and the set up did not look good for a large angle shot, so went to deep submergence and rigged for depth charge. Two sets of high speed screws were heard indicating the presence of a second escort which had not been sighted. Echo ranging was heard from one escort, probably the DE; but much to my surprise no further depth charges were dropped We were, however, under a sharp negative temperature gradient as indicated by the Bathythermograph; so undoubtedly the escorts were

Case 47, No. C-2 (Cont.)

unable to pick us up.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No: Time: 0850 (I) Date: August 6 Latitude: 29-03 N. Longitude: 141-12 E. Type(s) 2-5000 T. AKS Initial Range: 12,000 Course: 000° T Course: Speed: 8 knots. How Contacted: P Romarks: Out of range. Surfaced and gave chase.

No Time: 1036 (I) Data: August 6 Latitude: 29-10 N. Longitude: 141-00 E. Type(s) 1-7000 T+ AK 2-5000 T. AKS 1-DR 1-PC 20,000 210 .T Initial Range: Course: 10 knots. Speed: . How Contacted: SD Sighted while chasing contact No. 2. 7,000 ton AK similar to Amagisan Maru. Remarks: Other two AK's not identified. DE appeared to be fairly new ship with sing! stack and destroyer lines. Made

U.S.S. Paddle

attacks #1 and 2 on 7,000 ton AK.

First War Patrol

Casa 47, (Cont.)

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Generally good and complete.

No. C-5

August 2

- coos (I) At D.R. position 22-40N 138-56 E. Commenced one engine patrol of triangular area about desired 0800 position. Sky overcast.

 Occasional showers, clearing just before darm and in time to obtain star sights.
- O500 (I) Obtained a good fix showing us to be 18 miles due south of desired 0800 position.
 Had experienced unusual set to south.
- O502 (I) Changed course to O10°T at 15 knots to close C800 position.
- 0522 (I) Changed course to 090°T at 15 kmots.
- 0613 (I) Submerged for periscope patrol, assuming that further search was impracticable in view of expected air patrol and low clouds.
- OSJO (I) Heavy rain to southwest. Sky generally cvercast. Light choppy swell. Numerous white caps. Occasional showers throughout the morning. Visibility variable from poor to good.
- 0840 (I) Changed course to 330 T
- 1155 (I) Sighted land or carrier based plane bearing 121-30 T on horizon.
- 1156 (I) Plane lost in clouds.
- 1157 (I) Changed course to 090° F.
- 1202 (I) Sighted bomber bearing 044° T distant 6 miles Both planes on a southerly course.
- 1300 (I) Occasional showers throughout afternoon.

 Heavy rain at 1515 (I). Visibility variable.
- 1858 (I) Surfaced on course 090° T and commenced one engine (10 knots) patrol to eastward.

August 3

- 1205 (I) Position 22-20-30 H 142-07-00 E. Changed course to 021 T.
- 1412 (I) Position 22-47-00 H 142-18-00 E. Changed course to 000° T.

Case 47. No. C-5 (Cont.)

August 4

- 0055 (I) Look-out and OOD simultaneously picked up cdor of stack gases on southeasterly bearing.
- 0058 (I) Changed course to 135 T.
- 0432 Made trim dive.
- 0446 (I) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol, searching with #1 periscope.
- 2000 (I) Changed course to west to pass between Kita Io Shima and Io Shima of Ogasawara Gunto group. SJ radar picked up Kita Io Shima (2631 ft.)
- 2320 (I) at approximate range of 45,000 yds.

August 5

Slow speed on auxiliary engine during night to save fuel

August 6

- 1024 (I Submerged to routine all torpedoes.
- Surfaced and continued one engine speed patrol on course for area.

August 7

- Changed course to 110 T. Sea building up 0500 (I) during the morning from the east. Heavy swells at 1200 I.
- 1225 (I) Increased to two engine propulsion because of heavy seas.
- Position 27-41N 137-14E. Sighted ship by 1300 (I) #1 periscope on horizon bearing 072 T.
- 1303 (I) Ship in sight determined to be a submarine.
- 1304(I)Submerged and closed track on northerly course. 1326 (I) It is a U.S. Submarine on a westerly course.
- 1328 Opened range on course 180 T.
- Surfaced. Submarine in sight only from #1 1404 (periscope. Set course 106 T.
- 1909 [1] Commenced search on base course 353 T.

Case 47. No. C-5 (Cont.)

August 8

Find increased during morning. Mcderately heavy sea by late afternoon. Visibility remained good although sky usually overcast. 1745 (I) Changed to course north.

U.S.S. Pike

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: Generally good on the higher frequencies

No. C-7

August 3

0522 (L) Made trim dive.
1525 (L) Sighted single wing unidentified airplane bearing 080° T, distance approximately 4 miles. Submerged to 120 feet. Lat. 24-28 N. Long. 155-31 E.
1854 (K) Surfaced.

August 4

0245 (K) Radar contact bearing 337 T, distance 10,000 yards. Target identified as Marcus Island. Turned to course 160° T, to open range.
0412 (K) Submerged. Closed island.

O611 (K) Sighted radio towers on Marcus Island bearing 350° T, distance 12 miles. Conducted submerged patrol off south coast of Marcus Island. One medium size tanker and one small freighter were discovered at the pier on the middle of the south coast.

1800 (K) Sighted armed trawler patrolling off south coast of Marcus Island. Increased smoking noted on tanker at pier.

1905 (K) Tanker with small unidentified escort cleared the pier and headed restward in twilight.

Set course 2900 T, to obtain trailing position

Casa 47, Ho. C-7 (Cont.)

when ships cleared the southwest point of Marcus Island. Too dark for accurate submerged approach.

1950 (K) Surfaced about 7,000 yards astern of tanker and commenced tracking and battery charge.

Night dark, partly overcast; visibility with binoculars 6,000-8,000 yards. Used radar and visual bearing tracking and maneuvered to reach tankers starboard bow. Tanker and escort were zigzagging on base course 290° T. at 8.5 knots.

August 5

- 0245 (K) Battle stations. Commenced surface approach on tanker.
- 0304 (K) Fired 3 torpedoes from bow tubes from position on starboard beam of tanker, about 1,500 yards. Lat. 24-37 N., Long. 152-45 E.
- O305 (K) Three explosions observed on tanker. Tanker fired yellow flare from stern and shell from stern gum. Escort appeared from opposite bow of tanker blinking signal light rapidly and firing promiscously. PIXE reversed course to the left and retired at maximum speed on 4 main engines. Tanker was observed sinking with bow in the air.
- 0307 (K) Radar lost contact on tanker.
- 0324 (K) Secured from general quarters. Proceeding in easterly and then southerly directions to clear attack area.
- 0431 (K) Submerged. Continued on course 180° T submerged - All hands catching up on lost alsep.
- 1915 (K) Surfaced. Set course 165° T at maximum cruising speed.

August 6

O607 (K) Submerged. Proceeding at 3 knots submerged.
Unable to fix position since leaving Marcus
due to overcast sky.

Case 47, No. C-7 (Cont.)

- 0738 (K) Breached with comning tower hatch clear of water to obtain sum line for verifying longitude. Changed course to 180° T.
- 1308 (K) Sighted Japanese converted aircraft carrier of KASUGA class escorted by one FUBUKI class destroyer bearing 180° T, distance approximately 16,000 yards, steering in northerly direction.
- 1315 (K) Went to battle stations. Commenced submerged approach. Target making high speed, 20-22 knots, zigzagging radically.
- 1350 (K) Rigged ship for depth charge attack. Hade ready bow and dack tubes. Planned to fire deck tubes on NK 8 angle solver bearings, bow tubes with TDC, white light method.
- 1356 (K) Fired #7 deck tube on incorrect firing bearing Shifted immediately to bow tubes and fired 4 torpedoes by "white light method" followed by #8 deck tube on a MK 8 angle solver firing bearing. Firing range 2,200 yards. Lat. 21-03 N., Long. 153-51 E.
- 13572(K) Heard two distinct explosions 14 seconds apart. (Some personnel reported hearing a third explosion about 30 seconds after the first one). Heavy firing from guns of carrier directed at periscope. Shells exploding very close. Made ready stern tubes.

 Destroyer observed on the port beam heading for periscope at high speed, range 1,700 yards. Ordered deep submergence (240 feet).
- 1400 (K) First depth charges went off on port quarter, estimated range 400 yards.